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Education research continues to struggle with how to characterize students’ 
engagement in the doing of science. Too often, educators and researchers reduce 
doing science to learning particular facts and explanations, or participating in 
narrowly-defined, de-contextualized ways of reasoning and arguing. In this 
dissertation, I review prominent work that attempts to characterize students’ 
engagement in one aspect of doing science—seeking coherence. By seeking 
coherence, I mean trying to make information “hang together” in meaningful, 
mutually consistent ways. Using examples from a variety of science classrooms, I 
show that these prominent approaches fail to provide substantive accounts of 
students’ work to form connections between information. To address those 
weaknesses, I develop, refine and illustrate an alternative perspective on coherence 
  
seeking in science education, one that emphasizes what information students are 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“The ability to relate and to connect, sometimes in odd and yet striking fashion, lies at 
the very heart of any creative use of the mind, no matter in what field or discipline.”    
—George J. Seidel 
1.1 Introduction 
 Making connections is a fundamental part of human nature. “Connexions”, in 
Hume’s (1910) language, are absolutely central to our ability to function in the world. It 
is through our ability to make connections that we can use our prior experiences to make 
predictions about the future. In a linguistic sense, the act of verbalizing or interpreting 
even a single sentence requires finding ways to connect ideas together, and ideas to 
words (Stevenson, Knott, Oberlander, & MacDonald, 2000). Connections are so 
important that the presence of gaps or mismatch between our ideas may lead us to severe 
psychological discomfort (Festinger, 1957; Wilson, 2002).  
 Despite evidence that humans continuously seek to connect information in the 
world around them, educators continue to express concern that students are not making 
these connections in science class. Education researchers and practitioners alike lament 
that students see science as “a heap of disconnected facts" (Lerner, 2000, p. 288)—that 
students often fail to make connections, or to seek coherence, in science (Covitt, 
Gunckel, & Anderson, 2009; National Research Council, 2007; Nordine, Krajcik, & 
Fortus, 2010; Songer, 2006). 
 And yet, we know that students can seek coherence. Students' nascent abilities to 
find and reconcile inconsistencies (Berland & Lee, 2010; Engle & Conant, 2002; 





relationships between information via analogies and explanations (May, Hammer, & 
Roy, 2006; Kelly & Crawford, 1997; Sandoval, 2003; Warren, Ballenger, Ogonowski, 
Rosebery, & Hudicourt-Barnes, 2001) are well-documented. These abilities constitute a 
rich foundation from which students might develop ways of seeking coherence often 
identified as characteristic of more experienced scientists (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; 
Hammer, 1995; Thagard & Nowak, 1988). 
 Some work attributes the discrepancy between the studies that say children can 
seek coherence, and the studies showing they do not, to poorly designed and fragmented 
curricula (Nordine et al., 2010). But what if the discrepancy is largely a matter of 
perspective? When researchers and teachers comment on student thinking, we tend to 
notice the inconsistencies students ignore, the information they fail to relate, and the 
connections they do not make. We then make the problematic generalization that because 
students are not making particular connections, they are not seeking coherence at all. 
Really, we mean they are not connecting information together in the ways that we would 
expect or desire: 
The arguments in favor of the position that children are self-contradictory and 
inconsistent often do not take into consideration that what may appear as 
contradictory and inconsistent from the adult or expert point of view may not be 
contradictory from the point of view of the child. (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, p. 
580)     
 
 This tendency to look only for particular kinds of coherence seeking has limited 
the field from developing more nuanced interpretations of coherence seeking as it occurs 
in the classroom. In order to fill this gap, and begin to provide a more nuanced account of 
coherence seeking, I adopt a perspective that looks closely at the information students are 





information do students try to connect together? And what are the connections that they 
try to make? 
1.2 Research Questions 
 At the outset of this study, I had hoped to use existing frameworks for coherence 
to build accounts of coherence seeking in science classrooms. However, when I began to 
look at classroom data, I found current approaches for looking at and talking about 
coherence in the science classroom largely unsatisfactory. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
these approaches left out much of the nuance and the dynamics of students’ coherence 
seeking. Thus, I decided to refocus my dissertation on creating an alternative perspective 
that considers coherence seeking as:  
- a dynamic, ongoing, and active process, emphasizing coherence seeking rather 
than the resulting coherence between ideas 
- having multiple, context-dependent meanings determined by participants, 
teachers, and researchers 
 My dissertation tells the story of how I constructed and refined this perspective. 
Some of these refinements were made in response to theoretical or philosophical 
dilemmas—for example, making claims about where coherence seeking “lives.” But 
more importantly, I tell the story of refining my perspective in response to data, as I try to 
build accounts of coherence seeking in my participant classrooms. In each account, I 
consider:    






With respect to the first two parts of that question, the focus is on the “what” of 
coherence seeking. What kinds of information do students try to fit together? What 
connections do students make between this information? What tensions arise as students 
determine what information should be connected, how, and for what purpose? These 
questions are largely descriptive, but they begin to highlight aspects of coherence seeking 
that to this point have been overlooked by the literature.  
 Moving beyond just description, I also ask: To what end(s) do students seek 
coherence? I consider the question of ends from the students’ perspective, trying to make 
sense of what purposes and reasons students might have for pursuing particular kinds of 
connections, in particular moments, in science class. Though I intentionally distinguish 
these claims from the purposes that expert scientists and educators might see in students’ 
coherence seeking, the analyses in this study nonetheless contribute to existing literature 
that identifies potentially productive aspects of students' engagement in science (Engle & 
Conant, 2002; Ford, 2006; Hammer & van Zee, 2006; Russ, 2006; Varelas, Pappas, & 
Rife, 2006; Smith, Maclin, Houghton, & Hennessey, 2000). 
 Though they are largely descriptive and normative, these questions are a 
necessary step in working towards a more nuanced account of coherence in the science 
classroom. In this study, I present accounts of coherence seeking drawn from a range of 
formal science learning experiences, including elementary classrooms and teacher 
professional development workshops. Together, these accounts serve as an assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of my perspective, and lay the groundwork for continued 
work on the dynamics of students’ coherence seeking. 





 The construction and refinement of any framework, perspective, or theory 
necessarily involves tension, as such work challenges the status quo, but at the same time 
attempts to build on it with an eye toward what could be. In conducting, documenting, 
and writing up my work on coherence seeking in narrative form, I felt tension over when 
to complexify and when to simplify, when to generate and when to prune ideas, when to 
analyze data systematically and when to let disjointed insights emerge, and when to 
fragment and when to unify (Conlin, 2012; Levrini et al., submitted).  
 In selecting a narrative form to capture these struggles, I opted to focus each 
chapter on one or two important aspects of the development of this perspective. For 
example, Chapter 4 considers in detail issues of what counts as evidence of coherence 
seeking, and in that section I discuss relevant literature, theoretical and analytical 
challenges, tentative findings, and unanswered questions. Likewise, in Chapter 5, I 
explore from multiple angles the challenge of determining what information students try 
to connect, and in what ways. The narrative arc of the dissertation spans from largely 
theoretical and research-centered in the early chapters, to increasingly empirical and 
focused on issues of practice in the later chapters.   
1.4 Overview of Dissertation Chapters 
Chapter 2: Motivation and Literature Review 
 This chapter offers a comparative analysis of three prominent coding schemes for 
coherence, as well as a description of how my work builds on and deviates from these 
approaches. 





 This chapter presents the evolution of my methodological approach for building 
and refining a perspective on coherence, which I illustrate through successive analyses of 
classroom data. I conclude with a detailed explication of the principles underlying my 
approach.   
Chapter 4: Identifying Evidence of Coherence Seeking in Science Classrooms 
 Building on the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter 
considers in detail the various categories and forms of evidence for coherence seeking, 
contextualized with examples from participant science classrooms.  
Chapter 5: Considering What Information Students Try to Connect—Examples 
from 5th Grade Experiments on Evaporation 
 In this chapter, I focus on students’ coherence seeking within the context of 
another highly studied phenomenon in science class—students’ response to anomalous 
data. Through an analysis of students’ experimental work over the course of multiple 
days, I consider the analytical challenges of identifying the “information” that students 
try to connect, and the “meaningful relationships” they try to form.  
Chapter 6: Intent and Coherence Seeking—Examples from a 4th Grade Class 
Arguing About the Contents of a Battery 
 Both the terms “seeking” and “trying” attribute to students some sort of 
awareness, or even intentionality, in their sense-making around natural phenomena. In 
this chapter, I present a series of clips from a 4th grade class reasoning about the contents 
of a battery to suggest that perceptions of students’ intent are intimately tied to our 
understanding of what information they are trying to connect.  





 Having outlined and illustrated the main components of coherence seeking in 
previous chapters, in this reflection I comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
perspective, and make suggestions for future refinement.  
Chapter 8: Discussion and Implications for Pedagogy 
 Finally, this chapter positions the analytical and theoretical findings of the 
dissertation within the broader context of education research and practice, with particular 






Chapter 2: Motivation and Literature Review 
“Whether that coherence obtains universally is a question that need not be answered 
here since only those parts where the coherence has actually been found become part of 
Science.”        —Wilhelm Ostwald 
2.1 Introduction 
 We have good reason to think that adults and children are constantly connecting 
information about the world together in ways that allow them to make sense of the world. 
And yet, education research lacks clarity on if and how students make these connections 
in science class.  
 I hope to work towards some clarity in this regards, by beginning with a relatively 
simple question: What does it look like when students try to find coherence in science? 
Consider the following excerpt from a 5th grade discussion about clouds. One student, 
Raphael, spontaneously finds a way to connect clouds, fog, water, the sun, and 
evaporation: 
1  Raphael: Uh, well I think that uh when the sun comes up, the // it pushes the  
2  clouds down and that's the morning and uh they turn into fog. And they go 
3  and they form puddles. And then when the sun gets really hot // uh hotter like  
4  later in the afternoon, the puddles evaporate. And that's, and the clouds are  
5  connected to the fog and the water [gestures with right hand, palm facing up] 
6  and the sun [lifts hand up] // evaporation. 
7  Ms. M: Okay, so there's some // now you're bringing back in what we talked  
8  about yesterday. There's some connection with all of this. 
9  Raphael: Yeah, the ice, because they're made of ice, ice can melt. And since  
10  they're so close to uh, the sun, the sun will push em down [moves left hand in  
11  a patting motion] because // and then they'll turn into fog and they'll, they'll  
12  melt and then the water that's left will go into the puddles and the sun will  
13  evaporate the puddles [moves left hand slowly up] later on in the afternoon. 
 
 What evidence of coherence or coherence seeking (if any) can we see in this clip? 





both on Raphael’s and Ms. M’s behalf. I will further argue that one’s ability to notice this 
evidence requires a broader notion of coherence than what currently exists in the 
literature.  
 But first, I review existing literature in the form of a comparative analysis. In the 
next section, I present the theoretical underpinnings of three prominent coding schemes 
for coherence, as represented in Vosniadou and Brewer (1992), Thagard (1989), and 
Sandoval (2003). Then, I apply each of these coding schemes to the Raphael clip above. 
Finally, I discuss the strengths and weakness of each approach in terms of their ability to 
help us see coherence seeking in classroom data.   
2.2 Defining Coherence—Three Approaches from the Literature 
2.2.1 Stella Vosniadou and Colleagues: Coherent Mental Models  
 Education research has turned to the construct of coherence mainly to (i) 
characterize the knowledge in students’ minds, (ii) model how students’ ideas change, 
and (iii) assess the quality of students’ verbal and written work. Exemplifying the first 
use of coherence, Stella Vosniadou and her colleagues have written extensively on the 
structure of students’ knowledge about the shape of the Earth.   
 Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) begin with the presupposition that students have 
evidence to think the Earth is flat. They walk on a ground which feels and looks 
relatively flat, and they have seen maps depicting a flat Earth. On the other hand, in 
elementary school, students hear stories about a round Earth and they see globes 
representing the Earth as a sphere. With all of this contradictory evidence about Earth’s 





 Some research suggests that there is no single answer to this question. The 
fragmented or manifold resources view of knowledge claims that students have many bits 
of knowledge about Earth’s shape, and they coordinate these bits dynamically when 
trying to make sense of the world around them. Sometimes they think or will say the 
Earth is flat, other times that it is round, and sometimes they will say both or neither of 
these. Students’ answers appear inconsistent because the resources they draw upon in 
constructing their ideas depend on the situation. When playing outside, it makes sense to 
think of the Earth and ground as flat. When a teacher asks you what the shape of the 
Earth, it makes sense to say that it is round. In other words, students think the earth is 
both flat and round.  
 Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) dispute the fragmented view of cognition, instead 
suggesting that children’s intuitive knowledge about the shape of the Earth “can be 
conceptualized as consisting of a coherent and systematic set of ideas which deserve to be 
called a theory” (p. 537). In this unitary approach, students may have evidence that the 
earth is round or flat. But, they combine these experiences into relatively static “hybrid” 
models of Earth’s shape. 
 To marshal additional evidence for the unitary view of cognition, Vosniadou and 
Brewer attempt to show that students’ seemingly inconsistent answers to questions about 
the shape of the Earth are actually indicative of a single underlying coherent, but 
incorrect theory (a hybrid model). Their approach was as follows: Ask students a series 
of questions about the shape of the Earth. Through the line of questioning, intentionally 
make space for students to contradict themselves. For example, if a student claims the 





the earth is flat (“draw the Earth”, “Does the Earth have an edge?” etc.). Finally, analyze 
these responses to see if somehow even the apparently contradictory responses fit 
together into a wrong, but coherent model to the student. For example, if a student 
describes the Earth as both round and having an edge, maybe the student is reasoning 
from a coherent “pancake” model of the Earth. In their quest for evidence of cognitive 
coherence, the authors identify five hybrid models of the Earth, and further argue that 
most of their research participants appear to reason from one of these five models.    
2.2.2 Paul Thagard and Colleagues: Explanatory Coherence and Theory Selection 
 Vosniadou and Brewer’s work on coherence primarily serves to marshal evidence 
for a particular theory of knowledge. Paul Thagard and his colleagues also use coherence 
as a way of describing the mind, but they do so from an entirely different theoretical and 
analytical perspective.     
 In the late 1980s, Paul Thagard, trained in philosophy of science, set out to 
understand how scientific communities come to accept one theory over another.  He 
worked under the basic assumption that scientists prefer the explanation that is more 
“coherent” or that “fit[s] together” best with available evidence (Thagard, 2000, p. 17). 
Thagard developed this assumption into a more detailed theory of explanatory coherence, 
which he and his colleagues formulated into a computer program (ECHO) that can 
evaluate the “explanatory coherence” of any theory (Ranney & Schank, 1998; Ranney & 
Thagard, 1988; Schank & Ranney, 1992). 
 According to Thagard, statements and ideas either “cohere (fit together) or 
incohere (resist fitting together)” (Thagard, 2000, p. 17). Just as there are different ways 





publications Thagard and his colleagues identify a number of different kinds of 
coherence: analogical, conceptual, deliberative, deductive, emotional, ethical, 
explanatory, linguistic, and perceptual. Each form of coherence involves different kinds 
of ideas, and different relationships between those ideas. All are the result of “maximal 
satisfaction of multiple constraints” (p. 17). In other words, coherence describes the 
extent to which a set of ideas fit together.     
 Among the variety of ways that people can fit ideas together, Thagard identifies 
explanatory coherence as the fundamental form of coherence in science because the work 
of science is to develop the most robust explanations for phenomena.1 The details of his 
Theory of Explanation Coherence (TEC) and its “seven principles of explanatory 
coherence:” symmetry, explanation, analogy, data priority, contradiction, competition, 
and acceptability appear in Thagard (1989). Simply speaking, the theory says that for 
ideas to be coherent, they must not contradict, and they must also “speak” to each other. 
In other words, a collection of non-contradictory, but random facts is not coherent in the 
TEC. The TEC applies both locally (coherence between two ideas) and globally 
(coherence among a set of ideas).   
 Alongside the development of the philosophical aspects of TEC, Thagard and his 
colleagues designed a computational model, called ECHO, to measure the coherence of 
explanations. They applied ECHO to theory selection situations from history of science 
and science education. Thagard and Nowak (1988), for example, showed that Wegener’s 
initially unpopular theory of plate tectonics was ultimately accepted over competing 
                                                 
1Within philosophy, the role of coherence in science has been explored extensively. Two lines of such 





theories because it was more coherent with geological evidence. Later, Ranney and 
Thagard (1988) showed that ECHO could predict how students might revise their beliefs 
in physics “in ways driven by considerations of explanatory coherence” (p. 4). But, 
unlike Vosniadou, Thagard does not willingly leap from explanatory coherence to 
cognitive coherence. That is, while he suggests that students might revise their beliefs to 
maximize explanatory coherence, he does not make specific claims about individual 
students’ cognitive structures in his work.2  
2.2.3 William Sandoval: Causally Coherent Explanations 
 Finally, and most recently, William Sandoval’s (2003) work aims to assess how 
well students’ written explanations “hang together.”  His work is part of a larger trend in 
science education research to help students develop their abilities to engage in 
disciplinary practices (Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 2000; Kuhn & Pease, 2008).   
 According to Sandoval, we can view students’ explanations as stories—
uninterrupted, written descriptions of a phenomenon that explain why an event happened. 
To assess these stories, we might compare them to the scientifically accepted ones, i.e. to 
determine whether the students’ ideas are “correct” or “incorrect.” Davis’ (2003) coding 
scheme for the coherence of ideas in students’ written work takes such an approach:  
The coherence of students’ ideas in their letters is a strong measure of knowledge 
integration because it measures both the degree of linkedness and the conceptual 
validity. By linkedness I mean both links that were made between evidence and 
claims and the extent to which ideas cited do or do not contradict each other (i.e., 
whether links are made between contradictory principles like “black absorbs 
light” and “black attracts heat”). By conceptual validity I mean whether the ideas 
the students cite are scientifically normative. (p. 112) 
 
                                                 
2 Ranney & Thagard (1988) do not comment on cognitive structures, but do “conceive of the networks as 





 However, Sandoval suggests that the disciplinary practice of constructing explanations 
involves more than concepts. Students must also come to develop sophisticated epistemic 
criteria, such as coherence, for evaluating explanations. Thus, unlike Davis (2003), 
Sandoval distinguishes between conceptual validity and coherence. He suggests that 
students might develop explanations that are internally consistent and causal, yet not 
scientifically normative.  
 To analytically separate correctness from coherence, Sandoval draws on the 
studies of causal cohesion in literature as discussed in Trabasso, Secco, and Van Den 
Broek (1982). In the “story model,” a coherent explanation is one that contains a central 
causal chain, or cause-and-effect story. The more aspects of the explanation that are 
explicitly connected to this chain, the more coherent the explanation. For example, one 
student in Sandoval’s study concluded that weight was an important factor for predicting 
Finch’s survival of a drought, writing:  
The trait selected by the pressure of the drought is weight. This is because with 
less food, the finches began to lose weight. The heavier finches before the drought 
had an advantage over the lighter ones when the drought occurred. If the heavier 
finches were either fatter or more muscular they could survive better. The fatter 
ones could live off their fat, thus needing less food while the muscular finches 
could obtain the food better due to their physical superiority. (Sandoval, 2003, p. 
29-30). 
 
Though the student incorrectly identifies weight as the important trait (beak size is the 
“correct” answer), Sandoval assigns his explanation a perfect coherence score because it 
is articulate, hangs together, and the student did not have access to data that would 
contradict his weight claim.   





 Each of the three approaches to coherence differs in their motivations, theoretical 
underpinnings, and analytical approaches. In this section, I demonstrate that each of these 
approaches allows us to see different aspects of coherence in the Raphael clip.3  I 
conclude with a summary of the strengths and limitations of these approaches, in terms of 
finding evidence of coherence in Raphael’s ideas. 
2.3.1 Analysis 1: Vosniadou and Brewer’s Mental Models 
 The Vosniadou and Brewer analysis begins with two questions: Are the ideas in 
Raphael’s explanation consistent with each other? And if so, does that mean that Raphael 
has a coherent mental model for thinking about water-related phenomena?    
 The first chunk of the transcript offers clear evidence that Raphael thinks his ideas 
about rain, the puddles, clouds, etc. fit together. And the fact he has fit all of these ideas 
together is precisely the thing he wants to share with the class. He says in lines 4-6: 
And that's, and the clouds are connected to the fog and the water [gestures with 
right hand, palm facing up] and the sun [lifts hand up] // evaporation.  
 
Raphael explicitly states that in his story, he has found a way that clouds, fog, water, the 
sun, and evaporation are connected, but how? 
 Typically, the interviewers in Vosniadou and Brewer’s studies would ask probing 
questions to help interpret Raphael’s explanation as he constructs it; however, because 
this data comes from the classroom, rather than a clinical interview, I do not have the 
advantage of looking at Raphael’s responses to probing questions. Nevertheless, I can try 
to make sense of his ideas, starting with the first chunk of explanation:  
1  Raphael: Uh, well I think that uh when the sun comes up, the // it pushes the  
2  clouds down and that's the morning and uh they turn into fog. And they go 
3  and they form puddles. And then when the sun gets really hot // uh hotter like  
                                                 





4  later in the afternoon, the puddles evaporate. And that's, and the clouds are  
5  connected to the fog and the water [gestures with right hand, palm facing up] 
6  and the sun [lifts hand up] // evaporation. 
 
In lines 1-2, he begins with a description of how fog forms: in the morning, the sun rises 
and “it” (presumably the sun) pushes the clouds down, turning them into fog. It is not 
clear exactly how the sun pushes the clouds down, and how that leads to fog and puddle 
formation. In the last step of Raphael’s explanation, the puddles evaporate as the sun gets 
hotter in the afternoon.  
  Raphael concludes the first portion of his explanation with a statement that is 
reminiscent of the water cycle—that clouds, fog, water, evaporation, and the sun are all 
connected. Next, Ms. M comments on the nature of Raphael’s idea. She notices that 
Raphael draws on the previous day’s discussion about the puddle, and made “some 
connection” between the various topics they have discussed. Raphael confirms this 
interpretation (“yeah”), and continues:  
9  Raphael: Yeah, the ice, because they're made of ice, ice can melt. And since  
10  they're so close to uh, the sun, the sun will push em down [moves left hand in  
11  a patting motion] because // and then they'll turn into fog and they'll, they'll  
12  melt and then the water that's left will go into the puddles and the sun will  
13  evaporate the puddles [moves left hand slowly up] later on in the afternoon 
 
This second chunk of explanation fills in some of the missing mechanisms from lines 1-6. 
According to Raphael, clouds are made of ice, which can melt, and also, clouds are close 
to the sun. So when the sun rises, it melts/pushes down the clouds, forming fog and 
puddles. Then, in the afternoon, the sun warms up and the puddles evaporate. 
 While there is outside information that I might draw on to further understand 
Raphael’s story, Vosniadou and Brewer are careful to limit their analyses to the 





check whether Raphael’s explanation is internally coherent, rather than to see if this 
explanation is coherent with other outside experiences. 
 To determine if Raphael’s explanation is internally coherent, I looked for 
contradictions in his explanation. Overall, Raphael’s explanation is remarkably internally 
coherent. I could find only one inherent contradiction in his explanation, related to 
whether it is hot or cold close to the sun. Raphael says that clouds are made of ice, which 
implies that it is cold up high where clouds are. Later, however, he claims that the sun is 
warm and melts the clouds, suggesting that up higher, closer to the sun, its warmer. So is 
it warmer up high, or colder? One possibility is that Raphael does not notice or see this 
contradiction. Another possibility is that Raphael thinks that in the night, when the sun is 
down, it is cold in the sky. Then, when the sun comes up, the sun is hot so it is warm up 
high. Either way, it is plausible that Raphael’s ideas fit together, to him.  
 Other than the one contradiction, Raphael’s story is relatively internally coherent, 
from my perspective. But does the coherence of his explanation suggest cognitive 
coherence, that is, a coherent mental model? In making this leap in their own data, 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) write:  
It is not clear from the results of this study whether the models we have identified 
represent precompiled theories which are stored in long-term memory or whether 
they are constructed by the children on the spot under the influence of our 
questions… (p. 575-576) 
 
 In Raphael’s case, he most likely created his explanation on the spot; in fact, we 
see him adding to it in the moment, suggesting that prior to his sharing it, it did not exist 
in his mind in a pre-compiled form.  
 One of the strengths of the Vosniadou and Brewer approach is that it asks us to 





fit together to more knowledgeable others. More broadly, their work suggests that 
coherence, or the extent to which ideas hang together, should be measured not in absolute 
terms, but rather, from the perspective of the sense-maker. 
 But Vosniadou and Brewer’s approach does not lend itself to considering the 
dynamic construction of ideas. In the generative, dynamic classroom environment, 
students like Raphael are continually constructing ideas, and seeking coherence in the 
process. Even in their interviews designed to illicit underlying student thinking, 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) struggle to make sense of the origin of student’s ideas:  
Some children appeared to be very certain about their views and expressed them 
with such speed and lucidity that it is unlikely that they constructed them on the 
spot. In other cases, the sequence of responses to our questions suggests some 
model construction while answering the questions. (p. 576) 
 
Vosniadou and Brewer do not elaborate on the evidence for “model construction while 
answering questions”; their focus is on evidence of consistent and static models, rather 
than dynamic ones. However, in re-visiting Vosnadiou and Brewer’s data, I found 
additional evidence of coherence, but not in the ways that the authors suspected. A third 
grade child named Darcy (“C” in transcript), for example, appears to try to fit her 
responses to the interviewer’s (“E”) prompts:   
E: Now that’s a really good picture. Now show me where the people live. 
C: (Child draws house at the border of the paper.) 
E: Can you show me in your picture where the people live, Darcy? 
C: Down over here? (Child draws another house along the same border.) 
E: Is that where people live on the earth? 
C: Child (giving in to the implicit demands of the experimenter) erases one of the 
houses and draws a person inside the circle. 
E: Here is a picture of a house. This house is on the earth isn’t it? How come the 
earth here is flat but before you made it round? 
C: I don’t know. 
E: Is the earth really round? 
C: No. 





C: Yaa, it’s round. (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, p. 570) 
 
The clip above illustrates clearly why it is important to distinguish between coherence 
and coherence seeking. A static view of coherence suggests that Darcy has in her mind a 
set of ideas about the earth. The interviewer’s job is to pull that set of ideas out and 
examine it, to see how it fits together. 
 A dynamic view of coherence seeking suggests that Darcy (and also the 
interviewer) continuously tries to fit information together. For example, after Darcy 
draws a picture of the Earth, the interviewer asks Darcy to show “where the people live.” 
Darcy had not included this information in her drawing, so now, in response to the 
interviewer she must fit people into her drawing. She draws a house, and then another, on 
her picture. The interviewer, apparently unsatisfied, again asks where the people live. 
Darcy, sensing that she has not fulfilled the interviewer’s demands, again changes her 
picture and draws a person inside her circular earth. In these moments, Darcy likely 
coordinates a variety of information: her own drawing, her interpretation of the 
interviewer’s question, her many ideas about the shape of the earth and people and 
houses, her ideas about the social expectations of the interview (for example, that she 
should fulfill the interviewer’s requests), non-verbal cues from the interviewer, her own 
feelings about how the interview is going, etc. The process of coordinating all of this 
information is the essence of coherence seeking, and Vosniadou and Brewer’s relatively 
static conception of coherence misses these dynamics in Darcy’s ideas, and also in 
Raphael’s explanation.4   
                                                 
4 Vosniadou & Brewer (1992) do allow for some dynamism in the construction of mental models. They 
suggest that students may construct mental models on the spot, but that “stable underlying conceptual 





2.3.2 Analysis 2: Thagard, Ranney, and Schank’s Connectionist Model 
 To take a second look at Raphael’s explanation, I used a graphical adaptation of 
Thagard’s ECHO program, called ConvinceMe. The program is publicly available, and 
comes with a handbook describing in detail how to code explanations for entry into 
ConvinceMe.5   
 In some sense, the ConvinceMe program itself is unnecessary; the analysis of 
coherence occurs during the formatting and coding Raphael’s explanation for input into 
ConvinceMe. The first step of formatting is to clean up the explanation. I deleted Ms. 
M’s comments and combined Raphael’s statements into one block of text. Then, I labeled 
these ideas according to hypothesis (H) or evidence (E) as described by Schank and 
Ranney (1992): 
Uh, well I think that uh H1[when the sun comes up, the // it pushes the clouds 
down] and E1[that's the morning] and uh H2[they turn into fog]. And H3[they go 
and  they form puddles.] And then H4[when the sun gets really hot] // uh E2[hotter 
like later in the afternoon], H4[the puddles evaporate]. And that's, and H5[the 
clouds are connected to the fog and the water and the sun // evaporation]. Yeah, 
the ice, becauseE3[they're made of ice], E4[ice can melt.] And since E5[they're so 
close to uh, the sun], H1[the sun will push em down]  because // and then H2[they'll 
turn into fog] and H6[they'll, they'll melt] and then H3[the water that's left will go 
into the puddles] and H4[the sun will evaporate the puddles] E2[later on in the 
afternoon]. 






Because explanatory coherence is “fundamentally a matter of there being a causal 
relation between what is explained and the representations that do the explaining”, the 
coding for (H) and (E) is perhaps the most important step in the coding (Thagard, 2000, 
p. 65). However, the phenomenon that Raphael was trying to explain was not well-
defined, so it was not easy to distinguish between hypotheses and evidence. For example, 
in lines 3 and 4, Raphael says that when the sun gets hotter in the afternoon, the puddles 
evaporate. Is this a hypothesis he about what makes puddles evaporate? Or is he 
providing evidence for his later claim that clouds, fog, the sun, and evaporation are all 
connected in lines 5 and 6? In general, I counted as evidence any pieces of information 
that Raphael likely takes as “observable truths”—that ice melts, that clouds are made of 
ice, that the sun is hotter in the afternoon. I labeled the more tentative statements 
(indicated by tone or linguistic markers such as “I think”) and explanatory statements as 
hypotheses. 
 After coding the statements, I used the linguistic cues identified by Schank and 
Ranney (1992) (“because”, “since”, “so”) to determine the explanatory links and 
contradictions in the explanation. I also inferred some connections based on the structure 
of Raphael’s argument (for example, that all E’s and H’s explain H5).  
 E3, E4, E5 explains H1, H2, H6 
 All E’s and H’s explain H5 
 H1 explains H2 
 H1 explains H3 
I tried to enter these relations as I thought Raphael might see them. However, Raphael 





movement of water from cloud, to fog, to puddle, and back to evaporation. As Ms. M 
notices, Raphael is clearly drawing connections between water-related phenomena; 
unfortunately, these connections do not easily translate into a set of “explain” and 
“contradict” relationships. In fact, Ranney and Thagard (1988) note that “translating 
utterances into propositions” can be problematic because coders may add links between 
propositions that are not linked in the mind of the subjects, or misinterpret what the 
subjects view as evidence, fact, or explanation (p. 13). 
  In a sense, most of what the ConvinceMe approach allows us to see in terms of 
coherence is revealed in these preliminary steps—the formatting and coding of the 
explanation. For example, we see that Raphael’s explanation contains an intimately 
connected set of hypotheses and evidence, and that he identifies the sun as a central 
causal element in the formation of puddles, fog, and evaporation. He does not identify 
any explicit contradictions in his explanation, nor does he cite counter-evidence. All of 
the elements in his explanation are connected to at least one other element—there are no 
isolated, disconnected facts presented in his explanation.  
 In the final and perhaps superfluous step, I entered all of these codes into the 
ConvinceMe program. The program requires setting a variety of parameters related to 
hypotheses and evidence (i.e. reliability, priority, believability). For the first run, I kept 
all of these parameters at the default setting. After each run, a window pops up that says 
“The correlation between you and ECHO: #.”  The number, between -1.0 and 1.0, 
represents the degree to which ECHO agrees with the user’s coding of the explanation, 





 After my first run, the correlation was 0.0. In terms of coherence, ECHO neither 
agreed nor disagreed with how I coded Raphael’s explanation. For the second run, I 
changed the parameters on the hypotheses and evidence to reflect the degree to which 
Raphael might “believe” or trust in each statement. For example, I know that Raphael 
probably very much believed that clouds are made of ice when he gave his explanation 
because the teacher had just confirmed this idea. After adding in plausible values for the 
believability and source of Raphael’s ideas, ConvinceMe returned a score of -0.07. The 
negative score means that ConvinceMe disagrees with my coding; or in other words, 
Raphael strongly believing that clouds are made of ice actually makes his ideas less 
coherent, to ECHO. For the third run, I attempted to aim for a perfect coherence score 
(1.0) by playing with the parameters. I was able to achieve a score of 0.94, solely by 
adjusting the values of “believability” for each of Raphael’s comments in his explanation.  
 Finally, to see what affect an implicit contradiction would have on the scoring, I 
entered a contradiction between H1 (the sun pushes clouds down) and H4 (the sun makes 
puddles evaporate). These ideas, in fact, could be seen as contradictory (how can the sun 
both push water down, and make it rise up?), but there is no evidence that Raphael sees 
them as contradictory. But just to test whether this contradiction would change the score, 
I inserted it into the coding for Run 3, which previously had a nearly perfect coherence 
score. The result was a new score of 0.85, slightly lower than before. That is, the 
explanatory coherence score of Raphael’s ideas depends not only whether the explanation 
contains contradictions, but more importantly on the weighting of these ideas in terms of 





tell us little about what kinds of connections Raphael might be trying to make among his 
experiences of water-related phenomena.   
2.3.3 Analysis 3: Sandoval’s Story Model 
 On the surface, Raphael’s explanation seems tailored for Sandoval’s story model 
analysis. The explanation sounds like a story (And then…and then…) and clearly 
contains non-canonical elements. For example, Raphael’s story for what causes fog goes 
something like this: 
Clouds are made of ice, and are high up in the sky. When the sun rises, it melts 
and pushes down the clouds, which makes fog.   
Raphael’s fog story, while fascinating, is clearly incorrect. Fog generally forms when 
water vapor cools and condenses at relatively low altitudes, not when ice is heated at high 
altitudes. Davis (2003) would suggest that Raphael’s story is incorrect and therefore 
relatively incoherent. However, Sandoval’s work suggests that while incorrect, Raphael’s 
story might still be causally coherent.   
 The first step in Sandoval’s approach is to break down the explanation, verbatim, 
into propositions of causes and effect, or antecedents and consequences. Though his 
approach was designed for written explanations, for the purposes of this analysis, I 
treated Raphael’s entire statements above as a single “explanation” and neglected Ms. 
M’s contributions. I also deleted repeated ideas, per Sandoval’s recommendation: 
a) well I think that uh when the sun comes up, the //  
b) it pushes the clouds down and  
c) that's the morning 
d) they turn into fog.  
And they go and they form puddles.  
e) when the sun gets really hot // uh hotter  
f) like later in the afternoon 





g) the clouds are connected to the fog and the water and the sun // evaporation. 
h) because they're made of ice 
i) ice can melt.  
j) And since they're so close to uh, the sun,  
the sun will push em down 
because // and then they'll turn into fog  
k) and they'll, they'll melt  
l) and then the water that's left will go into the puddles and  
m) the sun will evaporate the puddles  
later on in the afternoon. 
 
 Next, I attempted to organize these ideas into causal chains, a step made difficult 
by the fact that there is no single phenomenon that Raphael appears to be trying to 
explain. Among the possible questions he addresses are:  
How does fog form? 
How does the puddle form? 
Where do puddles go in the afternoon? 
How are clouds, fog, water, the sun, and evaporation connected? 
Like Thagard, Ranney, and Schank’s work, Sandoval’s work is limited in that he assumes 
that the phenomenon to be explained is clear and well-bounded, so that it is easy to 
establish what is being explained and to identify the causal story in that explanation. For 
Raphael, neither is the case. 
 However, for the purposes of continuing with the analysis, I identified causal 
chains in Raphael’s statements, which are represented graphically in Fig. 1. For example, 
I inferred from Raphael’s statements that one of the things he was trying to explain was 
the opening question—why puddles would disappear in the afternoon (n). The causal 
story for this phenomenon is that (a) the sun rises, (k) the clouds melt, (l) the remaining 





 To calculate a final score for coherence, Sandoval takes the ratio of propositions 
in the central causal chain to the total number of propositions in the network, resulting in 
a score from 0 to 1 (p. 26). In Raphael’s case, the total number of nodes in the causal 
chain is 9 (h, i, j, a, b, d, k, l, and m) and the total number of nodes is 13 (n is an inferred 
node, which does not count as part of the scoring). The coherence score for his 
explanation is 0.69. For comparison, Sandoval found that the mean coherence of the 
explanations provided by biology students in his study was 0.70; however, scores ranged 
from 0 (completely incoherent) to 1 (completely coherent). Coherence generally dropped 
when students failed to use “clear causal language” or when they made “unconnected 














Figure 1: Causal Chain for Raphael's Cloud Story 
Solid arrows represent causal chains. Dashed lines indicate implicit units of information 
or causal relationships.  
 Sandoval’s analysis combines important aspects of Vosniadou and Brewer’s and 





connected to the student, and he distinguishes between the correctness and the coherence 
of an explanation. And like Thagard, Sandoval’s quantitative coding scheme focuses on 
one particular kind of coherence—causal/explanatory.   
 By grounding his coding scheme in reading comprehension literature, Sandoval’s 
work has the potential to draw attention to aspects of coherence that are often 
overlooked—including linguistic and narrative coherence. Raphael’s explanation is not 
only a collection of causes or effects, hypotheses and evidence, but it is a story about how 
“the clouds are connected to the fog and the water and the sun // evaporation” (line g). In 
summing up his ideas in g, Raphael explicitly tries to connect a series of ideas together in 
a part-to-whole, or cyclical relationship. In that way, his explanation is very similar to the 
kind of relationships described in classroom versions of the water cycle. However, in 
Sandoval’s approach, g actually counts against Raphael because it is not explicitly part of 
a causal chain—it does not describe explicitly a cause and an effect. Because Sandoval 
focuses only on one kind of relationship, a causal one, his coding scheme not only misses 
the part to whole/cyclical relationship in g, but in fact line g counts as evidence against 
students’ ability to attend to epistemic criterion of coherence. Such a tendency to define 
coherence narrowly, according to the researcher’s preferences about what is most 
important in science, is common in the literature. And, ironically, the focus on causal 
chains in the “story model” analysis leaves out important aspects of Raphael’s coherence 
seeking—that he is trying to create a story of the water cycle!  
2.4 Discussion 





 The literature reviewed here suggests a variety of reasons to study coherence in 
science classrooms. As Thagard’s work demonstrates, coherence appears to play an 
important epistemological role in scientific progress. Generally speaking, scientists work 
to increase the explanatory coherence of theories—that is, they work to increase the 
extent to which models and theories align with observations of the natural world.6 For 
example, coherence between theory and observation drives work on cosmological models 
in astronomy: 
Observations are providing progressively tighter constraints on cosmological 
models advanced to explain the formation of large-scale structure in the Universe. 
These include recent determination of the Hubble constant…and measurements of 
the anisotropy of the cosmic microwave background. Although the limits imposed 
by these diverse observations have occasionally led to suggestions that cosmology 
is facing a crisis, we show here that there remains a wide range of cosmological 
models in good concordance with these constraints. (Ostriker & Steinhardt, 1995, 
p. 600) 
 
Sometimes, the discrepancies between observation and theory within a field become so 
untenable that a “paradigm shift” must occur (Kuhn, 1962). But beyond coordinating 
theory and observation, there are other types of coherence seeking in science as well. 
Physicists have sought to fit together the four fundamental forces into a coherent, all-
encompassing model of matter and energy under a “grand unified theory” or the even 
more elusive “theory of everything” (Ellis, 1986). The coherence they seek is between 
theories, rather than between theory and observations. Interdisciplinary fields, such as 
atmospheric science, can require additional kinds of coherence. Our recent advances in 
                                                 
6 Increased coherence, though, depends on one’s perspective. Furthermore, as Chinn and Brewer (1993), 
Frisch (forthcoming), and Meheus (2002) show, scientists may respond locally to inconsistencies in any 
number of ways, including ignore or discount them. But among the aims of scientific explanation more 
broadly is “an objective kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the 
phenomena as manifestations of common underlying structures and processes that conform to specific, 





understanding the diurnal variation of some atmospheric constituents (Su et al., 2011), as 
well as the effect of aerosols on precipitation (Li et al., 2011), have come as a result of 
coordinating formerly competing physical and chemical perspectives.  
 Coherence (or seeking coherence) also pays a central part of students’ science 
learning. Both the fragmented knowledge and intuitive theory perspectives on knowledge 
state that learning requires fitting and re-fitting information (broadly defined here to 
mean observations, ideas, theories, etc.) together. In fact, an entire pedagogical method 
called discrepant events aims to capitalize on the importance of coherence seeking in 
conceptual change (Gonzales-Espada, Birriel, & Birriel, 2010; O’Brien, 2010). 
 Finally, as an aspect of sense-making, coherence seeking cuts across many of the 
disciplinary practices under study in the field of education research. Though rarely 
identified as “coherence”, many researchers have identified how trying to put information 
together in meaningful, mutually consistent ways is central to learning to do science. In 
describing productive disciplinary engagement, Engle and Conant (2002) state: 
…students’ engagement is productive to the extent that they make intellectual 
progress, or, in more colloquial language, “get somewhere” ... What constitutes 
productivity depends on the discipline, the specific task and topic, and where 
students are when they begin addressing a problem. In the FCL case, we show 
that the students’ arguments for their claims became increasingly sophisticated 
over time (Hatano & Inagaki, 1991), and that their discussion prompted them to 
raise new questions. In other situations, such productivity might involve things 
like recognizing a confusion, making a new connection among ideas, or designing 
something to satisfy a goal. (p. 403) 
 
In trying to “get somewhere” in their reasoning about the natural world, one of the things 
students do is seek coherence—they try to find gaps in their understandings, they try to 
make new connections among ideas, they check if their ideas are consistent, and so on. 





2000), explanation building (McNeill, Lizotte, Krajcik, & Marx, 2006), experimentation 
(Ford, 2006), or modeling (Schwarz et al., 2009). Regardless of the form, we can aptly 
describe students’ inquiry as “the pursuit of coherent, mechanistic accounts of 
phenomena” (Hammer, Russ, Scherr, & Mikeska, 2008, p. 150). 
2.4.2 Learning From Existing Coding Schemes 
 The three perspectives reviewed in this chapter reveal some important insights for 
continued work on coherence. First, coherence must not be confused with, or even linked 
to, correctness. Sandoval’s analysis shows that a wrong explanation can still hang 
together. Raphael’s explanation was relatively coherent (0.69), even though it contained 
glaringly wrong ideas about the water cycle. Thagard’s coding scheme does not even take 
correctness into account—none of his parameters rely on the evidence, hypothesis, or the 
relations between them being true or aligned with the canon. And finally, Vosniadou and 
Brewer’s work shows that students’ wildly non-canonical ideas about the shape of the 
Earth might still fit together for the child in important ways. In other words, all of these 
schemes allow us to see that there are productive aspects of students’ otherwise incorrect 
ideas.   
 Secondly, the literature suggests that there are many ways that students can 
connect information together. Analogies, contradictions, consistencies, narratives, cycles, 
and syllogisms are all ways of fitting information together, and coherence seeking in 
science might involve any of these and more. Vosniadou and Brewer’s work goes to great 
lengths to explore internal consistency, and explanatory coherence has been the focus of 
many other studies (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004; 





one or two forms of coherence. More work needs to be done to look at the multiple kinds 
of coherence students seek in science and to consider how students develop criteria for 
coherence. Some work that considers multiple aspects of coherence seeking, though 
under different names, will be helpful in this regard (see for example Hammer, 1997; 
Engle & Conant, 2002; Ford, 2005; Smith et al., 2000).  
 And third, coherence is perspective-dependent. Thagard showed that whether a 
scientist judges an explanation to be coherent or not depends on the information available 
to that scientist. In fact, Wegener had to marshal evidence in support of his theory for 
precisely that reason. He showed that the coastlines seem to fit together, and noted that 
there are similar fossils on both sides of the Atlantic. Without knowledge of these and 
other observations, it is unlikely that the scientific community would have considered 
Wegener’s theory to be any more coherent than competing Contraction Theory. Because 
researchers, teachers, and students have very different knowledge and experiences, they 
are also likely to make different judgments about whether an explanation is coherent. 
Evaluating a students’ explanation from a researcher’s (or teacher’s) perspective does not 
give us much information about how a student pursues coherence, only that a student 
failed to access or explicitly account for some particular piece of knowledge. But 
evaluating coherence from the students’ perspective requires a large number of inferences 
about knowledge available to the student. Sandoval’s coding system and the highly 
adjustable parameters of Thagard’s connectionist computer program demonstrate the 
problematic nature of making such inferences.  
 Finally, coding schemes that treat coherence as a static characteristic of students’ 





making. Vosniadou and Brewer’s clinical interviews miss the coherence seeking that 
students do as they interpret and respond to the interviewer’s verbal and non-verbal cues. 
Sandoval’s coding scheme tells us nothing about the process that students went through 
in constructing their explanations. But Thagard’s Theory of Explanatory Coherence, 
which again treats coherence as a static quality of explanations, also holds that scientists 
prefer and in fact search for coherence. That is, scientists try to fit ideas and information 
together in ways that are meaningful and mutually consistent. It is this aspect of 
Thagard’s work that I argue can be productively adapted to research on students’ 
engagement in science. Rather than consider whether students’ explanations are coherent, 






Chapter 3: The Beginning of Constructing a Perspective on Coherence 
“Only connect! That was the whole of her sermon.  
Only connect the prose and the passion, and both will be exalted,  
And human love will be seen at its height.  
Live in fragments no longer.  
Only connect...”     —E.M. Forster, in Howards End  
3.1 A More Expansive View of Coherence 
 Among the important findings in science education research is that all students, 
even very young ones, can “do science” (NRC, 2007; Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 
2000). That is, students are able to make sense of the physical world, and engage others 
in that sense-making.   
 In science, sense-making leads to, among other things, more refined explanations. 
Philosophers have explored the many dimensions along which an explanation might be 
refined—mechanism, consistency, consilience, simplicity, elegance, intelligibility, and 
the focus of this study—coherence. In science, and in the literature reviewed in the 
previous chapter, coherence often refers to the internal consistency of an explanation and 
how well an explanation hangs together with other knowledge available at the time. 
 In helping students work towards more sophisticated engagement in science, we 
might prefer that students come to seek coherence in ways that are valued by current 
scientific practice and that lead to currently accepted explanations of phenomena. In 
physics class, for example, we may ask students to model current electricity as flowing 
water, or compare light waves to water waves, as these analogies have proven fruitful for 





approach—it defines coherence narrowly, focusing on only particular kinds of 
connections commonly accepted as important in science. In turn, these frameworks 
recognize only a small portion of the coherence seeking in, for example, Raphael’s cloud 
story (see Chapter 2). In the rest of this chapter, I motivate and illustrate the beginnings 
of an approach to broaden what counts as evidence of coherence seeking in science class. 
I conclude with a pre-/post- analysis of a single clip to illustrate the potential insights that 
a broader notion of coherence seeking affords.       
3.2 The Case for Defining Coherence Broadly  
 In Chapter 2, I used comparative analyses of the Raphael Cloud Story clip to 
suggest that a broader definition of coherence seeking, combined with the working 
assumption that students are always seeking coherence, reveals new insights into 
students’ reasoning in science class not captured by existing coding schemes. But a 
compelling case for re-conceptualizing coherence can also be made using findings from 
studies of science and education research more generally.  
 I begin with a description of a popular Newton’s Third Law lab utilized in many 
high school and college physics classes. The lab opens with a prediction task. Students 
must anticipate the magnitude and direction of forces on two cars of different masses as 
they collide with each other. Usually (and incorrectly), students predict that the smaller 
car will feel a bigger force when hit by the heavier car. Having elicited students’ prior 
conceptions about the relative forces on the cars, the activity then requires students to test 
out their predictions using force probes. The probes reveal that despite the mass 
difference, the cars experience “equal and opposite” forces. The hope is that, in 





forces in ways that align with Newton’s Third Law. That reconstruction requires, among 
other things, that students seek particular kinds of coherence—to recognize that their 
predictions and observations do not match, and modify their predictions (and underlying 
ideas) accordingly. Some versions of the activity also ask students to coordinate 
Newton’s Second and Third Laws to explain why the lighter car appears to recoil more 
than the heavier car, upon collision.7 In the instances that students fail to form these 
particular coherences, educators accuse them of failing to account for anomalous data 
(Kuhn, 1989), or failing to seek coherence at all.8 Coherence seeking becomes 
dichotomous—students either are or are not seeking coherence.  
 In my initial analyses of classroom data, I often used language indicative of 
viewing evidence of coherence seeking as a single, dichotomous category (see Appendix 
A for an example of an analysis using such language). Though I recognized that the 
category might be further refined into subcategories, and also, that these categories might 
be context-dependent, I still assumed that there ought to be some set of behaviors or 
language that count as evidence of coherence seeking and another set that does not.  But 
forcing the category evidence of coherence seeking to take a dichotomous form may be 
problematically artificial. Rosch’s (1973; 1975) prototype theory suggests that humans 
employ and reason about category membership not in dichotomous terms, but as a matter 
of degree. Just as a robin might be more of a “bird” than a “penguin”, or a “sofa” might 
be more of a piece of furniture than a “pen”, some kinds of behaviors and discourse 
                                                 
7 For an example of student reasoning around such a tutorial, see Chapter 6. 
8 I elaborate on the pedagogical implications in Chapter 8, and also in a NARST paper presented in 





moves might seem more central to coherence seeking than others.9 Importantly, the 
perceived centrality of an item in a category likely arises in one’s interaction with the 
world and depends on one’s experiences, culture, perspective, etc. In describing what 
coherence seeking looks like in science class, educators might refer to students’ building 
textbook explanations, fitting their ideas with their everyday experiences, trying to find 
causal relationships, or checking the internal consistency of a model. These are examples 
of prototypical evidence of coherence seeking, the kinds of evidence that we might prefer 
or most highly value. Centrality, certainly, might vary according to the context. Before a 
standardized test, a teacher may value textbook explanations far more than students’ 
drawing on everyday experiences. But during a discussion to open up a new unit, teachers 
might see drawing on everyday experiences as central to students’ coherence seeking in 
science.   
 Perhaps at the periphery of category of evidence, students also seek coherence in 
ways that seem to deviate drastically from the practices of normative science. Students 
may ignore anomalous data to maintain the coherence of their own ideas (Kuhn, 1989) 
(though as Chinn and Brewer (1993) point out, scientists do this too!), they may select 
explanations based on principles of fairness or for entertainment’s sake, rather for how 
these ideas explain natural phenomena. Beyond the purely conceptual, students also fit 
information together as they communicate, evaluate the intentions and emotions of 
                                                 
9 Lakoff (1999) cites two common misinterpretation of Rosch’s prototype theory, namely that prototype 
effects i) reflect some truth about categories “out there” in the world, or ii) reflect a cognitive structure. 
Lakoff argues instead that prototype effects arise from interaction between observers and the world, and 
that certainly one aspect of that interaction may involve correlative cognitive structures. Here, I argue 
that regardless of their source, the existence of prototype effects within natural categories such as color 
and furniture might warrant a degree-of-membership approach to constructing the artificial category (or 





others, construct a sense of what an interaction or activity is about, and locate themselves 
socially and physically within a class. The coding schemes reviewed in Chapter 2 
(Sandoval, 2003; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; Thagard, 1989) do not recognize these 
forms of sense-making as coherence seeking. Perhaps in a clinical interview, like those 
employed by Rosch (1975), researchers and educators might demonstrate prototype 
effects with respect to coherence seeking—that remains an open empirical question. My 
argument is that, given the existence of prototype effects in many domains, it seems 
reasonable to try out a degree-of-membership approach to constructing the category (or 
categories) evidence of coherence seeking. And that approach would involve allowing 
even non-normative kinds of sense-making to count as evidence of coherence seeking.    
 Though I did not initially set out to think of coherence seeking in terms of 
prototype theory, it serves as a useful analogy for describing the intellectual work of 
creating an alternative perspective on coherence seeking. Re-constructing evidence of 
coherence seeking from a dichotomous category to a degree-of-membership category 
would require two steps. First, the category must be expanded to include ignoring 
anomalous data, making sense of social and affective information, etc. as evidence of 
coherence seeking, even if only peripherally. Secondly, prototype effects must be 
explored, to understand how we determine the centrality (and value) of these kinds of 
evidence in both classroom data and expert scientific practice. Analogous to that first 
step, I developed an approach to coherence seeking that assumes students are always 
seeking coherence with respect to something. And, akin to the second step, I intentionally 
tried to distinguish between evidence of coherence seeking and evidence of 





Maintaining that distinction proved quite challenging, and in retrospect, I was not 
completely successful. I tended to ignore episodes in classroom data that did not jump out 
at me as particularly productive or sophisticated, resulting in a sort of selection bias. 
Appendix B includes an annotated example of an episode that I initially overlooked 
because of such bias.   
 But despite the challenge of doing so, studies of science warrant reconsidering, or 
perhaps even blurring, the line between sophisticated and “other” forms of coherence 
seeking in science. Existing coding schemes overlook many kinds of evidence of 
coherence seeking in part because they de-contextualize coherence seeking as it occurs in 
expert scientific practice. Scientists conduct their work within social, political, personal, 
cultural, and gendered worlds; as such, their work involves aligning theory and evidence, 
but also coordinating elements of information that do not seem to be so much about 
concepts as about being human (though some might argue these elements are inextricably 
intertwined) (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Solomon, 1992; Solomon, 1994). But even within 
studies of science that focus specifically on conceptual information, a context-sensitive 
image of scientists’ coherence seeking emerges. Dunbar’s (1999) description of work in a 
biology lab, for example, illustrates how scientists’ treatment of unexpected experimental 
results varies. While a single surprising result was likely to result in “replication, change 
in protocol, or use of an entirely new protocol” a series of such results would lead 
scientists to “offer new more general models, hypotheses, or theoretical explanations” (p. 
6). No single kind of coherence seeking is uniformly valued and sought by practicing 





pursuing different kinds of coherence at different times, within their larger communal 
effort to understand natural phenomena.  
 The value educators place on certain kinds of coherence seeking can also stem 
from, or reinforce, a more general deficit model of student cognition. These deficit views 
are perhaps most evident curricula designed to expose students to dissonant information, 
and then walk them through ways to reduce that dissonance. Discrepant events curricula 
and counterintuitive problems were designed in response to the general finding that that 
students can leave science class with their intuitive ideas about the natural world (also 
problematically referred to as “misconceptions”) intact:  
students will often reinforce misconceptions by incorrectly incorporating new 
information on an incorrect framework. It is also possible for students to reject 
new information when it contradicts what they think they know. (Everett & 
Pennathur, 2007, p. 3) 
 
Rather than recognize students’ maintenance of intuitive ideas as coherence seeking—
which could be used in quite productive ways in science class—discrepant events 
curricula seeks to supplant students’ “incorrect” thinking with a certain way of 
connecting information. Furthermore, educators assume that by presenting a discrepancy, 
students will naturally recognize it as such and seek to reconcile it in the same ways as 
the educator would, as though the learning physics is purely a matter of applying 
objective logic. But perhaps not surprisingly, students often respond to discrepancies in 
ways that deviate from the intentions of the curriculum, leading to frustration on behalf of 
the educator and possibly humiliation for the students (Everett & Pennathur, 2007).  
 Rather than treat students’ reasoning as something to be corrected or modified, as 
was common in the decade following the onset of misconceptions research, science 





learning. A narrow definition of coherence underestimates the “raw materials” that 
students bring to science class, but a nuanced understanding of these raw materials is the 
very thing that teachers must deeply understand if they are to develop their curriculum 
and instruction around it (Hammer, 1996; Hammer, Goldberg, & Fargason, in press).  
 The educator who attends only to students’ seeking of explanatory or causal 
coherence, to the exclusion of all other forms of coherence seeking in which students are 
engaged, also assumes that the path from students’ current ways of thinking to other 
“more sophisticated” forms is linear, i.e. the inputs have a one-to-one correlation with the 
desired outputs. However, along with valuing the resources that students bring into the 
classroom, education research has also begun to productively characterize learning as a 
complex process, with multiple possible ways that those resources might be activated, 
intertwined, and refined over time. Through these complex dynamics, ways of thinking 
that are traditionally considered far outside the realm of science, including 
anthropomorphism (Bang & Medin, 2010), humor (Nespor, 1994) and even furniture 
design (Calabrese-Barton, Ermer, Burkett, & Osborne, 2003) have been shown to play 
potentially productive roles in students’ science learning. Coding schemes for coherence 
that omit these forms of reasoning fail to acknowledge the role they might play in 
students’ coming to seek other, more traditionally valued, forms of coherence in science. 
And finally, for students to fully appreciate why particular kinds of coherence are 
important in current scientific practice, they must have the opportunity to consider, 
refine, and evaluate multiple ways of making sense of phenomena (Bang & Medin, 2010; 
Coffey, Hammer, Levin, & Grant, 2011). Thus, determining what kinds of evidence of 





hierarchy will not suffice. I explore approaches to making normative claims about 
coherence in more detail in Chapter 8. 
 To summarize, science education and studies of science speak to utility of a 
broader and at the same time more nuanced conception of what constitutes coherence in 
science class. If students are to see science as more than a set of disconnected facts, they 
must have the opportunity to refine their seeking of coherence, and evaluate the 
usefulness of the coherences they seek.  If we limit the refining to only those kinds of 
coherence that we think most important in science, we not only oversimplify the practice 
of science, but also discount the demonstrated complexity of science learning. An 
approach that considers evidence of coherence seeking as a matter-of-degree aligns with 
the working assumption that students are always seeking coherence, while also allowing 
space for scientists, educators and students to value some kinds of coherence seeking 
more than others, in different moments.   
3.3 Methodological Approach 
3.3.1 Overview 
 The construction, refinement, and illustration of a perspective on coherence 
seeking—a process outlined in pieces throughout this dissertation—involved a reflexive 
relationship between theoretical elements and the analysis of data, and also between 
myself and my work. In telling the story of that work for this dissertation, however, I opt 
for what some might call a post-positivist form of expression; the dissertation explicitly 
focuses on the logical and intellectual rather than the emotional and personal aspects of 
constructing a perspective. Though I omit an extensive discussion of my own subjectivity 





inquiry and its outcomes” as documented in analytical memos, a research journal, and a 
sketchbook was an important component of my methodological approach (Peshkin, 1988, 
p. 17).   
 In terms of approaches to analyzing data, each chapter includes a description of 
methods used to make claims about coherence seeking in the focal episodes. However, all 
of the analyses share commonalities with respect to data sources, modes of interpretation, 
episode bounding and selection, coding, and transcription, as discussed in the next 
sections.    
3.3.2 Data Sources 
 The primary data source for this study is a three-year, multi-site National Science 
Foundation-funded research project to develop learning progressions for scientific 
inquiry in the context of energy.10 The project worked with a handful of participating 
elementary and middle schools in San Diego, California, a large, urban, diverse school 
district. Specific school sites were chosen so as to maximize the chance of having 
students participate over multiple years as they moved from grade to grade. (Raphael, for 
example, participated in both 5th and 6th grade). Across the 11 schools, fourteen 
elementary and middle school teachers (two 3rd grade, five 4th grade, five 5th grade, and 
two 6th grade) and their students were recruited for the project.  
 The Learning Progressions (LP) project involved three major components: 
professional development, curriculum design, and research on student and teacher 
learning. The professional development work consisted of a series of bi-weekly meetings 
                                                 






throughout the year, a two-week long summer workshop each summer, classroom 
observations, and informal communication via phone and email. In each of these 
contexts, LP staff and teachers worked together to find ways to facilitate students’ inquiry 
in the classroom. In professional development meetings and workshops, we split our time 
between watching and discussing classroom video and doing science together, as 
described in Chapter 8 and in Lineback (2012).  
 Like the professional development, the purpose of the curriculum development 
aspect of the project was to open up space for scientific inquiry in the participant 
classrooms. To that end, LP staff created a series of prototype science curriculum 
modules for energy (3rd grade), batteries and bulbs (4th grade), the water cycle (5th grade), 
and burnability/composting (6th grade). These topics were chosen to align with district 
standards for each grade. Each 20-hour module opens with a question designed to elicit 
student ideas around the focus topic. From there, the curriculum provides teachers with 
ideas for “next moves” to build upon the students’ ideas and reasoning. The curriculum 
modules differ from the standard curriculum implemented in San Diego11 in that the 
modules do not have a pre-defined set of activities or content objectives; rather, the 
primary goal of the LP modules is to facilitate students’ “pursuit of coherent, mechanistic 
accounts of phenomena” (Hammer, Russ, Mikeska, & Scherr, 2005, p. 150). In later 
years of the project, the teachers worked alongside LP staff to revise the modules based 
on their experience using them in the classroom.12  
                                                 
11 San Diego utilizes the Full-Option Science System (FOSS) Curriculum for grades K-5. The two sixth 
grade teachers implement a district-wide curriculum. 





 Finally, the third aspect of the LP project involved research on student and teacher 
learning, with an emphasis on characterizing student and teacher progress in scientific 
inquiry. The teachers videotaped their implementation of at least one curriculum module 
each year, though some teachers chose to implement more than one module with their 
students. I focused primarily on these module implementations, as well as some of the 
teachers’ scientific inquiry during the professional development meetings, to construct a 
perspective on coherence seeking. Though I have collected episodes from most of the 
classrooms in the study, the episodes in this dissertation come primarily from one of four 
sources: Ms. M’s water cycle module from Year 1, Ms. H’s water cycle module from 
Year 1, Ms. F’s electricity module from Year 2, and a teacher professional development 
workshop from Years 1 and 3. I chose to focus on these sources because they contain 
particularly rich and varied evidence of coherence seeking. To speak more broadly about 
coherence seeking across the spectrum of science learning, I supplement the Learning 
Progressions data with data from other published work. Appendix C includes a complete 
list of the data presented in each chapter.   
3.3.3 Continuously Revisiting Data 
 In first viewing classroom video, I generally just watched for something 
“interesting”—something that exemplifies, extends, or challenges my current lens for 
looking at coherence seeking. The Raphael episode, for example, exemplifies how a 
student spontaneously tries to build cycle-like relationships between ideas. The Learning 
Progressions data contains many interesting examples of coherence seeking, so choosing 





 Once I identified a moment as compelling, I revisited the data using a variety of 
analytical tools, to build up my interpretations of the data. The process was highly 
nonlinear, but included i) bounding the episode, ii) transcription, iii) breaking transcripts 
into stanzas according to topic (Nathan, Eilam, & Kim, 2008), iv) writing analytic memos 
of multiple plausible interpretations (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995), v) sharing 
interpretations with colleagues, vi) constructing a narrative of the episode, and vii) 
writing summary tables with codes.   
3.3.4 Episode Selection and Bounding 
 My episode selection process was strongly guided by the overarching purpose of 
this work—perspective-building. I did not try to select clips according to arbitrary, 
objective, or randomized criteria; rather, I actively searched for and selected episodes that 
exemplify, challenge, or help to refine the perspective. Other perspective or theory-
building work has taken similar approaches, for example Hammer, Elby, Scherr, and 
Redish’s (2004) work on resources and framing, and Lave and Wenger’s (1991) work on 
legitimate peripheral participation.   
 Generally, the episodes in my analyses have multiple boundaries. For example in 
the Raphael episode, I initially bounded the episode to include the whole of Raphael’s 
“cloud story” (lines 1-13). But, in order to make sense of some of the ideas that Raphael 
was sharing, I had to work outward from narrowly bounded episode. To find the potential 
origins of Raphael’s idea that it is “cold up high”, I worked backwards in the video data, 
and found that Raphael may have gotten this idea from a flight attendant. In determining 
purposes that story might have served for Raphael and the class, I looked forward in the 





contains an internal inconsistency. In a sense, then, the episodes of coherence seeking are 
bounded on multiple levels, and driven by my attempt to see how ideas and relations play 
out over the course of students’ sense-making.  
 By selecting and bounding episodes in these ways, I cannot make more general 
claims about the kinds of coherence seeking that happen in most science classrooms; my 
data comes from classrooms that are particularly conducive to sense-making, and from 
those, I select particularly rich episodes of coherence seeking. In addition, my work does 
not provide a complete characterization of the coherence seeking in any single classroom, 
though that future work building on this dissertation might pursue such characterizations.    
3.3.5 Coding  
 Researchers who study students’ engagement in the practice of argumentation 
tend to draw on well-established, Toulmin-inspired coding schemes (Sampson & Clark, 
2008). While one logical step in this work would be to develop such a coding scheme for 
coherence seeking, I instead focused my efforts on constructing a language and 
perspective for looking at and talking about coherence seeking. Two key aspects of that 
lens are: i) to focus on the information students try to connect, and the ways in which 
they connect it, and ii) to assume students are always seeking coherence with respect to 
something. 
 Through this lens, I tried to balance “looking for” coherence seeking with seeing 
what emerged from the data. I coded both inductively and deductively, at all times 
wondering, “What sorts of things might I hear and see students doing when they are 
seeking coherence in particular ways?” The deductive codes come from my operational 





relationships between information (broadly defined).” Examples of deductive codes 
include pointing out an inconsistency or showing surprise at an observation. I also coded 
inductively, continually asking “How might that student’s statement/gesture/facial 
expression be evidence of coherence seeking? And with respect to what information?” 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994). I kept track of these codes in a working table of evidence (see 
Appendix D).  The codes serve two purposes. First, they are a concise tool for keeping 
track of the kinds of coherence seeking within and across episodes, i.e. they give us a 
flavor of what kind of coherence seeking is occurring in an episode. Secondly, the codes 
may help reveal patterns in the data that warrant further investigation. For example, do 
students in Raphael’s class tend to seek narrative coherence often, or does that seem to be 
specific to Raphael?  
 Appendix D does not constitute a rubric for evaluating students’ coherence 
seeking, nor does it encompass all possible kinds of evidence of coherence seeking. In 
that sense, my “coding” for coherence seeking in this work is markedly different than 
those used to study scientific argumentation in classrooms. Many Toulmin-inspired 
coding schemes for argumentation reduce the practice to a series of behaviors: make a 
claim, state data, and offer a warrant to the data to the claim. While convenient, these 
coding schemes are reductionist, sometimes dichotomous, and often lose the “holistic” 
sense of the practice (Sampson & Clark, 2008, p. 469). Cognitively, we can think of 
coherence seeking as arising from a complex interplay of conceptual, epistemological, 
affective, cultural, linguistic, etc. resources. As such, it cannot be meaningfully reduced 
to a list of behaviors. And within a sociocultural perspective, coherence seeking arises in 





independent linguistic markers (Tang, 2010), there can be no context-independent codes 
for coherence seeking. Still, Lindfors does emphasize the importance of multimodal 
discourse analysis, including gesture, tone, and expression, in studies of children’s 
inquiry. Chapter 4 discusses evidence of coherence seeking in greater detail.   
3.3.6 Transcription 
 An important aspect of coherence seeking is the conceptual content of what 
students are saying: the relations students make between information about the natural 
world. Thus, transcripts must facilitate interpretation of the content of what students say. 
In instances where content is central, Oliver, Serovich, and Mason (2005) recommend a 
more denaturalized approach, with more focus on what people say and less emphasis on 
how they say it. On the other hand, students seek connections not only between 
conceptual information, but also between linguistic, epistemological, cultural, personal, 
social, emotional, material, etc. information. A naturalized approach that includes details 
such as intonation, pause, and overlapping speech may reveal these other aspects of 
coherence seeking. Gestures and gaze can also illuminate the conceptual information that 
student try to connect. The transcripts in this work represent a “hybrid” between the 
naturalized and denaturalized approaches, and follow conventions similar to those used 
by Varelas, Pappas, Kane and Arsenault (2007) (see Appendix E). Transcripts are 
indexed according to episode and utterances number.  
3.4 Coherence Seeking in Raphael’s “Cloud Story” 
 To illustrate the more dynamic, contextualized approach to studying coherence 
seeking offered in this work, I must begin by putting Raphael’s episode in a larger 





student in Ms. M’s class. Ms. M and her students were completing a novel curriculum 
module about the water cycle. The module began by asking students to brainstorm what 
might have happened to a puddle that disappeared over the course of the day. The rest of 
the module was relatively open, allowing Ms. M to focus on students’ reasoning, rather 
than on a strict order of lessons and activities. 
 On day two of the module, Ms. M draws students’ attention to the clouds outside 
in the hopes of opening up a discussion about types of clouds. She opens the classroom 
door, looks up, and asks: 
"[This morning] there were clouds and now there aren't clouds. Where did the 
clouds go?" 
 In identifying a phenomenon to be explained, Ms. M opens up space for sense-
making. The students talk among themselves for a minute, and then Raphael tells Ms. M 
that he thinks "clouds need a cold environment" because a flight attendant told him that if 
a plane window opened, everyone would turn into a "block of ice." Upon further 
questioning, Raphael also agrees that high clouds are "probably [made of] ice." Ms. M 
writes Raphael’s answer on the board, putting particular emphasis on the fact that clouds 
can contain ice (one of the state science standards): 
 1.1 Ms. M: Okay, so, clouds that are higher up [writing] 
 1.2 Raphael: And then when uh the sun comes up it might push it away.  
 1.3 Ms. M: [writing] Higher up contain..ice crystals? Can I say that? 
 
Ms. M does not respond to Raphael’s comment that the sun might “push clouds away.” 
But just as Ms. M finishes writing, Raphael interrupts her and exclaims "Oh! I have an 
idea." 
 1.4 Raphael: Yeah. 





 1.6 Raphael: Oh! I have an idea. 
 1.7  Ms. M: I-I just, yes. [turning around and putting lid on marker, nodding  
  as she says “yes”] 
 
What follows is Raphael’s “Cloud Story”:  
1.8 Raphael: Uh, well I think that uh when the sun comes up, the // it pushes  
the clouds down and that's the morning and uh they turn into fog. And 
they go and they form puddles. And then when the sun gets really hot // uh 
hotter like later in the afternoon, the puddles evaporate. And that's, and the 
clouds are connected to the fog and the water [gestures with right hand, 
palm facing up] and the sun [lifts hand up] // evaporation. 
 
In this flurry of ideas, Raphael not only explains what may have happened to the clouds 
(they were pushed down by the sun), but he also connects his ideas back to the previous 
days’ question about a disappearing puddle (it evaporated). Ms. M recognizes that 
Raphael has made "connections" between clouds, the topic of the day's discussion, and 
puddles, the previous days' discussion topic: 
 1.9 Ms. M: Okay, so there's some // now you're bringing back in what we  
talked about yesterday. There's some connection with all of this. 
 1.10 Raphael: Yeah, the ice, because they're made of ice, ice can melt. And  
since they're so close to uh, the sun, the sun will push em down [moves left 
hand in a patting motion] because // and then they'll turn into fog and 
they'll, they'll melt and then the water that's left will go into the puddles 
and the sun will evaporate the puddles [moves left hand slowly up] later on 
in the afternoon. 
 
In a holistic sense, segments [1.7] and [1.9] illustrate Raphael’s seeking of narrative 
coherence. He tries to fit the puddle, the clouds, fog, the sun, and evaporation together in 
a narrative, or story. The story contains both temporal and causal/mechanistic 
relationships, which are central to coherence seeking in text comprehension seeking 
(Russ, 2006; Trabasso, Secco, & Van Den Broek, 1982). The temporal relations connect 
phenomena the class had been discussing over the course of two days—cloud movement, 





relationship between the sun, cloud disappearance, and fog formation, though the details 
of the relationship are unclear. He says that the sun pushes down clouds, and uses a 
patting gesture to indicate the clouds literally being pushed down. But, he also says that 
the clouds can melt, and it is unclear if and how the melting and pushing are related for 
Raphael. In the next part of Raphael’s story, the melting/pushing down of clouds leads 
both to fog and puddle formation. (Interestingly, he makes no mention of rain as the 
source of puddles). Finally, the driving force of the entire story, the sun, evaporates the 
puddles in the afternoon.  
 The story, both in substance and in language (“and then”… “and then”), is linear. 
However, if Raphael also thinks that evaporation leads to cloud formation, then he may 
actually be seeking a cyclical story, literally his own version of the water cycle. 
Regardless, his excitement and repetition of his ideas suggests that for Raphael, this story 
hangs together quite nicely, and he is probably proud of it. In addition, the construction of 
the story represents not only conceptual coherence seeking, but also coherence seeking 
with respect to classroom norms. Raphael uses his story to answer two of Ms. M’s 
questions: the opening question about what happened to the puddles, and her question 
about what happens to clouds over the course of the day. We do not know whether 
Raphael thinks that Ms. M wants him to connect the answers to these questions together, 
or whether he makes these connections for some reason other than to please Ms. M. 
Regardless, at least part of Raphael’s sense-making involves answering Ms. M’s 
questions.    
  Clearly, my analysis overlaps with some of the findings presented in Chapter 2. 





him. I recognize many of the causal relationships that Thagard’s (1989) and Sandoval 
(2003)’s approaches revealed, for example, that the sun’s warmth causes clouds to melt. 
However, my analysis adds an attention the conceptual, epistemological, and linguistic 
coherences of Raphael’s story, maintains a holistic sense of the coherence that Raphael 
seeks, and interprets that coherence seeking within the context that it occurred.  
3.5 Principles of Analysis for Local Moments of Coherence Seeking 
 Raphael’s cloud story illustrates clearly that existing approaches to analyzing 
students’ coherence seeking, while reasonable as a starting point, need refinement. In 
trying to build a broader but also more nuanced perspective on coherence seeking, I 
adopted two intellectual strategies, or principles of analysis, relatively early into my 
work.  
 First, I approached data under the assumption that even students who seem like 
they are not seeking coherence are still seeking coherence with respect to something. 
From a psychological and cognitive perspective, the assumption is not so far-fetched. 
Both bodies of literature suggest that human perception and cognition involves continual 
integration of information, in ways that are both intentional and unconscious. In science 
class, we tend to focus on students’ integration of conceptual information in ways that 
align with the scientific canon. However, learners’ coherence seeking may involve not 
only unexpected conceptual and epistemological elements, but also cultural, linguistic, 
social, material, and affective elements which are often overlooked in science education. 
 Secondly, much of the existing literature considers coherence primarily, or even 
solely, as a characteristic of scientific products—explanations, arguments, etc. As 





how13 students’ explanations “hang together” provide some insight into what elements a 
student finds relevant to answer a prompt, and which relationships between those 
elements seem important. Raphael’s cloud story, for example, tied together a series of 
elements (puddle, sun, evaporation, clouds, fog) into a causal story. However, Raphael’s 
story was just one moment in a larger inquiry that his class engaged during the Water 
Cycle Module. The moments leading up to that story, and the way it is taken up later, are 
as important to understanding Raphael and his classmates’ coherence seeking as a static 
analysis of the explanation itself. That is, coherence is an aspect of products of science, 
but it is also something that students seek together as they try to make sense of natural 
phenomena. Emphasizing coherence seeking as an activity complements current work 
aiming to characterize students’ engagement in doing science, or “the nature and quality 
of students’ participation in exploration, invention, and discourse” (Hammer, 1997, p. 
488). And from a research perspective, it follows that work on coherence seeking must 
analyze students’ reasoning in context. Work that looks only at the internal coherence of 
a single sentence that a student writes is unlikely to reveal much useful information about 
students’ thinking and doing of science.  
 Through multiple analyses of Raphael’s cloud story, I have begun to demonstrate 
how a perspective built around these two principles offers more insight into students’ 
coherence seeking than otherwise available through existing coding schemes. But the 
adoption of these principles also greatly impacted the way I approached data analysis 
over the course of the study. The working assumption that students always seek 
                                                 
13 How, not how well, it hangs together. If we assume that the students are seeking coherence as they 
construct the explanation, then the explanation likely hangs together in some way for that student. In 





coherence was especially transformative in that it completely shifted not only how I 
selected episodes, but what evidence of coherence seeking I saw within them. To 
demonstrate that shift more clearly, I present in the next section two analyses of a single 
clip: one conducted before I assumed that students always seek coherence, and one 
conducted afterward.14   
3.6 Jason and the Magnets: Comparison of Original and Refined Coding Schemes 
 In my initial exploration of hundreds of hours of classroom video, only a few 
moments clearly stood out as examples of coherence seeking, one of which was the 
Raphael Cloud Story discussed earlier. Another example came from a 4th grade 
discussion about magnets. On the day prior to the discussion, the students discovered that 
they could make a toy car move using small magnets. The students attached one magnet 
to a car with tape, and brought a second magnet toward the first. Depending on the 
alignment of the poles, the car either moved away from the incoming magnet, or moved 
toward it. The next day the teacher, Ms. B asks the students to explain how the magnets 
make the car move. Caitlin suggests that the magnets contain “electricity” in them, an 
idea which puzzles both Ms. B and another student named Jason. A discussion around the 
idea of electricity being inside magnets ensues:   
2.1  Caitlin: Umm, well, the magnets have some electricity in them, and it-- 
2.2 Ms. B: They have electricity in them? 
2.3 Caitlin: Yeah, so sometimes-- 
2.4 Ms. B: How can the magnets have electricity? I didn't, 'cause it doesn't  
have a plug on it [moves arm back and forth as if plugging in a cord], so 
I'm getting confused.  
…(lines omitted)… 
2.15  Jason: Um, how could it have electricity in it because, because metal  
conducts electricity.  When it hits it it goes through to wherever it is.   
                                                 
14 Analysis 1 was last edited on June 23rd, 2009. I first presented the intellectual strategy that students are 





2.16  Ms. B: And what is the toy car made of? 
2.17 Jason: Plastic. 
2.18  Ms. B: And so you're asking why is the magnetism // you [Jason, Joe, and  
another student off camera] need to sit down so everyone can see-- 
2.19  Jason: No, how could, how could the magnet be part of...How could it  
have um, electric in it because if it conducts to metal, electric when it hits 
it, it would just travel through until, until there's no other metal on it. 
2.20  Ms. B: Does anybody know the answer to that? He wants to know why is  
it working when it should be made of metal, and the toy car is made of 
plastic.  So why is it still working, Michael? 
2.21 Michael: Well, I just wanted to say (*** ***) found out something else  
about the toy car. Um, we tried that same magnet on the back of the car 
and if you pushed the other magnet closer to it, it moved forward…from 
the back. 
2.22  Ms. B: So why is that working because that's what Jason's confused about.   
Why would that be working when the toy car is made of plastic so he's 
saying it's not conducting the whatever that is. 
2.23  Jason: No, I'm saying how could, how could a magnet have electricity in it  
because, isn't a magnet metal too? sort of?  If it had electricity in it, it 
would go out.  Because once electricity hits metal it goes, it keeps going in 
the metal until it goes // until there's no other metal on to for it to travel 
through and then it goes out.  
 
 In the clip, Jason challenges the idea that a magnet can have electricity inside of it 
on the basis that electricity flows through and out of metals. Ms. B works to understand 
Jason’s concern, and in the process points out some inconsistencies that she herself sees, 
for example, that the plastic car can be moved by magnets.  
3.6.1 Analysis 1: Before Presuming That Students Always Seek Coherence  
 In creating an initial coding scheme for coherence seeking, I focused on two 
aspects of coherence often discussed in the literature—consistency and relationships.  
Consistency, as an aspect of coherence, means non-contradiction. But a set of facts or 
words can be consistent, and yet apparently have nothing to do with each other, i.e. they 
do not seem to “hang together.” Thus, the second piece of coherence seeking involves 
building relationships between ideas. In conceptualizing what evidence of these two 





these two aspects of coherence into constituent parts, based on both my own experience 
in science and literature on coherence. In particular, I limited “relationships” to those 
often recognized as important in science, i.e. causal, functional, part-to-whole, etc.: 
Table 1: Initial Coding Scheme for Coherence Seeking 
  
 Using the coding scheme in Table 1, I found two kinds of evidence of coherence 
seeking in the clip: Ms. B and Jason identified inconsistencies and requested 
reconciliation of these inconsistencies. I distinguished between identifying an 
inconsistency and requesting reconciliation for it on the basis of how the inconsistency 
was brought to the attention of others. For example, in line 2.4, Ms. B asks a question 
about the inconsistency, suggesting that she wants Caitlin to elaborate (request 
reconciliation), whereas in line 2.23, Jason appeared to be conveying a point about why 
Caitlin’s idea does not make sense to him (identifying inconsistency):   
2.22 Ms. B: How can the magnets have electricity? I didn't, 'cause it doesn't  
have a plug on it, so I'm getting confused.  
2.23  Jason: No, I'm saying how could, how could a magnet have electricity in it  
because, isn't a magnet metal too? sort of?  If it had electricity in it, it 
would go out.  Because once electricity hits metal it goes, it keeps going in 
the metal until it goes // until there's no other metal on to for it to travel 
through and then it goes out.  
 
Consistency Relationships 
o Identifying contradictory pieces of 
information. 
o Questioning a result or idea that 
disagrees with what the student 
already knows. 
o Noticing something unusual or 
unexpected. 
o Attempting to reconcile 
inconsistencies/explain the 
unexpected. 
o Describing ideas or evidence in 
terms of causal, functional, part-to-
whole, etc. relationships.  
o Identifying missing information 
needed to complete an explanation. 







At the time, the distinction between identifying and requesting seemed important; 
coherence seeking at its fullest, I thought, must involve finding contradictions and doing 
something about them. (While I maintain that noticing and addressing contradictions in 
some way constitutes an important aspect of the scientific community’s coherence 
seeking, I have since abandoned the idea that an individual’s noticing an inconsistency in 
a moment is a priori less sophisticated or less central to coherence seeking than noticing 
and reconciling it in that moment.) 
 The codes also focused strictly on conceptual and some epistemic components of 
Jason’s and Ms. B’s reasoning, with little attention to the social, affective, cultural, and 
linguistic aspects of students’ sense-making. As Table 2 shows, I parsed participants’ 
utterances primarily in order to unpack the conceptual information that they were trying 
to make cohere. For example, in line 2.23 Jason says:  
Jason: No, I'm saying how could, how could a magnet have electricity in it 
because, isn't a magnet metal too? sort of?  If it had electricity in it, it would go 
out. [gestures with scissors] Because once electricity hits metal it goes, it keeps 
going in the metal until it goes—until there's no other metal on to for it to travel 
through and then it goes out.  
 
I coded the statement as: request reconciliation of an inconsistency; identify an 
inconsistency between perceived facts (magnet is metal, electricity goes through metal) 
and Caitlin's claim. That coding left out the fact that Jason recognized that Ms. H was 
misinterpreting his idea (“No, I’m saying how could…”), and also expressed frustration 
over it, as indicated by his tone. The approach also located coherence seeking within the 
minds of individuals and merely expressed in language. The initial coding scheme did not 





 Finally, and notably, in this initial analysis, most of the transcript was discarded 
as “noise.” I did not see any evidence of coherence seeking in Michael’s utterances, for 
example, and so omitted them from the analysis entirely. Likewise, I considered Caitlin’s 
contribution part of the conditions supporting Jason’s coherence seeking, rather than 
evidence of her own coherence seeking.  
  






Table 2: A Preliminary Analysis of Jason and the Magnets 
Line Speaker Transcript Analysis Code 
2.4 Ms. B 
How can the magnets have 
electricity? I didn't, 'cause it 
doesn't have a plug on it, so I'm 
getting confused. 
Inconsistency between claim (Caitlin's 
claim that magnets have electricity in 
them) and idea (Ms. B's idea that 
things with electricity [in them?] 
require plugs). 
Identify inconsistency (teacher) 




[standing] Um, how could it have 
electricity in it because, because 
metal conducts electricity.  When 
it hits it it goes through to 
wherever it is. 
Indentifies an inconsistency b/t 
Caitlin's claim (electricity in magnets) 
and perceived facts (metal conducts 
electricity/electricity goes through 
metal) 
Identify inconsistency (student) 
b/t claim (student)-info (perceived 
facts); request reconciliation 
(partnered with repeated requests) 
2.19 Jason 
No, how could, how could the 
magnet be part of… [sits down] 
How could it have um, electric in 
it because if it conducts to metal, 
electric when it hits it, [moves 
hand] it would just travel through 
until, until there's no other metal 
on it. 
Restates/identifies inconsistency from 
18 b/t Caitlin's claim and perceived 
facts (electric travels through metal—
implies that magnets must be metal, 
which Jason says in 2.19).  
Identify inconsistency (student) 
b/t claim (student)-info (perceived 
facts); request for reconciliation 
2.20 Ms. B 
Does anybody know the answer 
to that? He wants to know why is 
it working when it should be 
made of metal, and the toy car is 
made of plastic.  So why is it still 
working, Michael? 
the car moves, the toy car is made of 
plastic, car needs to be made of metal 
to go 
Identify inconsistency (teacher) 
b/t three pieces of information: 1) 
the car is moving (observation), 
2) the car is made of plastic (she 
gets this answer from Jason), 3) 
the car should be made of metal 
in order to move 
(misinterpretation of Jason's 
statements in 18, 22); request 





2.22 Ms. B 
So why is that working because 
that's what Jason's confused 
about. Why would that be 
working when the toy car is 
made of plastic so he's saying it's 
not conducting the whatever that 
is. 
Ms. B is re-explaining her 
interpretation of Jason's question and 
asking for a reconciliation.  
request reconciliation of an 
inconsistency 
2.23 Jason 
No, I'm saying how could, how 
could a magnet have electricity in 
it because, isn't a magnet metal 
too? sort of?  If it had electricity 
in it, it would go out. [gestures 
with scissors] Because once 
electricity hits metal it goes, it 
keeps going in the metal until it 
goes—until there's no other metal 
on to for it to travel through and 
then it goes out.  
Jason realizes, again, that Ms. B is 
misinterpreting his question. He 
restates, this time adding that magnets 
might be made of metal, so they can't 
keep the electricity in.   
request reconciliation of an 
inconsistency; identify an 
inconsistency b/t perceived facts 
(magnet is metal, electricity goes 






3.6.2 Analysis 2: After Presuming That Students Always Seek Coherence 
 As I revisited the Jason and the Magnets clip over time, with a broader 
perspective on what coherence seeking means and looks like, I likewise saw more 
evidence of coherence seeking in the data. The working assumption that students are 
always seeking coherence with respect to something revealed not only additional aspects 
of Jason’s and Ms. B’s coherence seeking, such as linguistic coherences, but also 
highlighted Caitlin’s and Michael’s coherence seeking, which I had previously 
overlooked as noise. 
 In my most recent analysis of that clip, I constructed a narrative, rather than a 
tabular analysis of evidence. Starting with line 3.1, Caitlin suggests that “magnets have 
some electricity” in them: 
2.1  Caitlin: Umm, well, the magnets have some electricity in them, and it— 
She never has a chance to fully articulate her thoughts, but she might mean that some 
active ingredient in magnets, call it “electricity”, accounts for their behavior (Watts, 
1983). Or, perhaps Caitlin sees (or is trying to form) a relationship between electricity 
and magnets. For example, two magnets sticking together might remind Caitlin of how 
static electricity makes a balloon stick to the wall. Regardless, Ms. B appears to treat 
Caitlin’s idea literally: 
2.2  Ms. B: They have electricity in them? 
2.3  Caitlin: Yeah, so sometimes— 
2.4 Ms. B: How can the magnets have electricity? I didn't // cause it doesn't  
have a plug on it [moves arm back and forth as if plugging in a cord], so 
I'm getting confused.  
 
In [2.2] and [2.4] Ms. B implicitly identifies a contradiction between Caitlin’s idea and 





objects that require electricity have plugs. So if magnets do not have plugs, how can they 
have electricity in them? She also gestures as though she is plugging a cord into a wall, 
perhaps further implying that electricity comes from the wall socket and is carried by the 
plug or cord.  
 In identifying this contradiction, and also bringing it to Caitlin’s attention, Ms. B 
seeks coherence. Her coherence seeking takes the form of a question, and also a 
syllogism. In Deductive-Nomological (D-N) form, the syllogism is:   
s1. Things with electricity have plugs. 
s2. Magnets do not have plugs. 
p. Therefore, magnets do not have electricity 
In addition to this coherence seeking, Ms. B’s comment “so I’m confused” could be 
interpreted as a performative move, evidence of her taking on the role of the unknowing 
teacher who needs to be enlightened by the student. And, though she does not specifically 
ask a question, Caitlin interprets Ms. B’s utterance in [2.4] as a request for additional 
information. Caitlin demonstrates that if she holds a magnet in her hand, and brings 
another magnet near it, the magnet in her hand jumps up. After Caitlin’s demonstration, 
Ms. B opens up the floor to other students, and a student named Jason asks a question 
about Caitlin’s idea: 
2.15  Jason: [gaze in Ms. B’s direction] Um, how could it have  
electricity in it because, because metal conducts electricity?  When it hits 
it it goes through to wherever it is.   
2.16  Ms. B: And what is the toy car made of? 
2.17  Jason: Plastic. 
2.18  Ms. B: And so you're asking why is the magnetism // ##you [to Jason,  
Michael, and another student off camera] need to sit down so everyone 
can see## — 





part of // How could it have um, electric in it because if it conducts to 
metal, electric when it hits it, it would just travel through until, until 
there's no other metal on it. 
 
Like Ms. B, Jason uses an interrogative form to point out an inconsistency between some 
of the things he knows about metal and magnets, and Caitlin’s idea. The gist of his 
concern is this: Magnets are made of metal. Metal does not “hold” electricity, rather, 
electricity travels through it. In that case, magnets cannot have electricity in them. Or 
again, in D-N format:  
 s1. magnets are made of metal 
 s2. electricity goes through metal 
 p. magnets cannot have electricity in them 
Ms. B re-voices Jason’s question to the class, and calls on Michael, who has had his hand 
raised since Caitlin’s magnet demonstration: 
2.20  Ms. B: Does anybody know the answer to that? He wants to know why is  
it working when it should be made of metal and the toy car is made of 
plastic. So why is it still working, Michael?  
2.21  Michael: Well, I just wanted to say (*** ***) found out something else  
about the toy car. Um, we tried that same magnet on the back of the car 
and if you pushed the other magnet closer to it, it moved forward…from 
the back. 
 
Michael’s phrasing “I just wanted to say” and “found out something else” suggest that he 
is aware that his statements will not directly answer Ms. B’s question. Instead, Michael 
reports that his group was able to make the toy car move by taping a magnet to the back 
of one car, and bring the other magnet near it. Interestingly, Michael’s observation is 
precisely opposite of what Caitlin showed. When Caitlin brought the magnets together 
and they stuck together; when Michael brought them close together, they pushed apart. 





his observation is the opposite of, and thus inconsistent with, Caitlin’s. However, by 
marking his utterance as something other than an answer to Ms. B’s question, Michael 
certainly tries to fit his observation into the flow of the conversation, a sort of linguistic 
coherence seeking. Ms. B redirects Michael and the rest of the class back to her 
interpretation of Jason’s question: 
2.22  Ms. B: So why is that working because that's what Jason's confused about.  
Why would that be working when the toy car is made of plastic so he's 
saying it's not conducting the whatever-that-is. 
 
Ms. B notices that Jason is concerned about an inconsistency. She thinks that he is 
concerned about the toy car being made of plastic [2.20, 2.22], because electricity only 
travels through metal. Her interpretation of Jason’s idea likely resonates with her own 
ideas about what kinds of materials conduct electricity. But Jason re-explains himself, 
pointing out that he is not concerned that the toy car is made of plastic, but that the 
magnet is made of metal: 
2.23  Jason: [now holding a pair of scissors] No, I'm saying how could, how  
could a magnet have electricity in it because, isn't a magnet metal too? sort 
of? If it had electricity in it, it would go out. [waving scissors, from the 
left, to the right, seeming to show how electricity would move] Because 
once electricity hits metal it goes, it keeps going in the metal until it 
goes…until there's no other metal on to for it to travel through and then it 
goes out.  
 2.24  Ms. B: Alright, so how many of you agree that we have a lot more  
  experimentation with the magnetism until we understand it? 
 
Thus, Jason’s utterance in [2.23] not only indicates his coherence seeking with respect to 
Caitlin’s initial suggestion that magnets contain electricity, but also indicates that he 
checks to see if Ms. B’s rephrasing aligns with the substance of question. Given the 
argumentation literature’s emphasis on students’ being able to recognize and distinguish 





that additional aspect of Jason’s coherence seeking (Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 1998, p. 
299). That is, argumentation:  
…is not only about learning to coordinate evidence with claims and being causal 
in one’s theorizing, it is also about resolving differences of opinion by developing 
a shared understanding of complex concepts, persuading others about science-
related disputes, using sophisticated linguistic structures, making personal 
decisions that are consequential, and navigating the accountability structures of 
formal schooling. (Bricker & Bell, 2008, p. 496) 
 
Ms. B, perhaps sensing that she has not been able to establish a shared understanding 
with Jason, puts his concerns aside for the moment and moves the class on to other ideas 
[3.24]. 
 Judith Wells Lindfors (1999) describes wondering discourse as the construction of 
an “inquiry text” (p. 31). In the Jason and the Magnets Episode, the students and Ms. B 
collaboratively construct an inquiry text around their observations and questions about 
magnetism. Each person in the class who participates in the construction of this inquiry 
text, either as a listener or as a speaker, must seek coherence in a linguistic or narrative 
sense (Tapiero, 2007; Levy & Fowler, 2004). For example, for Michael to even recognize 
that the discussion was about magnets, he must have at some point constructed 
connections between Ms. B’s, Caitlin’s, and Jason’s contributions. More generally, 
making sense of a conversation requires that students evaluate how statements in a 
conversation might be related to each other (Graesser, Mill, & Zwan, 1997; van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983; see also Bartlett, 1932).  
 In addition to the linguistic and conceptual coherence seeking taking place, the 
students are also connecting together information about each other, their surroundings, 
the kind of activity in which they are engaged. In other clips, discussed in Chapter 7, 





sometimes overshadow) students’ pursuit of coherence among more “conceptual” 
information. In the Jason and the Magnets clip, students’ connecting of social and 
affective information certainly occurs, but perhaps in less obvious ways. Jason’s change 
in tone as he continues to re-state his concerns in line 2.19 and 2.23 indicates an 
increasing frustration. But he also expresses tentativeness, for example, when he asks, 
“aren’t magnets metal too, sort of?” The tentativeness could indicate his own uncertainty 
about the idea that magnets are metal, or he might be uncertain about the social situation, 
i.e. if the teacher and other students do not see understand what I am saying, then maybe 
what I am saying does not make sense. As Jason continues to speak, he becomes more 
animated, physically and verbally, and begins to rise out of his chair. Ms. B asks him to 
sit down in line 2.18, enforcing a classroom norm (it is customary for students to stay in 
their seats in Ms. B’s class). In fact, much of the work that Ms. B and the students are 
doing in the days leading up to and after the Jason and the Magnets clip involves making 
sense of and negotiating “what’s going on here” as they work through a science 
curriculum module unlike any they have participated in together that year (Hammer, 
Elby, Scherr, & Redish, 2005).   
  Tracking not only the conceptual coherences, but also all of the other kinds of 
coherence seeking going on in these moments made the use of the table analyses 
increasingly unwieldy. Narratives (with video stills), annotated transcripts, and diagrams 
became the most pragmatic way to keep track of the linguistic, social, affective, 
epistemological, etc. evidence of coherence seeking (as intertwined with conceptual 
information), whereas the table remained a useful tool for distilling students’ coherence 






 The question of how to define coherence is not merely a philosophical musing; 
rather, definitions of coherence drastically affect how researchers and educators interpret 
students’ sense-making in science class. As the Raphael Cloud Story and Jason and the 
Magnets analyses illustrate, a perspective built on the assumption that students are always 
seeking coherence with respect to many kinds of information has the potential to enrich 
our understanding of how students collaboratively construct knowledge (their “inquiry 
texts”) in science class.  
 In the next chapter, I further substantiate the working assumption that students are 
always seeking coherence, as well as outline more systematically categories of evidence 





Chapter 4: Identifying Evidence of Coherence Seeking in Science 
Classrooms 
“Meaning is not cut and dried; it is a matter of imagination and a matter of constructing 
coherence. The objectivist emphasis on achieving a universally valid point of view misses 
what is important, insightful, and coherent for the individual.” 
      -Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 
4.1 Introduction 
 In the last chapter, I argued that much of the richness in Raphael’s Cloud Story 
lies in recognizing that he constructs that story dynamically in the moment, as he pieces 
together ideas that the class had been discussing over the past two days. That is, in 
interpreting Raphael’s participation as a search for coherence, we can begin to make 
sense of how he pieces together ideas about clouds, water, evaporation, fog, and even his 
experiences flying. I also showed how although Raphael’s idea is incorrect from a 
scientist’s point of view, there is reason to value Raphael’s explanation in that it shows he 
is trying to make sense of, and to seek coherence, between ideas. He suggests that many 
of the water-related phenomena that his class has discussed, including the disappearance 
of clouds and puddles, and the formation of rain and fog, are actually causally connected. 
The sun heats clouds in the morning, causing the clouds to melt and form rain and 
puddles. Then, as the sun gets even warmer in the afternoon, the puddles evaporate. 





expressions, suggests that Raphael believes he has not only sought, but also achieved a 
sense of coherence for himself.15 
 Raphael’s cloud story contains many different kinds of evidence of coherence 
seeking. Pauses, repetition, and preliminaries (“Oh! I have an idea”) are evidence that 
Raphael is thinking through his ideas as he is sharing them—that is, he is literally 
constructing the explanation in the moment. His speech contains linguistic markers that 
indicate causal relationships (“and then”). He explicitly identifies some of the conceptual 
information that he tries to connect in these causal relationships (“the sun”, “the 
puddles”, etc.). Raphael’s meta-cognitive comments about his idea (“And that's, and the 
clouds are connected to the fog and the water”) indicate not only how he was connecting 
information, but also his intention and awareness in making those connections. Finally, 
Raphael’s gestures, facial expressions, and tone of voice help illuminate how Raphael 
sees and feels about the connections he is making.   
 Raphael’s Cloud Story is just one example of what coherence seeking can look 
like in science class. However, in this chapter, I move beyond Raphael’s story to consider 
more broadly what constitutes evidence of coherence seeking in science classrooms. I 
begin with a working definition of coherence seeking, and proceed to illustrate various 
forms of coherence seeking using data from participant classrooms.    
4.2 A Working Definition of Coherence Seeking 
 In the broadest terms, coherence refers to how well ideas “hang together” 
(Buchmann & Floden, 1992, p. 4). A search for coherence, then, is an attempt to make 
                                                 
15 Bartlett (1932/1995) describes the end state of seeking connections as “primarily affective.” That is, “an 





ideas fit together in some way. But there are a variety of ways to make ideas or 
information fit together, some of which seem to have very little utility in science. 
Crossword puzzles, for example, invite readers to connect together terms and phrases in a 
visual way. Advertisers try to make viewers associate their products with ideas and 
feelings of enjoyment, happiness, or success through carefully constructed commercials. 
Even choosing an outfit for the day involves coherence seeking; garments must quite 
literally “hang together” in a visually pleasing way. In each of these scenarios, the 
standards for what counts as coherent are determined in interaction with the designers 
(puzzle, clothing, commercials) and the users.  
 As scientists make sense of phenomena, they also construct criteria for coherence. 
For example, in evaluating cosmological models, scientists generally prefer models that 
can postdict the currently accepted values for cosmological parameters (Ostriker & 
Steinhardt, 1995). In atmospheric science, weather models are constrained both by 
accurate prediction of local conditions now, as well as accurate prediction of weather 
conditions in the future (Kalnay, 2003). In materials science, theoretical models of a 
substance’s electronic properties (i.e. Mott-Anderson Theory) must align with both 
observation and fundamental laws of physics (Mott, 1974). Though scientists determine 
specific criteria for coherence dynamically as they make sense of phenomena, generally 
speaking, two key criteria for coherence seem relatively stable in science—non-
contradiction and explicit relationships. That is, in searching for coherence, scientists 






 In some sense, the non-contradiction criterion is self-explanatory. Ideas that are 
contradictory cannot fit together. Or, in the language of logic: If p implies not P, Then p 
and P contradict and do not cohere (Thagard, 1989). It seems that such logic should be 
universal, and independent of the observer. But, as Vosniado and Brewer (1992) describe, 
non-contradiction is not absolute, especially in the science classroom. While a teacher 
might think that the earth is round (p) logically implies the earth is not flat (not P), 
students can see these two ideas as consistent (the Earth is both p and P).    
 The second criterion—coherent explanations explicitly describe the relationship 
between statements—also seems to make sense intuitively. In searching for coherence, 
scientists do not simply look to accumulate a list of consistent facts. Rather, they try to 
find relationships between these facts, often in the form of causal explanations. But like 
consistency, relationships are also perspective-dependent. Raphael’s explanation, which 
brought together various pieces of knowledge about the water cycle, clearly contained 
meaningful relationships for him despite many non-canonical elements. The explicit 
statement of relationships also seems to be a commonly held value in science and science 
education. For example, Ng and.Mooney (1990) defined coherence as “how well the 
various observations are ‘tied together’ in the explanation” (p. 2). Similarly, Sandoval 
(2003) described coherence as how well the explanation “hangs together” and “the extent 
to which students are explicit about how claims relate to each other” (p. 25-26). The 
danger of coding schemes that require explicit relationships are twofold. First, they miss 
evidence of students’ coherence seeking when the relationships that students build are 





schemes may give false positives, attributing coherent conceptual knowledge to students 
who have actually just mastered the game of connecting vocabulary.    
 But, as a starting point, I suggest the following working definition for coherence 
seeking: trying to fit ideas and information together in ways that are meaningful and 
mutually consistent. Aspects of this definition are intentionally ambiguous, including the 
terms “trying”, “information”, and “meaningful” to allow space to interpret these ideas in 
the context of analyzing classroom episodes. 
4.3 The Learning Progressions (LP) Project “Responsive” Curriculum 
 The episodes in this chapter come from a series of elementary classrooms and one 
teacher professional development meeting, during units specifically designed to allow 
learners to construct, share, refine, and revise their ideas about energy, electricity, and the 
water cycle.  
 The elementary curriculum modules, designed specifically for use in the Learning 
Progressions (LP) project, differ drastically from the typical curricula implemented by the 
teachers. The standard science curriculum at these schools, called Full-Option Science 
System (FOSS), consists of a sequence of activities designed to help students master 
important concepts. For example, the 4th grade Electricity & Magnetism Module contains 
five activities, which students must complete in order. The first activity asks students to 
observe various magnetic effects, the second involves building a basic circuit, the third 
activity consists of experiments with parallel and series circuits, the fourth activity has 





system. In each activity, the students must follow specific instructions, and complete a set 
of questions at the end to check for understanding.16 
 In contrast, the LP modules are designed to be responsive. Rather than follow a 
strict sequence of activities, teachers determine what to do next with students based on 
the ideas that students raise in class. Each module begins with one opening question (see 
Table 3). For example, the water cycle module begins with the question: 
Suppose that one night it rains.  When you arrive at school you notice that there 
are puddles of rainwater in the parking lot.  But when you go home you notice 
that the puddles are gone. What happened to the rainwater?  
  
After the opening question, the module implementations vary. In Raphael’s class, Ms. M 
guided students into a discussion about clouds and cloud types. Ms. H, on the other hand, 
followed the opening question in her class with a series of experiments outside related to 
puddles and evaporation. In both cases, students’ ideas were central to the lesson.   
Table 3: Learning Progressions Modules and Focus Classrooms 
 
 Batteries and Bulbs Water Cycle Rain Workshop 
Grade 4th grade 5th grade Teachers & Staff 







Lighting a bulb: 
How can you make 
a bulb light using a 
battery and wire? 
Suppose that one 
night it rains. When 
you arrive at school 
you notice that 
there are puddles of 
rainwater in the 
parking lot. But 
when you go home 
you notice that the 
puddles are gone. 
What happened to 
the rainwater? 
Given its proximity 
to the ocean, why 
doesn’t it rain very 
often in San Diego? 
                                                 






 The purpose of the LP responsive curriculum is to make space for students’ 
inquiry in a way that a more strict sequence of activities may not. Freed from the 
constraints of “the curriculum,” teachers are able to pursue student thinking, and to help 
students refine that thinking in ways consistent with the disciplinary practices of science 
(Hammer, Goldberg, & Fargason, in press). As a corollary, the responsive curriculum 
also has the potential to open up space for particular kinds of coherence seeking that 
might otherwise be limited. In particular, when the pressure to move from one topic to 
the next is relieved, students have the opportunity to build upon their ideas in ways that 
involves looking for: 
 Alignment and misalignment between peers’ ideas 
 Connections between their everyday experiences and the phenomena under 
investigation 
 Consistency in their models/theories over time 
 Gaps in their explanations/unexplained phenomena 
 Alignment between their own ideas and the evidence available to them 
And conversely, other kinds of coherence seeking that are usually emphasized in science 
class, such as alignment between students’ ideas and those from authoritative sources (the 
teacher, the textbook) are less emphasized in the LP responsive curriculum. 
 The teacher professional development in the LP project includes a significant 
‘doing science’ component. Each summer, teachers spend a few hours a day, for two 
weeks, doing inquiry on a topic from their district standards or some other topic of 





scientific inquiry, the LP staff hoped to “create an environment in which teachers would 
actively engage in the practices of knowledge construction in science and would think 
about how they might create for their students a similar experience” (Rosebery & 
Warren, 1998, p. 3).  
 Both the elementary classroom data and the professional development inquiry 
data provide a rich context for exploring coherence seeking. Within and between these 
classrooms, the ideas that learners try to connect together, and the kinds of connections 
they try to make, are complex and varied. The episodes presented in this chapter are 
meant to illustrate various kinds of evidence of coherence seeking, as well as raise 
questions about how researchers and teachers attend to coherence seeking in the 
classroom. In Chapters 5 and 6, I delve into particular implementations of the water cycle 
and electricity modules in more detail, and reflect on the complexities of identifying 
evidence of, and interpreting, coherence seeking in science classrooms.  
4.4 Contrasting Examples of Coherence Seeking: The Obvious and the Ambiguous 
4.4.1 The Obvious: Evaporation in Winter 
 Sometimes a student’s sense-making resonates with commonly accepted ideas 
about what constitutes sophisticated scientific inquiry, i.e. the student tries to make ideas 
fit together in the way that clearly resembles scientific practice. For example, it is easy to 
recognize coherence seeking when it clearly opens up a pathway to the currently 
scientifically accepted answer or when it clearly resembles a disciplinary practice like 
modeling or forming analogies. There are many clear examples like these in the Learning 





magnets in which 4th grade student Jason points out a contradiction he sees in a 
classmate’s idea that magnets contain electricity: 
 Jason: [holding a pair of scissors] No, I'm saying how could, how  
could a magnet have electricity in it because, isn't a magnet metal too? sort of? If 
it had electricity in it, it would go out. [waving scissors, from the left, to the right, 
seeming to show how electricity would move] Because once electricity hits metal 
it goes, it keeps going in the metal until it goes…until there's no other metal on to 
for it to travel through and then it goes out.  
 
In identifying an inconsistency, and pushing the class to try to resolve it, Jason clearly 
attempts to make ideas fit together. Similarly, in a 5th grade classroom studying the water 
cycle, students developed and implemented a plan to catch evaporation which they claim 
to have observed rising up off of a puddle. The students put dome over the puddle, as 
indicated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Artifacts From the Dome Experiments in Ms. H’s Classroom 
  








(A) Drawing of the plan to put a dome plan. (B) Example of one group’s experimental set 
up of the dome test. (C) Partial list of questions students generated the day after the dome 
experiment. Ms. H’s note about Nate’s question appears second from the bottom (“How 
does water get to earth?” –winter- where’s heat”)   
  
 The dome indeed collected water on the inside surface, though there were 
differences in amount depending on the shape of the dome, where it was located, etc. The 
day after the students conducted the dome test, Ms. H asked the students to generate 
questions about the results (see Fig. 2). While generating questions, a student named Nate 
points out something that seems troubling:  
1.1  Nate: [gaze directed down toward his desk] Does wa // how like, how 
 does water get from Earth? I know it's evaporation, but [turns toward Ms.  
Does dirt in water effect evaporation? 
 
What’s making the water vapor rise? 
What causes water vapor to turn back 
into it’s liquid form? 
 
Aha! Water cycle depends upon water 
changing it’s state of mater. Like 
butterflies and humans 
 
Is the air in the dome saturated with 
water? Is this why water came down or 
is it weight? Cloud? 
 
How does water get to the earth? –
winter- where’s heat 
 
Why do some liquids evaporate faster 





H] doesn't heat ha // like, I'm thinking of winter, for some odd reason, with 
the dome and the water and everything. So when it rains [briefly looks 
down; moves hand in an upward motion], w-when it evaporates, doesn't it 
need heat to go up, back up in the clouds? 
1.2  Ms. H: So you have this question, really, not about how does water get to  
Earth, but, winter…where's the heat?  
1.3  Nate: Ya. [starts writing on his paper]17  
1.4  Ms. H: Because you're sitting here saying, "I know heat has something to  
do with this. But, winter months don't necessarily have heat, so how can 
this // how can this dome thing work if it's cold in there?" Is that what 
you're going for?  
1.5  Nate: Yes [writing on his paper]. 
 
In [1.1] Nate explains that he is thinking about different pieces of evaporation:  
 that water somehow leaves the earth (“how does water get from Earth”) 
 the name for that process is “evaporation” (“I know it's evaporation”) 
 water/rain needs heat to go back to the clouds (“doesn't it need heat to go up, 
back up in the clouds?” + gesture moving hand upward) 
 the experiment where students tried to catch evaporation with a dome (“with 
the dome and the water and everything”) 
 winter/cold in winter (“I'm thinking of winter… doesn't it need heat to go up, 
back up in the clouds?”) 
Unlike Jason, who appeared to have a clearly constructed question before he shared it 
with the class (despite his apparent trouble being understood), Nate seems to construct his 
question as he speaks. He starts by asking “how does water get from the Earth?” In the 
context of the larger class conversation, his question could be a push for mechanism. The 
class had developed and tested a system for catching the stuff coming off of the puddle 
                                                 
17 An additional camera angle reveals that Nate might be copying notes off of the front board; however, 





(which they interchangeably refer to as heat, evaporation, condensation, and water). 
However, prior to Nate’s question, the class had not developed an explanation for how 
exactly the stuff rises, other than that it involves heat and/or evaporation. Thus, in [1.1] 
Nate might be pushing the class to develop a causal account. His discounting of the term 
“evaporation” as a satisfactory answer is additional evidence that he might be looking for 
some sort of mechanism, or cause, beyond what the class has described so far.  
 But then Nate continues into a meta-cognitive comment, and the direction of his 
question shifts. He says that “for some odd reason” he is thinking of winter. Keeping in 
mind that this discussion took place nearly in June, and no one in the class had mentioned 
any ideas about cold or winter up to this point, it is a bit strange that Nate thinks of 
winter, and he is aware of that. He almost describes his thinking of winter as something 
that is out of his control, in contrast to ideas that  intentionally “shops for” such as the 
dome and water and heat rising (Sherin, Krakowski, & Lee, 2012; van Zee, Hammer, 
Bell, Roy, & Peter, 2005). He then starts to ask “when it rains” but gestures his hand in 
an upward motion. Perhaps the gesture triggers Nate that he has misspoken, because he 
pauses and re-states “when it evaporates.” Finally, the question emerges: “w-when it 
evaporates, doesn't it need heat to go up, back up in the clouds?” Rather than ask does it 
need heat, Nate asks doesn’t it need heat. Though seemingly a slight shift in wording, the 
intention of the question shifts dramatically. Nate is not asking for a mechanism for 
evaporation (how does it evaporate?), but instead rhetorically and implicitly points out a 
contradiction: how can it evaporate without heat (in winter)?  
 In [1.2] and [1.4], Ms. H intentionally de-centers to try to see the sense that Nate 





in [1.4] from “you’re” to “I” indicates that she actively tries to put on the perspective of 
Nate. She also pauses and restructures her speech multiple times as she tries to make 
sense of his idea and share with the rest of the class. She suggests that perhaps the thing 
troubling Nate is that if evaporation requires heat, then how could water evaporate in the 
winter? Nate confirms her interpretation. 
 In terms of instructional moves, Nate’s question jumps out as an opportunity to 
move the class towards a canonically acceptable understanding of evaporation. Up to this 
point, the class primarily discusses evaporation as something that requires extreme 
warmth or heat, i.e. evaporation can only happen in warm areas or on warm days. 
Students often fail to recognize that water can evaporate at any temperature (Canpolat, 
2006). Thus, Ms. H could use Nate’s question as an opportunity to launch into a 
discussion of vapor pressure and other factors affecting evaporation rates.  
 Ms. M does not opt to use Nate’s coherence seeking as a path to discussing 
canonically accepted ideas about evaporation. Rather, she allows the class to continue 
trying to resolve the apparent contradiction Nate has discovered:  
1.6  Molly: For the winter, the-the sun's still out, it's just the-the temperature  
is colder. 
1.7  Ms. H: So the sun's still out, but she says the temperature's colder. But he  
[Nate] still wants to know, but will that cause some other things to 
happen? Colin. 
1.8  Colin: It just, prob-well maybe, maybe it gets all the water in the  
summer and has like extra. 
1.9  Ms. H: So maybe it only functions in the summer? 
1.10  Colin: Ya. 
 
 Molly seems to take as fact that water evaporates in the winter. Therefore, she 
looks for what might cause or allow this evaporation to occur, and she identifies the sun 





happen in the winter. Rather, the evaporation happens in the summer, and whatever is left 
over or “extra” carries over to the winter.  Another student chimes in, with an idea that is 
a bit more difficult to understand: 
1.11  Ms. H: That's an interesting thought. // Chuck. 
1.12  Chuck: Um, cause like when it's cold in the winter, it doesn't, the snow's  
still there. It doesn't melt then evaporate. So...But as it gets warmer, then it 
does. So really, there's not much heat during the winter. But... 
 
Chuck points out that snow exists in winter, but he is not specific about whether he is 
referring to snow in clouds, or snow on the ground. Either way, the snow stays frozen 
(“doesn’t melt”) in the winter. But as the Earth gets warmer, the snow melts and then 
evaporates. Chuck’s point might be that in the winter evaporation does not need to 
happen because the snow is already in the clouds (similar to Colin’s argument). Or, he 
might simply be claiming that evaporation does not happen in the winter because the 
snow is frozen, leaving Nate’s initial question unresolved. 
 Ms. H explicitly draws attention to the work that students are doing to make sense 
of evaporation and cloud formation:  
1.13  Ms. H: So what would you say then, you think might be going on with this  
whole process that we've kinda been looking at. We've only seen parts of 
it, but we're kind of inferring that maybe it goes further. What would you 
say then, Dale, happens during the winter? How- Does this change? 
Because that's kind of what Nate wants to know. Does this, what we were 
seeing yesterday, does that change just because it's winter? 
 
 Ms. H’s move in [1.13] highlights what I see as an important distinction between 
coherence and canonical correctness. In Ms. H’s words, the class is trying to understand a 
“process.” Though she does not elaborate on the components, or “parts” of that process, 
we can infer from the conversation that the process has something to do with evaporation, 





been explained—if and how that process changes in winter. And despite the students’ 
non-canonical proposed solutions to Nate’s question, Ms. H encourages Dale and the 
other students to continue along this line of reasoning. Even though the students’ answers 
may not seem to align with or even lead to scientifically accepted answers, the work they 
are doing to try to build a story of this process is coherence seeking, and an important 
part of their doing science.   
4.4.2 The Ambiguous: Jacuzzi Analogy 
 Finding evidence of coherence seeking in the discussion around Nate’s question is 
easy. The students are relatively articulate in pointing out and trying to resolve an 
inconsistency—a practice that is highly valued and some would argue even the driving 
force of progress in science (Dilworth, 1994; Kuhn, 1962; Meheus, 2002).  
 But within a science class, students do much more than try to resolve 
inconsistencies. While moments like Nate’s question stand out, there are many moments 
in which students do not seem to be trying to connect any information together at all. For 
example, a few days after the discussion around Nate’s question, a group of four students 
in Ms. H’s class decides to test whether warm or cold water evaporates faster. The 
students conduct a pair of experiments and find in both that the cold water evaporates 
faster than warm water. Upon completing the second experiment, Molly announces the 
results: 
2.1  Molly: Coldest evaporates first. The warmer it is, the slower than the  
cold. 
2.2  Leah: That's weird. 
2.3  Molly: Yeah that is weird. 
2.4 Leah: Ooh! [turning to face Molly] It's kinda like when you go in a 
 pool and a jacuzzi. You go in the pool and then you go-you go in the pool  
then it's cold then you in the jacuzzi and it's hot. And it's even hotter than 






After the first experiment, Leah was relatively quiet about the fact that the cold water 
evaporated faster. But upon hearing Molly’s summary after the second trial, Leah seems 
to suddenly realize that the results do not make sense [2.2]. Intuitively, warmer water 
should evaporate faster, not cold water. Rather than ignore the strange result, Leah tries 
to explain it with her Jacuzzi analogy [2.4]. Something about Leah’s recognizing and 
trying to explain a strange result suggests coherence seeking. But where exactly is the 
coherence seeking, in Leah’s statements?  
 In her work on inquiry and language, Linfors (1999) argues that even words like 
“Yuk!” and “That’s good”, when taken in context, can be evidence of inquiry (p. 35). 
Likewise, Leah’s simple comment “That’s weird” is an indicator, in this context, that 
something does not quite fit or make sense to her, and Molly agrees. “That” appears to 
refer to the experimental result—that warm water evaporates slower than cold water.  The 
word “weird” indicates Leah and Molly’s recognition of some sort of inconsistency, or 
mismatch—but between what? It is likely that the inconsistency is related to her own 
experiences with evaporating water: puddles evaporate faster on warm days, steam rises 
from a warm cup of hot chocolate. These experiences suggest that warm water should 
evaporate faster than cold water, but the experimental results say otherwise. The 
mismatch then, is between intuition (likely built on experiences) and an experimental 
result.  
 Even noticing that a result is “weird” is evidence of a particular kind coherence 
seeking. Seeking coherence is about trying to fit ideas and information together in ways 
that are meaningful and mutually consistent. A weird result—one that does not fit with 





3). And Leah’s comment in [2.2] not only gives us, as observers, evidence that she 
notices the inconsistency; it also brings the weird result to Molly’s attention. 
 Rather than just ignore the weird result, Leah attempts to reconcile it with other 
knowledge. Her Jacuzzi explanation is important for a number of reasons. First, it is 
additional evidence that Leah found the result troubling on some level. Cognitive 
dissonance theory holds that inconsistencies are psychologically uncomfortable, and that 
people will attempt to minimize that discomfort (Festinger, 1957). Leah’s explanation 
can be interpreted as just such an attempt—if she can explain the result, then it is no 
longer problematic.  
 Secondly, Leah’s explanation is evidence that she is trying to fit the result that 
warm water evaporates slower than cold into experiences and knowledge that she already 
has. She recounts the experience of going from a pool into a Jacuzzi, and how the Jacuzzi 
would feel “even hotter than usual” [2.4]. In a sense, Leah has made an analogy: pouring 
cold water outside on a hot day is like when you move from a pool to a Jacuzzi. In other 
words, there is some sort of extra effect associated with combining objects at different 
temperatures. 
 Finally, Leah’s appeal to Molly [2.4] is evidence of what Lindfors (1999) refers to 
as a “reaching stance” (p. 110). Using the pronoun “you” and the phrase “you know what 
I mean?” [2.4], Leah reaches out to Molly, trying to bring her in as a participant in 
inquiry, and in the seeking of coherence. Leah’s reaching out not only marks her 
language as an “act of inquiry,” but also suggests that she thinks Molly can and should 





 In this excerpt, it is easy to attribute coherence seeking to Leah. She notices a 
strange experimental result, and she constructs an analogy that fits the result in with her 
own experiences. Thus, it might be tempting to claim that Molly is not seeking coherence 
in this episode. She hardly engages with Leah’s comments, and does not show any clear 
evidence of trying to fit together her experiences and experimental observations. One 
possibility is that Molly does try to make sense of the same inconsistency as Leah, but 
does not articulate it. Molly’s science journal entry for the experiment may support that 
interpretation, as she does comment on the skin tingling she experiences when going 
from a pool to a Jacuzzi. Molly also shares the Jacuzzi analogy with Ms. H during journal 
writing time.  
 However, even if it had nothing to do with the experiment, Molly very likely was 
trying to connect some set of information together. As briefly stated in Chapter 3, I 
included as part of my approach to analysis of classroom data the assumption that 
students are always seeking coherence with respect to something. In the next section, I 
more explicitly outline categories of evidence for coherence seeking in science 
classrooms, and distinguish between the coherences that students are likely always 
seeking, and those that they only sometimes seek.     
4.5 Categories of Evidence of Coherence Seeking 
4.5.1 Brief Reminder of the Literature 
 Education research studies, if taken separately, have narrowly defined what 
counts as coherent in students’ reasoning. Each researcher tends to focus on one or 
perhaps two aspects of coherence that he or she deems most important for scientific 





 Ranney and Thagard (1988) for example, look for evidence of explanatory 
coherence in students’ reasoning about motion, that is, how do students modify or retain 
their beliefs about motion in the face of contradictory evidence. Vosniadou and Brewer 
(1992) focus on the internal consistency of students’ responses (both verbal and drawn) 
during a clinical interview about the shape of the Earth. If, over the course of the entire 
interview, the student’s responses are mostly consistent, then the authors ascribe to that 
student a coherent model of the Earth. In looking for evidence of students’ adherence to 
the epistemic criterion of coherence, Sandoval (2003) evaluates their written explanations 
about natural selection for evidence of explicitly stated causal claims. The inclusion of 
extraneous information in his coding scheme is evidence against coherence. Finally, 
Davis (2003) analyzes students’ written letters for coherence, which she defines as a 
combination of linkedness and conceptual validity. Linkedness encompasses both internal 
consistency (like Vosniadou and Brewer), as well as the explicit articulation of 
relationships between ideas. Conceptual validity refers to whether or not the students’ 
ideas are scientifically normative.  








Paper Aspect of Coherence 
Davis (2003) Canonical correctness; explicit 
relations 
Jimenez Gomez, Benarroch, & 
Marin (2006) 
Internal consistency 
Sandoval (2003) Explicit causal relations 
Samarapungavan & Weirs (1997) Explanatory coherence 
Schank & Ranney (1992) 
Ranney & Thagard (1988) 
 
Explanatory coherence (between 
hypothesis and evidence); internal 
consistency 





 Rather than isolate single aspect of coherence, I aim, most generally, to see the 
sense in what students are doing in science class. To do this work, I must step outside the 
boundaries that traditionally define coherence in western science (i.e. prototypical 
coherence seeking), and instead consider the myriad ways that students fit information 
together, including ways sometimes seen as outside of or even antithetical to science. My 
approach requires starting with the assumption that students are capable, thoughtful 
beings who interact with the world in ways that, on some level, make sense to them. That 
is, students are always seeking coherence with respect to something. 
4.5.2 Grounds for Asserting that Students are Always Seeking Coherence With 
Respect Something  
 As an intellectual strategy, it is useful for educators and researchers to assume that 
students are always seeking coherence with respect to something. Such a lens requires us 
to cast aside our notions of what constitutes correct or scientific sense-making, and 
instead focus on the sense that students are trying to make in the moment. However, there 
are theoretical and empirical reasons to take literally this intellectual strategy. That is, in 
the broadest and most general terms, students really are seeking coherence constantly 
because they are human. I briefly present arguments and evidence from three lines of 
research: perceptual processing, psychology, and linguistics.  
 4.5.2.1 Perceptual processing.  
 Humans possess a variety of sensory systems which are constantly streaming 
information. In order to make sense of this information, we must continually coordinate 
it, both consciously and unconsciously. For example, in recognizing an object as water 





object, but even our associations with respect to how that object is used (Smith, 2005). 
The visual arts often capitalize on the human tendency to make sensory information 
coherent, especially with techniques such as juxtaposition. In looking at the arrangement 
of fruit in Giuseppe Arcimboldo’s work, we cannot help but see a human-looking face. 
The search for coherence is in some sense automatic, or unconscious. But in entering a 
museum gallery for the first time, our search for coherence might be more purposeful. 
We look around to figure out “What kind of exhibit is this? What do these pieces of art 
have in common?” Part of our expectation of museums is that the pieces shown together 
have something in common, and so we search for those commonalities. And, these 
expectations actually shape our sensory experiences. We coordinate bits and pieces of 
information into our assessment of a situation, and conversely our ideas about what 
should be happening in a situation quite literally affect the information that we perceive, 
as demonstrated in for example Daniel Simons’ inattentional blindness studies (Simons & 
Chabris, 1999). The search for coherence occurs across multiple levels, both intentionally 
and subconsciously. 
 4.5.2.2 Psychology.  
 Psychologists offer many different perspectives on coherence and human-ness. 
But before exploring some of these perspectives, it is useful to think of what the world 
would be like for an individual who lacks the capacity to seek certain forms of coherence. 
Oliver Sacks provides the clinical example of Mr. Thompson, who has a form of short 
term memory loss which prevents him from being able to seek coherence over long (more 
than a few seconds) spans of time: 
If you walked into a room he might decide that you were a customer entering the 





sandwich. But then "click," change of scene. He might notice that you were 
wearing a white coat and would invent a new story—you are the butcher from 
down the street. "Click," new scene. The butcher always had bloodstains on his 
coat; so you must be a doctor. Mr. Thompson would see no inconsistencies in his 
changing stories. He came up with perfectly good explanations for his current 
circumstances, with no idea that these explanations changed from moment to 
moment.” (Sacks, 1985, p. 93-94)   
 
Mr. Thompson’s story is an extreme one, and likely does not characterize most students. 
However, his story illustrates what as educators we may often take for granted: that even 
in existing and making sense of the world around them, students are seeking coherence. 
Festinger (1957) and Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have expounded upon two aspects of this 
innate human capacity—and some would argue proclivity—to seek coherence.    
 Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance holds that or misalignment or  
dissonance between information causes humans psychological discomfort. Because 
psychological discomfort is unpleasant, we try to minimize it by seeking consonance, or 
alignment between knowledge and actions. Festinger showed that smokers, knowing their 
habit is unhealthy, will often reduce cognitive dissonance by rationalizing their habit, 
rather than quitting it. More recently, fMRI imaging has assisted in the development of a 
neurological basis for the theory cognitive dissonance. Van Veen, Krug, Schooler, and 
Carter (2009) showed that specific regions of the brain activate when participants are 
asked to argue that an unpleasant MRI is enjoyable; furthermore, these regions do not 
activate in the control group, suggesting that the regions activated by experimental 
condition are in fact evidence of cognitive dissonance. Festinger’s idea of reducing 
dissonance is in a sense a particular kind of coherence seeking—alignment between 





similarly argues that coherence seeking serves an important role in psychological well-
being:  
The psychological immune system uses the "feel good" criterion…namely 
selecting, interpreting, and evaluating incoming information in ways that maintain 
our self-esteem. One of the most important lessons from social psychology is that 
people are masterful spin doctors, rationalizers, and justifiers of threatening 
information and go to great lengths to maintain a sense of well-being. And the 
psychological immune system operates largely outside of awareness." (154-155) 
 
 Studies of human perception and psyche will not play a major role in my 
articulation of evidence for coherence seeking in the science classroom, other than to 
offer some justification for the starting assumption that students are always seeking 
coherence with respect to something. Occasionally, when it seems particularly relevant 
for understanding how students construct understandings of physical phenomena, I will 
comment on aspects of students’ perceptual and psychological coherence seeking.  
4.5.3 Language and Coherence Seeking  
 Beyond purely the sensory and psychological arguments, a case that humans are 
always seeking coherence can be made from work on language—that is, written, spoken, 
and gestural communication between people. Because language as an act of coherence 
seeking plays an important role in my analysis of video data, I discuss it at some length. 
  4.5.3.1 Trying to form syntactic relationships. 
 Communication involves forming sequences of symbols. Within the English 
language, certain sequences are standardized. For example, the plurality of a pronoun 
should align with the antecedent (“the dog is”, not “the dog are”). The verb generally 
follows the noun (“the man walked”, not “the walked man”).18 When students read or 
                                                 
18 Certainly, speakers also communicate in non-standard, culturally-specific ways. I use the examples of 






speak in science class, they must work to construct their ideas into an acceptable 
sequence, and they also monitor ideas for whether or not they follow the sequences, i.e. 
they seek syntactic coherence. For example, in one participant classroom, a 4th grade 
student Erin reads from her group’s paper a description about how to make a bulb light:  
Figure 3: Erin’s Group’s Explanation for How a Bulb Lights. 
 
3.1 Erin: [reading] Okay. The wire is taking the negative energy from annd--  
3.2 Shaye: No, from the == 
3.3 Erin: from the left light bulb and taking it to the right one and bringing  
it to the left one because the light bulbs need negative and energy po ... 
[At this point Erin starts following the words with her finger as she reads.] 
3.4 Shaye: ##Wait, you skipped a line.## 
3.5 Erin: ##negative and positive## energy to light. 
 
Understandably, Erin makes mistakes while reading; the words curve along the page, 
making it hard to follow the lines of the paragraph (see Fig. 3). After reading the first 
line, Erin interprets the word “and” as being part of the first line because of its physical 
location on the page [3.1]. Realizing that the sequence “from and” does not make sense, 
Erin hangs on the word “and” as she tries to make sense of the sentence. Shaye also 
notices the strange sequence, either on his own or perhaps triggered by Erin’s pause, and 
corrects with the phrase “from the.” Then, in [3.3], Erin pauses on the phrase “negative 
and energy po.” Erin notices something is wrong with the structure (and possibly the 
meaning) of the sentence, as indicated by her pause and rephrasing in [3.4] and [3.5]. 





to read the skipped line, but does correct a missed word. The paper says “negative and 
positive energy” but she reads “negative and energy.” The missing positive might have 
been not only a syntactic problem for her, but also an issue of meaning. Negative is one 
kind of energy, to Erin, so the phrasing “negative and energy” does not make sense.  
 In considering what information students try to connect when speaking, reading, 
and listening, at least two distinctions need to be considered. First, students seek syntactic 
coherence, i.e. that the sequence and structure of speech hangs together. Students check 
for pronoun-antecedent agreement, for word order, and for sentence structure. But as 
Chomsky demonstrated with his sentence “colorless green ideas sleep furiously”, 
syntactic coherence does not necessarily make a sentence conceptually meaningful. 
Another kind of coherence seeking in language, then, is the search for semantic meaning. 
Again, like syntactic coherence seeking, students’ continuous search for semantic 
meaning generally proceeds quietly. But when students encounter language that seems 
incoherent to them, the coherence seeking becomes evident. For example, when 5th 
grader Chuck recounts an example of density that he read in a book (that corks float in 
water), he mis-speaks in a way that confuses his group mate Dunn and his teacher:  
4.1  Chuck: And then um so the coo // since you know how if you were to put  
a corkscrew down in the ocean it would go up to the top. It's cuz the 
corkscrew is less  
4.2  Dunn: The cork. 
4.3 Chuck: What? 
4.4 Dunn: The cork? [sotto voce; gesturing with thumb and finger about an  
 inch apart, perhaps indicating the size and shape of a cork] 
4.5  Chuck: Yeah, the cork. [smiling and giggling; Dunn smiles] Not the  
 corkscrew. Um is more dense than the water so that's why it goes up. And 
 in the-- 
4.6  Ms. H: Are you sure? 






Chuck refers to putting a corkscrew in water, when actually he means to say a cork. Dunn 
notices the mistake, and in a questioning voice, suggests “cork” as a replacement. Chuck 
giggles and smiles, perhaps recognizing that his use of the word corkscrew was not just a 
syntactic mistake, but that it also rendered his sentence somewhat nonsensical (a 
corkscrew will not float, though it does contain the word “cork”, perhaps indicating a 
subconscious connection on Chuck’s part.) In [4.5], Chuck further says that the cork is 
“more dense than water so that’s why it goes up.” Ms. H stops Chuck here, implying that 
something he has said does not make sense to her. Chuck, perhaps responding to Ms. H’s 
tone and content of her speech (and possibly also facial expressions, though they were 
not visible on the camera), questions himself. He pauses, looks to the chart and his group 
mates for input, and tentatively changes his answer. While I have focused on evidence of 
linguistic coherence seeking here, I do note that Chuck, Dunn, and Ms. H are connecting 
many kinds of information in this moment related to conceptual information, their 
framing of the task, tone and facial expressions, etc.  
 At low resolution, evidence of communication (speaking, listening, reading, etc.) 
is evidence of coherence seeking. As educators and researchers, it is important to at least 
acknowledge this “baseline” coherence seeking, even if other kinds of coherence seeking 
are more salient. (We might think of it as the cosmic microwave background radiation of 
the classroom).  
 4.5.3.2 Conversational sequencing.  
 When we hold a conversation, there is some expectation that what we say next 
should in some way hang together with what has been said before. Participating in a 





Sometimes, students make that work explicit, as when 5th grader Raphael tries to make 
space for a question about altitude and temperature during a discussion about lightning: 
 Raphael: And also, I know this is kind of off our main question but, I just thought 
 like since the the clouds are so high, high up and it's cold, and the sun, and they're 
 closer to the sun than we are, why is it cold? 
 
Here, Raphael points out an apparent inconsistency between the idea that clouds are 
cold/it is cold up high (a bit of information he constructed based on information from his 
teacher and a flight attendant), and his observation clouds are closer to the sun. In terms 
of conceptual reasoning, his comment is striking. However, the very first part of his 
utterance is important for other reasons. He uses a preliminary “And also, I know this is 
kind of off our…main question” to introduce his utterance, explicitly trying to make a 
connection between what has come before in the conversation, and the question that he 
wishes to introduce. Raphael’s use of the preliminary indicates that he been keeping track 
of at least some of the prior moments in the conversation, that he thinks his comment 
might seem tangential to the teacher and his peers, and that he values his idea enough to 
share it despite the apparent disconnect.    
 In addition to being evidence of conversational coherence seeking, preliminaries 
might also tell us something about what social and cultural information students try to 
connect. Some districts, including the one in which the Learning Progressions data was 
collected, encourage teachers to establish the use of preliminaries as a classroom norm 
for gaining speaking rights. In Raphael’s specific case, he appears to be connecting his 
ideas into the flow of the conversation, as well as possibly aligning his utterance with a 
classroom norm of “accountable talk.” There are certainly situations in which a student 





her ideas substantively to those that came before. Thus, claims about what information 
that students are trying to connect when they use a preliminary must be grounded in the 
specifics of the episode.  
 Additional evidence of attention to conversational norms, beyond preliminaries 
already discussed, include turn-taking, repair, topical sequencing, shifts in gaze and body 
positioning, and speech volume normalization.  
 4.5.3.3 Story models and schemata. 
 Reading comprehension research models students’ sense-making of text in terms 
of coherence seeking. Briefly, as students read or listen, they construct dynamic models 
of the text. How exactly that model is constructed (i.e. top down or bottom up) remains 
poorly understood, but evidence that readers seek coherence across a variety of levels of 
text is well-supported in a number of studies. Interestingly, coherence seeking occurs not 
only during initial reading of the text, but also in reconstructing that text from memory. 
In his studies of memory, Bartlett (1932/1995) asked participants to read a story called 
The War of the Ghosts, which contained a number of unexplained plot turns. In re-telling 
the story, Bartlett found that participants tended to omit “jerky, surprising, and apparently 
inconsequential” details, thus reducing a previously disjointed story to “an orderly 
narration” (p. 86). And even when explicit connections were described in the text, 
participants did not necessarily recite these connections verbatim, prompting Bartlett to 
distinguish between participants’ tendency to seeking coherence, and their tendency to 
seeking (or recite) particular coherences: 
Any normal, educated observer strives after associative links, but whether the 
mode of connexion or the matter of such links, when they are supplied, is 






Story models and the criterion of coherence in comprehension have also been applied to 
studies of juror decision making. Pennington and Hastie (1992) describe jury service as 
an “active, constructive comprehension process” during which jurors are expected to 
create coherent—defined as consistent, complete, and plausible—narratives from an 
unwieldy and often unorganized presentation of evidence during the trial (p. 190). A 
series of experiments demonstrate that jury verdicts may vary depending on the order in 
which evidence is introduced, suggesting that coherence seeking is in fact an ongoing 
process, and not something that occurs only at the end of the trial during deliberation.  
 4.5.3.4 Language as evidence of, and an act of, coherence seeking. 
 Work to understand student thinking in science from a cognitive perspective treats 
language as evidence of the inner workings of the mind. In other words, language serves 
as evidence of coherence seeking among conceptual and epistemological information. 
Drawing on Lindfors’ (1999) language-act-framework, as well as the work on speech, 
conversational analysis, reading comprehension, I treat language as evidence of 
coherence seeking, but also as form of coherence seeking in and of itself.  
To participate in classroom discourse, students must coordinate their ideas into 
words, their words together into thoughts. Furthermore, students must find ways to 
articulate their ideas in ways that align with the classroom norms and ways of speaking 
appropriate to school science: 
To operate the register of classroom physics successfully we must discern what 
goes with what else, what particular relationships are implied…every moment of 
the discourse during which a particular thematic system is in use is rich with 
implicit cues to the structure of that system and its connection to other systems. 






Thus, coherence seeking can be considered a cognitive act, as well as sociocultural 
activity residing in discourse.   





















4.5.4 Summary of Categories of Evidence 
 Within a framework that narrowly defines coherence seeking, evidence can be 
conveniently reduced to a list of behaviors or discourse patterns that apply across 
multiple contexts. But within a framework that broadly defines coherence seeking, 
identifying and keeping track of evidence of coherence seeking becomes quite difficult. 
Assuming that students are always seeking coherence does not solve the problem because 
that still leaves the challenge of finding evidence of that work they are presumably 
always doing. Thus, to orient my analyses and impose some organization on the 
perspective outlined in this work, I have developed multiple ways of slicing evidence of 





 One categorization scheme distinguishes the coherence seeking that students are 
always doing from the coherence seeking that they sometimes do. I use perceptual 
processing, psychology, and studies of language and reading to illustrate examples of 
coherence seeking in which students are likely always engaged. But within making sense 
of phenomena, students may or may not try to reconcile conceptual inconsistencies, 
attend to experimental fairness, connect particular sets of information, etc.  
 Figure 4 demonstrates a second way to think about evidence of coherence 
seeking—according the kinds of information that students are trying to connect. When 
making sense of a physical phenomenon, for example how a bulb lights, students might 
seek coherence between epistemological, conceptual, linguistic, social, perceptual, 
affective, etc. information. The analytical challenge, then, lies in determining what kinds 
of information students are connecting and how.  
 A third way of organizing evidence of coherence seeking originates from the 
distinction between deductive and inductive approaches to analyzing data. The 
deductively-generated codes fall primarily from the working definition of coherence 
seeking, focus on conceptual information, and are described and illustrated in Appendix 
D. Examples include to: i) notice, draw attention to, or attempt to reconcile an 
inconsistency, ii) indicate that a result is unexpected, iii) attend to fairness of 
experimental conditions, iv) identify or construct a part-to-whole, causal, analogical, etc. 
relationship between ideas, v) notice or draw attention to an observation that is 
unaccounted for, and vi) question the relevance of a claim, observation, or piece of 
evidence. To inductively identify evidence of coherence seeking, I assume that students 





might be evidence of that coherence seeking. Because such evidence is inherently 
context-dependent, keeping track of it all in a single table of evidence would be unwieldy 
and also of limited usefulness. However, some examples of evidence that appeared across 
multiple clips include: i) use of preliminaries, ii) breaks and restructuring of speech, iii) 
mirroring of vocabulary, and iv) shifting gaze. 
 Two final approaches involve distinguishing between evidence of intentional and 
unconscious coherence seeking, which I discuss at length in Chapter 6, and between 
evidence of valuable/productive and other coherence seeking, discussed primarily in 
Chapter 8.  
4.5.5 Narrowing the Focus 
 Because I am primarily interested in understanding students’ work to make sense 
of physical phenomena, I necessarily had to develop a way of narrowing the focus in 
analyzing data. Rather than narrow coherence seeking to mean particular kinds of 
connections between particular kinds of information, as Sandoval (2003), Ranney and 
Thagard (1988), and Vosniadou and Brewer for example do, I choose to focus on 
episodes that prominently involve students’ sense-making around natural phenomena. For 
example, on the last day of the water cycle module in Ms. H’s class, Molly and Ari have 
a conversation before science class about another student. They notice that this student 
changes her behavior depending who she is talking to. While Molly and Ari are seeking 
coherence in the sense of looking for consistency in their peer’s behavior, I would not 
choose to analyze this episode in detail. Instead, I focus on moments when students are 





attend to students’ coherence seeking with respect to social, affective, or other 
information that does not explicitly seem to be explicitly about the natural phenomena.  
 For example, on the first day of the water module, Ms. H’s class created a list of 
ideas about what happened to the puddle water. Two of the ideas on the list were 
particularly contentious—that the water went into a crack or drain, or that it absorbed like 
a sponge into the ground. After a discussion of these and other ideas, Ms. H asks students 
to break into their small groups and create a “list of things [they] think would affect” the 
puddle.  
 Molly and Leah, along with their group mates John and Ari, spend a few minutes 
looking for dry erase markers, and then begin the discussion: 
5.1  Ari: Okay. I wanna say something, that (*** ***)-- 
5.2  John: [speaking loudly] Okay, so questions. 
5.3 Leah: Wait, [to John] what are we-questions? 
5.4 John: These are questions. 
5.5 Ari: Can I say one thing about the crack? 
5.6 Leah: Yes. 
 
During this transitional moment, there is tension among the students regarding what to do 
next. Ari makes two bids to continue an earlier discussion about the idea that the water 
went into a crack [5.1],[5.3]. John announces that this activity is about making 
“questions” [5.2]. Leah asks John what they are supposed to be doing [5.3], but also gives 
Ari permission to continue with the idea about the crack [5.6]. Molly is away from the 
group, sharpening her pencil. 
 By line [5.6], there are at least three different options for what the students will do 
next. One, they can follow Ms. H’s directions and come up with factors that affect 
evaporation. Two, they can let Ari talk about the idea that the water went into the crack. 





options roughly represent three different framings, or ways the students’ might answer 
the question “What is it that’s going on here?” (Hammer et al., 2005, p. 9).  And, 
consequently, they also open up opportunities for different kinds of coherence seeking.  
 With Leah’s permission [5.3], Ari takes the floor. He stops mentioning the crack, 
and instead talks about the idea that the water absorbed into the asphalt: 
5.7  Ari: Even if let's say asphalt could absorb water- 
5.8  John: Well I said wet asphalt. No one's mentioning that. (Ari: well  
but) I never said it was asphalt. I said it was wet asphalt. 
5.9  Ari: But wet asphalt, sometimes let's say, you know sometimes if you put,  
let's say you put a spudge, sponge in water- 
5.10  Leah: [looking at Ari] We need questions! 
5.11  Ari: I'm just (thinking?). Um, if you put a sponge in water, [Leah takes  
a paper from Ari] it sometimes it's at a certain point where it can't absorb 
any more water. 
 
The reason for Ari’s change of topic is unclear. It could be that he sees the crack and the 
absorbing idea as related (the asphalt and the crack both have a limited capacity for 
holding water?). Or, he may have just misspoken in [5.5]. Either way, Ari’s utterances in 
[5.1-5.11] indicate that Ari frames the activity as about considering ideas, rather than 
about generating questions. 
 But not only is Ari considering ideas, he is doing so in a particular kind of way—
he tries to connect his knowledge of water and sponges to the idea that the asphalt 
absorbed the puddle. Ari suggests that a sponge has a limited capacity to absorb water 
[5.11]. Though Ari never completes the line of reasoning, the implication is that “even if” 
the asphalt could absorb the puddle water, maybe it would not be able to absorb it all. In a 
sense, he is pointing out that the sponge idea may not completely account for the 
observation that the puddle water completely disappears. Or similarly, Ari may be 





that the asphalt absorbed water.  If a sponge has a limited capacity to absorb water, than 
what does that mean about asphalt? 
 Two aspects of Ari’s coherence seeking stand out. First, his comments occur at a 
transition between activities. Ari does not follow the teacher’s directions, nor does he 
follow the lead of another student. Instead, he tries to make space for considering what 
appear to be problematic ideas—that the water went into a crack or absorbed into the 
asphalt. Secondly, Ari continues to pursue coherence between the sponge analogy and the 
puddle disappearance despite continued interruptions by John [5.8] and Leah [5.10, 5.11]. 
 Leah, on the other hand, begins the episode apparently without a clear idea of 
what she should be doing. She turns to John (perhaps as a proxy for Ms. H) for input. She 
clearly latches onto his idea that the activity is about coming up with questions. And 
though Leah allows Ari to “say one thing about the crack”, she soon interrupts him, both 
verbally and by taking his paper. Later, she also interrupts John:        
5.12  John:  Or, yeah. But or, if you were, if you were in a place like a few  
years ago, if there are, if there are fires where near where you live a lot, 
[Leah taps the white board] that would probably affect. Cuz it would 
probably be fairly warm in that area so that would affect. [Leah writes 
"QUESTIONS" in big letters on the whiteboard] 
5.13 Ari: What! Leah... 
5.14 Leah: [hits her hands on the whiteboard, pointing to the word  
"questions"] 
 
Leah’s use of the whiteboard indicates that she has an expectation about what the 
students should be doing, and that expectation is not being met. Both she and Ari exhibit 
persistence as they try to get the attention of the group. There is little evidence that Leah 
considered Ari or John’s ideas, other than determining that they were not about coming 
up with questions. Surely Leah is seeking coherence with respect to something, but what? 





with the teachers' directions. She shows some evidence of listening to John and Ari's 
statements (or perhaps intonation) to determine if they are asking questions. She works 
hard to find different ways to get the group back on task, including verbal reminders, 
written reminders, and gestural reminders. And we cannot rule out that she may be 
thinking about Ari's question. But in looking at her contributions to the inquiry taking 
place in this moment, her moves are clearly toward closing down, rather than opening up, 
the conversation around Ari's question.  
Figure 5: Leah's Whiteboard 
 
 Thus, in the Questions! clip, the question of ‘coherence with respect to what?’ 
seems to be in part answered by distinguishing between Leah’s “doing the lesson” and 
Ari’s physical sense-making (Jimenez-Aleixandre, Rodriguez, & Duschl, 2000).  
4.6 Challenges to Seeing Evidence of Coherence Seeking 
 So far in this theoretical and methodological chapter on evidence of coherence 
seeking, I have: 
 i) offered a working definition of coherence seeking,  
ii) presented obvious and ambiguous examples of coherence seeking,  
iii) justified the assumption that students are always seeking coherence with 





iv) outlined various kinds of evidence of coherence seeking and how they inform 
my selection and analysis of classroom episodes.  
But even with all of the groundwork laid in this chapter, challenges to seeing evidence of 
coherence seeking in the classroom remain. In the complex ecosystem of school, a 
number of distracters can draw our attention away from evidence of students’ coherence 
seeking. Some of those distracters include: 
 “incorrect” answers, or conversely, “correct” answers  
 internal contradictions in students’ work, from our perspective  
 students’ failure to draw on relevant experiences/information, from our 
perspective 
 students’ work primarily to understand the social world, rather than the 
physical world 
 inarticulate or incomplete language 
 lack of verbal communication 
To illustrate some of these distracters, I draw on data from Davis (2003; n.d.). Davis’s 
coding scheme for coherence ranks students’ written work on a scale of 0 (incoherent) to 
4 (coherent).  
Code 0 letters include a complete lack of coherence in their ideas. These letters 
are often very brief or incomplete (see, for example, S102 & S108). Students 
who write letters like this often rely heavily on everyday experiences (see S419 & 
S426), to the exclusion of knowledge attained in science class. These students 
say all the claims are valid (see S213 & S228), and often cite no principles. The 
letters may include critiques of the evidence or claims (see S312 & S329)—but 
those critiques are not based on any scientific knowledge (normative or not). 






In essence, the coding scheme rewards the coherences often valued or preferred by 
educators—display of classroom knowledge (including information, principles, and 
warrants) and assignment completion—and overlooks students’ general attempts to make 
information “hang together.” Applying that coding scheme to the following “letter to the 
editor”, written in response to a fictitious news article with erroneous information about 
energy conversion, Davis finds no evidence of coherence and codes the letter a “0” 
(Davis, n.d., p. 1-2):  
 
Clearly, the students did not randomly hit keys on the computer to generate this letter. 
The construction of the letter itself, as well as the ideas within it, involved coordinating 
all kinds of information together. First, students adopt a letter-writing tone, one that is 
tentative (“we think”), laudatory (“we had fun”), and polite (“thank you”, “sincerely”). 





fictitious reporters (“they”, whose work they are reviewing) and from the editors (“you”, 
the audience for the letter). And notably, the students use terminology (credibility, valid) 
they have likely learned to be important in school science. The coding scheme completely 
omits this task awareness as evidence of coherence seeking, and instead focuses on how 
well students articulate connections between conceptual knowledge learned in school.  
Noticing students’ task awareness matters not only for building a nuanced account 
of students’ coherence seeking, but also for instructional decision making. In ignoring 
task awareness as part of the sense-making work that students do, educators may 
underestimate the influence that task awareness has on how students try to connect 
conceptual information. Students might see the letter writing task as sort of silly because 
no real editor exists, and thus write the bare minimum to complete the assignment. Or, 
students might see letter writing as an opportunity to share their ideas and imagine 
communication with a fictitious editor, rather than an opportunity to recite the details of 
energy conversion that they have used in class. The “incoherence” that Davis attributes to 
students’ explanations in the letter may be as much an artifact of the students’ interaction 
with the task as it is a reflection of the state of students’ knowledge at the time they wrote 
the letter.   
 Secondly, the coding scheme is strikingly inconsistent. Part of the reason that 
Davis coded the letter a 0 was because the students “rely heavily on everyday experiences 
(see S419 & S426), to the exclusion of knowledge attained in science class.” But if 
anything, the letter above illustrates the opposite. The students rely on knowledge 
attained in science class to the exclusion of their everyday knowledge. For example, the 





black than white.” A student who relies on everyday experience would certainly know 
that people feel warmer when they wear black clothing on a hot day. Thus, there would 
be no need to “prove” this to be true. But students learn in school to discount their 
everyday knowledge, i.e. the epistemological knowledge attained in science class says 
that knowledge must be proven experimentally. Thus, while the students may fail to 
incorporate conceptual knowledge related to energy transfer in the letters coded 
incoherent, they are likely incorporating epistemic knowledge that they have learned in 
school.  
 Certainly, Davis’s coding scheme does not make any specific recommendations in 
terms of what teachers should do in cases where students earn a “0” /incoherent score on 
the writing assignment. And yet, we can easily imagine that a teacher who fails to take 
students’ linguistic, social, epistemological, etc. coherence seeking into account might 
incorrectly presume that students’ poor performance on a writing assignment purely 
reflects a lack of content knowledge. Thus, the failure to recognize evidence of students 
coherence seeking not only matters not only for research, but also has important 
implications for practice.   
4.7 Conclusion 
 In overcoming the persistent urge to say that students are not seeking coherence, 
educators and researchers must recognize the myriad kinds of information that students 
connect continuously in science class, or as Buchmann and Floden (1992) write:  
Coherence allows for many kinds of connectedness, encompassing logic but also 
associations of ideas and feelings, intimations of resemblance, conflicts and 






Thus, in defining coherence seeking as trying to form meaningful, mutually consistent 
relationships between information, I hope to draw attention to the richness of students’ 
coherence seeking in science class. Using examples from participant 4th and 5th grade 
classrooms, as well as data from other studies, I have already illustrated aspects of 
students’ sense-making that other coding schemes miss. In general, these coding schemes 
focus on the conceptual content of students’ sense-making and many of them judge that 
coherence from the perspective of the more knowledgeable expert. As a result, they miss 
the linguistic, social, cultural, affective, and epistemological coherence that students seek 
in science class, as well as fail to recognize the coherence seeking evident in students’ 
non-canonical answers. I have also briefly touched on how noticing these aspects of 
students’ sense-making matters for instructional decision-making.  
 In the next chapters, I set existing coding schemes aside and transition to detailing 
the strengths and weaknesses of my alternative perspective on coherence seeking. For 
example, in all of my analyses up to this point I have been intentionally vague about what 
constitutes “information” and “meaningful relationships” in the working definition.  
Chapter 5 explores these points in detail, with explicit attention to the researcher and 





Chapter 5: Considering What Information Students Try to 
Connect—Examples from 5th Grade Experiments on Evaporation  
“Thoughts are our way of connecting things up for ourselves. If others tell us about 
the connections they have made, we can only understand them to the extent that we do 
the work of making these connections ourselves.” 
     –Eleanor Duckworth, The Having of Wonderful Ideas 
5.1 Introduction 
 When students do science, they connect many different kinds of information 
in many different ways. But some aspects of students’ coherence seeking have been 
studied much more extensively than others, largely due to their perceived importance 
in the scientific enterprise. Some work focuses on students’ linking of particular 
concepts, for example, that weight is a kind of force acting on an object. Other work 
focuses more on the categories of relationships that students build between 
information. Studies of scientific argumentation for example explore how students 
form connections between data and claims via warrants and backing (Berland & 
Reiser, 2008; Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 1998; Kuhn & Udell, 2003).  
 In this chapter, I focus on students’ coherence seeking within the context of 
another highly studied phenomenon in science class—students’ response to 
anomalous data. Because so many ideas in science seem to contradict everyday 
intuitions, educators need to understand how students will respond to contradictory 
information. As outlined by Chinn and Brewer (1993), there are several different 





including ignore it, reject it, exclude it, reinterpret it, or change their ideas in response 
to it.  
 Drawing on data from Ms. H’s 5th grade classroom during a water cycle unit, 
I analyze students’ responses to unexpected observational data during experiments on 
evaporation. I show, analytically, that all of these responses can be thought of as 
evidence of coherence seeking with respect to different sets of information. Finally, I 
consider the analytical challenges of identifying precisely what information students 
try to connect, and in what kinds of relationships.   
5.2 Anomalous Data in Science and in Science Class 
 Anomalous data, or data that does not fit expectation or theory, seems to be 
the perfect starting place for understanding how students try to fit information 
together in meaningful and mutually consistent ways. Anomalous data plays an 
important role both in students’ experiences in science class, and also in the doing of 
science. 
 Karl Popper (1968) argued that falsifiability, or the possibility of 
contradictory evidence, demarcates science from other modes of thinking. Indeed, 
accounts of scientific progress are ripe with examples of anomalous data prompting 
acceptance, revision or tossing out of theories for those that better align with available 
evidence. General Relativity underwent a number of empirical tests before it gained 
widespread acceptance. Among those tests were i) explaining Mercury’s shifting 
orbit, not accounted for by Newton’s universal law of gravitation, and ii) predicting 
the bending of light by the massive objects like the sun, as demonstrated during a 





continental drift, and geomagnetic reversal all hinged on ability of these constructs to 
explain previously anomalous observational data.  
 Anomalous data has also come to play an important role in understanding how 
students learn science. After all, “encountering contradictory information is a very 
common occurrence when one is learning science” (Chinn & Brewer, 1993, p. 1). 
Anomalous data comes from a variety of sources in science class. Students may make 
predictions that do not hold up to observation. They may share ideas that contradict 
their peers’ ideas. Or, they may encounter explanations from the teacher or textbook 
counter their own intuitions about how the world works.   
 Misconceptions research has catalogued the myriad ways that students’ 
everyday intuitions might contradict scientific understandings, across a variety of 
topics in science (see for example Halloun & Hestenes, 1985). Within physics, 
students may express the idea that motion requires a sustaining force, or similarly that 
light dies out as it travels. While the ontological nature of these intuitions and their 
role in instruction has been debated, in general educators agree that part of learning 
science must necessarily involve students coming to reconcile their intuitions with the 
conceptual information made available to them in science class, whether that 
information be in the form of observations, experimental results, or authoritative 
knowledge from the teacher or textbook. Educators have also designed instructional 
programs, including laboratory tutorials and discrepant events, specifically aimed at 







5.3 Experimentation and Anomalous Data in the Ms. H’s Year 1 Implementation 
of the Water Cycle Module 
 In the Learning Progressions water cycle module did not outline specific 
experiments or activities. Instead, as described in Chapter 4, the curriculum consisted 
of an opening question about what happens to puddle water that “disappears” over the 
course of the day, followed by a brief list of possible follow up activities, most of 
which involved further discussion of ideas.19 In contrast to discrepant events and 
other learning sequences utilizing contradictory data, the source and role of 
anomalous data within the Learning Progression curricula emerge naturally, as 
students try to build accounts of phenomena that align with their intuitions, 
observations, and reason. In evaluating each other’s ideas, students spontaneously 
generate counterevidence, offer competing interpretations of data, suggest possible 
experiments to test ideas, and identify possible flaws in those experimental designs.  
Experimentation was mentioned only once in the water cycle curriculum materials, in 
the context of students figuring out how to test their ideas. However, experimentation 
became an integral part of students’ work on the water cycle in Ms. H’s class during 
Year 1 of the project. Students used experiments to test their ideas about what 
happened to the puddle water, as well as to investigate various factors that might 
affect evaporation. In all, students conducted experiments on four of the nine days of 
the module (see Table 5).  
                                                 






 In the following sections, I explore a series of experiments conducted by the 
focus group of Leah, Molly, Ari, and John. Most of the experiments tested how one 
or more factors (size, shape, water temperature) affects the evaporation time of a 
puddle. Each experiment yielded unexpected results, from the students’ perspective.  
 Though Ms. H’s class conducted a number of different experiments over the 
course of the nine-day module, I focused on three of the focus group’s experiments 
primarily because of data limitations. Two cameras were used to videotape the water 
cycle implementation in Ms. H’s class. One camera followed Ms. H; the other camera 
focused on the focus group. Prior to the start of the module, Ms. H selected Leah, 
Molly, Ari, and John as the focus group. Thus, while I have access to bits and pieces 
of the other students’ experiments through the camera that followed Ms. H, the focus 
group experiments are the only ones videotaped in their entirety—including 
brainstorming and design, conducting, reflection, and reporting on the experiment. To 
analyze the students’ coherence seeking in the experiments, I draw on videotape data 
from these days, as well entries in the students’ science journals. I present portions of 
that analysis here, focusing on moments when students comment on unexpected 
results.  
Table 5: Summary of Water Module Implementation in Ms. H's Class 
Day Description and Clips Presented 
1 
Class discusses the Opening Question. 
 
Clips: Questions! (Chapter 4) 
2 
Focus group designs and conducts experiment to test how amount of 
water affects evaporation. 
 
Clips:  
 Experiment 1a: Which evaporates faster—a “3 ounce” puddle 





 Experiment 1b: Evaporating in double time (Chapter 5) 
3 
Students debate what the “stuff” was that came off of the puddles while 
they were outside on Day 2. 
4 
The focus group tries to catch “evaporation” using plastic bins.  
5 
Students generate additional questions they have about evaporation; 
students work in groups to decide how they can answer their questions. 
 
Clip: Nate’s question about evaporation in winter (Chapter 4) 
6 Students try to make clouds inside jars.  
7 
The focus group tests how temperature affects evaporation. 
 
Clips:  
 Experiment 3a & 3b: Which evaporates faster—hot or cold 
water? (Chapter 5) 
 Jacuzzi analogy (Chapter 4) 
8 Class discussion about experimental results from Day 7. 
9 
Class discussion about weather, how they got from puddle to talking 
about weather, and how they feel about the module compared to other 
science they have done. 
Students research weather using books and the internet. 
 
Clips: 
Annotated transcript of a focus group presentation about weather 
(Appendix B).  
 
5.3.1 Experiment 1a: Which Evaporates Faster—a “3 ounce” Puddle or a “6 
ounce” Puddle?  
 Following the opening day discussion about the disappearance of the puddle, 
Ms. H asks students to work in small groups to decide what they want to explore next. 
John and Ari suggest running some experiments “to learn more about evaporation.” 





of day and puddle size on evaporation time. But after sharing their plan with Ms. H 
and the rest of the class, they ultimately decide to just test amount of water.  The next 
day, just before setting up the experiment, the students discuss their predictions: 
1.1 John: Wait, so what do you think about it [glancing around at 
 each group member]? Do you think a small puddle will evaporate  
faster or a bigger puddle? 
1.2 Leah: I think a smaller puddle will. 
1.3 John: ##Yeah.## 
1.4 Ari: ##Yeah.## And also what I think that you never know. I wonder-- 
1.5 Leah: We should (*** ***)-- 
1.6 John: She said just put you think will happen. 
1.7 Ari: Yeah. 
1.8 Leah: Kind of like the science fair project, just, even if you already  
know the answer find out the scientific // ##the more scientific 
reason.##  
1.9 John: ##Yeah find out the most logical one.## [writing on paper] 
1.10 Leah: Yeah. 
1.11  Ari: Um, what I'm guessing is let's say something is two feet but very  
very shallow, it might evaporate faster [John gets up from the table] 
than something [Leah drinks from her water bottle] // or two cups are 
all spread out might evaporate faster than two cups that are in a little 
vial straight up. I'm wondering if evaporation has to do // if the depth 
has something to do with how fast it evaporates. [John returns] 
1.12  Leah: [nodding head] Yeah because if it was // like what Carl was  
saying if it was wider [Fig. 6A]. Like, if it was a wider space, [Fig. 6B] 
and the water spread out, then it would probably soak it up more [Fig. 
6C]. But if it's // but if it's [Fig. 6D] depth and it's in a smaller area-- 
1.13 Ari: But-- 
1.14 Leah: But [Fig. 6E] Wait. Then it will probably take  
longer cuz the water's [Fig. 6F] on top of each other. And if it's spread 
out, then [Fig. 6G] all the different sun rays and heat could come on all 











Figure 6: Leah’s Gestures in Utterance [1.12] 
 
 
Lines [1.1-1.8] reveal some information about how students view the task of 
designing an experiment. John, taking on a sort of group leader role, looks around at 
each student in [1.1] and asks which puddle they think will evaporate faster. He does 
not offer his own prediction, but Leah and Ari both predict the smaller puddle will 
evaporate faster. Perhaps recognizing the possible absurdity of running an experiment 
when they already know the outcome, Leah, Ari, and John begin to justify doing the 
experiment at all. Ari starts to express authentic uncertainty about the experiment in 
[1.4]. Leah also speaks, but her utterances are inaudible. Perhaps sensing the group 
moving off task, John refocuses students (“she just said put what you think will 
happen”). For John, the point of the task is to make predictions. It does not really 





 In [1.8] and [1.9], Leah and John further explain that at school/science fair, 
the “scientific” or “logical” answers are those that are obtained through 
experimentation. In other words, even if you know the answer, that knowledge is not 
valid until it has been supported by an experiment. But then in [1.11], a shift occurs. 
Rather than explicitly comment on the rules of doing school science, Ari offers a 
scenario in which the experiment could plausibly yield unanticipated results. Ari’s 
idea, briefly, is that more water could evaporate more quickly if that water is able to 
spread out.20 Leah elaborates with a specific mechanism for how depth matters. First, 
in [1.12], she suggests that a puddle that spreads out could be soaked up more, 
presumably by the asphalt as her gestures show the water pulling down toward the 
ground, rather than up. And though John suggests in [1.1] that the students agree that 
the water evaporates, in fact, to this point the entire class has a number of options on 
the table for what happens to the puddle water, including absorption into the asphalt. 
Then, in [1.14], Leah adds that piled up water will not get as many sun rays and heat 
as water that spreads out. She seems to be so invested in her idea that when Ari tries 
to interrupt her in [1.13], she reprimands him.  
 After making predictions, the students set up the experiment. They create two 
puddles on the asphalt outside, one with “three ounces” and the other with “six 
ounces” of water. However, as the students have measured it, the term ounces refers 
to inches of water as measured from the bottom of the container to the top of the 
liquid.  
                                                 
20 Ari’s idea resembles one expressed by another student named Carl during a class discussion earlier 





 As the experiment proceeds, the students notice the water spreading out with 
the wind and also disappearing. Ari wonders whether the water is evaporating or 
disappearing some other way. In response to Ari’s wonderings, John makes a 
prediction that focuses not on which puddle leaves faster, but rather, what causes the 
puddle to go away: 
2.1 John: After our experiment is over we'll be able to tell if it's  
evaporation by touching it [the asphalt] and seeing if it's really hot. 
Then it probably would be evaporation (Ari: yeah). If it's not really hot 
then it's just sliding and probably drying on the asphalt. 
 
Figure 7: Students Testing John's Hypothesis 
 
John’s prediction seems to be grounded in an idea that evaporation involves heat. If 
the water is evaporating, then the asphalt it was touching should be hot as well. 
Taking up John’s prediction, Ari suggests touching the asphalt in a place where the 
puddle has already disappeared (see Figure 7).  
2.2  Ari: Why don't we touch one of the areas like right around here.  
[John, Ari, and Molly touch the asphalt where the puddle has already 
evaporated.]  Is it? Yeah that's pretty hot. 
2.3  Leah: Well I think all the asphalt is hot. 
2.4  John: [standing] Um, the part where it dried is cooler. 





[evaporated spot on asphalt], one hand on here [regular asphalt], this 
part [the regular asphalt] is hotter. 
2.6  John: ##Just by a little.##  
2.7 Ari: ##You know what I think it is?## [All the  
students stand up and start shifting around the puddle.]  
  
Ari suggests that rather than wait for the puddles to completely evaporate, they can 
just touch part of the asphalt where puddle has already evaporated [2.2]. His 
suggestion allows the group to immediately begin looking for consistency between 
John’s prediction and the experimental results.  
 Ari touches just the place where the puddle evaporated and comments that it is 
hot. Leah implies that this information alone is not very helpful, saying “all the 
asphalt is hot” [2.5]. In other words, she questions the relevance of Ari’s observation. 
John and Molly also touch the regular asphalt and evaporated spot. They find that the 
place where the puddle used to be is cooler than the surrounding area, even if “just by 
a little” [2.6]. The students immediately try to explain and confirm this surprising 
result:   
2.8 Molly: ##Well yeah.## 
2.9 Leah: ##Maybe it## // maybe it also um... 
2.10 Ari: The water kind of is a little bit of a block  
2.11 Leah: it...[makes gesture with one hand as in Fig. 6D] yeah  
2.12 Ari: It blocks the ground a little bit but-- 
2.13 John: Let's try that with the other one. [John and Molly go  
touch the other puddle] 
2.14 Leah: Maybe [she touches the regular and then evaporated spot  
twice]..maybe it's because it kind // ##it soaked in more.## [repeat 
gesture Fig. 6D] 
2.15 Ari: ##yeah the water absorbed## 
2.16 Leah: Maybe it soaked in so it's...[Molly returns] 
2.17 Molly: yeah that-- 
2.18 Leah: soaked in a little also so it-- 
2.19 Ari: I think it also 
2.20 Molly: that one's [pointing to the other puddle] a lot cooler than the  
ground  





cover for the asphalt for a few moments. So it // so that it // so this 
started to heat up, so it was like putting a cover over this so this doesn't 
heat up as fast as this. And then taking the cover off. 
 
Ari wonders if the water may have “blocked” the asphalt like a “cover” [2.10, 2.21]. 
He does not specify what the water is blocking, but later in the experiment he reveals 
that the water might block sunlight sort of like “giant sunglasses.” Ari’s cover 
explanation accounts for at least three pieces of information: i) the water may have 
evaporated, ii) the asphalt under the puddle is cool, and iii) the asphalt warms up after 
the water is gone (Ari checks this himself). In Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) terms, Ari 
“reinterprets the data” and makes “peripheral changes” to his theory; that is, he 
maintains the idea that the water evaporated, but adds the idea that the water acts like 
a cover for the asphalt before it evaporates (p. 4).    
 Leah also tries to explain the discrepant result. She proposes that the water 
absorbed into the asphalt, causing the asphalt to feel cool. Her explanation is 
consistent with John’s original prediction that, if the spot is cooler, something other 
than evaporation must be occurring. In other words, she “accepts the data” and on the 
basis of that data, rejects evaporation as the cause of the water’s disappearance.  
 Rather than jump to explaining the anomalous data, Molly and John check to 
see that the result is repeatable [2.16, 2.23]. They find that even with the other puddle, 
the place where the water used to be is “a lot cooler” than the regular dry asphalt. No 
single category in Chinn and Brewer’s framework captures Molly’s and John’s 
attempt to confirm the result. The students do not outright reject the data or attribute it 





they do not simply “hold the data in abeyance” trusting that it will be explained in the 
future. 
 The students never explicitly say that they expected the asphalt where the 
puddle was to be warmer. But it is easy to imagine that this was their expectation. The 
students tone and reaction to finding that the evaporated spot is cooler is some 
evidence of their initial expectations. The students likely associate evaporation with 
heat or with heat sources like sunlight or the stove. If evaporation involves heat, then 
it is reasonable to think that the place where water evaporated should be hotter than 
everywhere else. Or, perhaps the students thought of the asphalt as something like a 
stovetop, where the burner feels warmer than the surrounding area. While I cannot for 
certain identify the origin of each student’s idea that the spot under the puddle will be 
warmer, the exercise of identifying everyday experiences (or cognitive resources) that 
students might draw on in thinking about the puddle experiments is an important part 
of how I analyze what information they are trying to connect. I elaborate on other 
aspects of that analysis in the next section.   
5.3.2 Identifying the “Information” That Students are Trying to Connect 
 At a low resolution analysis of the coherence seeking, the students are 
connecting many kinds of information while they conduct this experiment. They 
communicate, thus fitting together ideas and phrases into semantically and 
substantively meaningful thoughts. They process perceptual information from the 
world around them, including the feeling of coolness of the asphalt where the puddle 
evaporated. They recognize the work they are doing as “an experiment” and thus take 





keeping and taking notes. They notice an anomalous experimental result and try to 
make sense of it. These general statements paint an overall picture of students’ 
coherence seeking, but they do not really answer a more specific question: What 
information are these students trying to connect? I would like to have some more 
nuanced sense of the “ideas in play” for these students.  
 But narrowing down a word as vague as “information” into something 
analytically useful is not trivial. First, there is the question of the ontological nature of 
this information, i.e. are we talking about the information in students’ minds or 
information that lives in discourse? Ranney and Thagard (1988), for example, attempt 
to model the network of information in students’ minds. Characteristic of work on 
students’ cognition more generally, they uses interviews as a way to glean evidence 
of what happens cognitively for a student as she encounters anomalous data. The 
nodes and connections in their diagrams (see for example, Ranney & Thagard, 1998, 
p. 6) represent information and links thought to reside in some form inside the 
students’ minds. Lindfors’ (1999) work, on the other hand, situates coherence seeking 
as an act of language. In her approach to parsing discourse, the utterances are units of 
conversational meaning, and not necessarily indicative of units of meaning inside the 
mind. Surely, seeking coherence involves both coherence seeking in the mind and in 
discourse, and so it worth considering both.  
 There are many different ways of linking coherence seeking in the mind with 
coherence seeking as living in interaction. Lindfors argues that Vygotsky’s notion of 
internalization allows for ways of speaking to become ways of thinking. 





semiotic tools (language, diagrams, symbols, etc.) of mathematics to support their 
own intuitive ideas about, for example, probability. And embodied and distributed 
cognition blur the distinction between the individual mind and the external world. An 
account of coherence seeking built on Hutchins’ (1995) work, for example, might 
speak of a classroom (physical space and equipment included) as seeking coherence, 
with individual students playing specific roles within that larger system. While such 
complex views of cognition are certainly worth exploring in future work, for the 
purposes of this dissertation I have chosen to focus on coherence seeking as 
attributable to individual students. In other words, while student’s coherence seeking 
might be influenced by their interactions with others, by the physical environment, 
and even their physical location in space, I treat all of these as pieces of information 
that are ultimately connected within the individual’s mind.21  
 Additional issues surrounding the development of a more specific account 
what information students are connecting are best illustrated through an examples of 
existing methods for doing this kind of work. In their analysis of students’ ideas about 
seasons, for example, Sherin, Krakowski, and Lee (2012) develop a system for 
isolating two kinds of cognitive units of information in students’ interview responses: 
nodes and modes. The nodes are elements of knowledge of all kinds (and at all levels 
of abstraction), whereas the modes are a set of interconnected nodes. To explain their 
                                                 
21 Hutchins argued that in some systems, the “outcomes of interest are not determined entirely by the 
information processing properties of the individual”, in which case the system should become the 
unit of analysis. For example, landing a plane requires the coordination of two pilots and multiple 
artifacts, making the cockpit a sensible unit of analysis. Because my focus in this work is not on 
outcomes, per say, it is not methodologically imperative that I inform my unit of analysis based on 
the data. However, if I were to try to characterize, for example, the focus group’s progress in 
developing an account of evaporation through the lens of coherence seeking, then most certainly I 





coding scheme, they present a snippet from an interview with a student named Leslie, 
who tries to explain the causes of the seasons: 
3.1 Leslie Um::: well, um, you know times savings? / / you know? Like in  
the summer, when you have – 
3.2 Interv. // mm-hmm 
3.3  Interv. – Daylight Savings time? 
3.4 Leslie Yeah, daylight savings time. Um, in the summer we have more  
time, like, with, like, daylight and that’s why it gets warmer. And like 
just with the circulation of the earth and like the axis that it’s on just 
has to do with like summer and winter. (Sherin et al., 2012, p. 176) 
 
Sherin et al. identify the following nodes in Leslie’s utterances: i) sun is a source of 
heat, ii) daylight savings, iii) days are longer in summer and shorter in the winter, 
and iv) the earth moves (p. 11). But what do these units really tell us about the 
information that Leslie is trying to connect, from her perspective? It seems they tell us 
more about how the researcher makes sense of Leslie’s ideas than how Leslie herself 
makes sense of them.  
 For example, in [3.4], Leslie comments on “the circulation of the earth and 
like the axis that it’s on.” Sherin et al. collapse this statement into the node the earth 
moves. As the authors acknowledge, what exactly Leslie imagines with respect to 
earth’s circulation and the axis is not clear. But when the researchers combine the 
idea of circulation and earth’s axis into one node, that choice reflects their own 
understanding, and not necessarily the connection Leslie sees between these ideas. 
While to an expert the idea of Earth having an axis might be subsumed by the idea 
that Earth moves (i.e. the Earth rotates around an axis), even in the structuring of her 
language (circulation of the earth AND like the axis), it seems that Leslie 





 Sherin et al.’s analysis also favors researcher perspective in that it focuses 
only on the conceptual aspects of Leslie’s reasoning. But Leslie clearly attends to 
more than just the conceptual knowledge inside her mind during the interview. For 
one, she responds to verbal information from the interviewer. When the interviewer 
suggests the phrase “Daylight Savings time” in [3.3], Leslie incorporates this phrase 
into her response in [3.4], meaning that she is not only making sense of the Earth’s 
seasons, but possibly also the cues and hints that the interviewer provides. And while 
the authors do not provide the necessary evidence to make such claims, including 
gestures, gaze, and facial expressions, it is very likely that Leslie is also responding to 
nonverbal cues from the interviewer, including signals about her performance. All of 
this is to say that understanding the information that Leslie is trying to connect, from 
her perspective, requires de-centering and trying to see the physical and social world 
from her point of view (Donaldson, 1979).   
 Returning to the transcript from Ms. H’s class, in line [2.1], for example, what 
information was John trying to connect? John’s statement sets up the conditions for 
anomalous data to arise in the first place, and so understanding his ideas in [2.1] are a 
necessary part of understanding the students’ later response to the anomalous data. 
Akin to Sherin et al’s approach, one of the approaches I have tried in analyzing 
classroom data is to leverage students’ phrases and terms to isolate key conceptual 
components. For example:  
[2.2] John: After our experiment is over we'll be able to tell if it's evaporation 
by touching it [the asphalt] and seeing if it's really hot. Then it probably 
would be evaporation (Ari: yeah). If it's not really hot then it's just sliding and 
probably drying on the asphalt. 
 





2b) Evaporation involves heat. 
2c) If the puddle evaporated, the asphalt should be hot.  
2d) If the asphalt is not hot, the puddle might have slid and dried on the 
asphalt. 
2e) He can check the hotness of the asphalt by touching it. 
2f) The check must be done when the experiment is over. 
Certainly, John may be drawing on information in this moment not explicitly 
represented in his language. However, as a starting point in analyzing data, I parse 
students’ utterances into potential units of meaning, and those units might focus on 
the physical or social world. Like Sherin et al. (2012), I am drawn to the information 
that students express about the physical world. However, the list of information 2a-2f 
might suggest that for John, the experiment is primarily about physical sense-making, 
when actually, social and other dynamics might be more important or prominent to 
John in this moment. To deal with such ambiguity, I consider scale. In looking at the 
experiment as a whole, clearly, social and school norms play an important role for 
John. He conducts an experiment in accordance with procedures and rules he has 
learned at school, and he has also built up an interactional history with each of the 
students in his group. However, in looking at utterance [2.2] specifically, these 
dynamics seem to run in the background, even for John, as he works to articulate a 
prediction based on his everyday sensibilities about how the world works. In other 
utterances, for example [1.6] (“She just said to put down what you think will 





 In analyzing the Puddle Experiment clips, I also tried mapping the units of 
meaning and relationships in the form of diagrams, akin to the work that Sandoval 
(2003) and Ranney and Thagard (1988) did in their analyses of students’ 
explanations. For example, in trying to map John’s statement in [2.1], I interpreted it 
as an if/then/else statement (see Figure 5). 








and dried on 
asphalt.
 
The benefit of these diagrams, as opposed to lists of information, is that they start to 
show potential relationships that John tries to make between that information. For 
example, John’s use of if/then language suggests a branching structure as indicated in 
Fig. 8.   
 But the lists and diagrams above, while clearly representative of how I make 
sense of John’s statement, may not necessarily represent the units and relationships 
that John sees as important. Thus, in trying to think more from John’s perspective, I 
also try parsing his language according to natural breaks for him, as indicated by 
pauses in his speech. Pauses can be indicative of distinctions between ideas, for 
example:   
[2.2] After our experiment is over we'll be able to tell if it's evaporation 






by touching it [the asphalt] and seeing if it's really hot. Then it probably 
would be evaporation  
[pause] (Ari: yeah). 
If it's not really hot then it's just sliding and probably drying on the asphalt. 
The first pause in John’s statement, lasting just over a tenth of a second, occurs after 
the first instance of evaporation. The purpose of the pause might be to think about 
what he is going to say next, to take a breath, or to signify the beginning of a new 
thought. The second pause occurs after the second instance of evaporation, while Ari 
is looking down at the puddle. Ari uses the pause as a moment to give feedback and 
express his agreement with John (“yeah”). Ari’s agreement appears to encourage John 
to continue talking, and thus he introduces the second half of his hypothesis about 
sliding and drying. In essence then, the bit about sliding and drying might be an add-
on to John’s initial idea, rather than part of a formal if-then-else relationship. In 
addition, John utters the words “seeing if it’s really hot. Then” without any pauses at 
all. In the structure of John’s speech, 1c and 1e are uttered as though they are one 
thought, rather than distinct ideas.  
 There are other reasons, besides attention to the pacing of John’s language, to 
question the way I have delineated the units of information in the list and diagram 
above. For example, John identifies “evaporation” as one thing that could be 
happening to the water. But the second option “sliding and probably drying on the 





of the drying processes, to John? To answer these questions, I looked at Leah and 
Ari’s utterances that came just before John’s [2.1]: 
2.0 Ari: One thing I'm wondering is, is it, is it actually evaporation or is  
the water just kind of sliding, eh the water over there— 
 
Leah?: I think it's both. (Ari: yeah) It's sliding so there's less water and 
um (Ari: yeah, so there's) and it's easier for it, it's faster. Yeah. 
 
Ari: Yeah. I think that's the depth now. How deep it is. Even if 
nothing's, if most um, two cups, it might if one is three inches deep 
and one is one inch deep. The one inch cup might evaporate faster. 
 
2.1  John: After our experiment is over we'll be able to tell if it's  
evaporation by touching it [the asphalt] and seeing if it's really hot. 
Then it probably would be evaporation (Ari: yeah). If it's not really hot 
then it's just sliding and probably drying on the asphalt. 
 
Both the terms evaporation and sliding were introduced by Ari in [2.0], and the term 
sliding was echoed by Leah [2.0]. Thus, in terms of coherence, John may be seeking 
to mirror the terminology introduced by Ari and Leah. Sliding, as a unit of 
information for John, may represent both a possible outcome for the puddle, but also 
represents information about the students’ conversation. That is, the item 1d in my list 
might be revised to say something like “If the asphalt is not hot, the puddle might 
have slid like Ari/Leah said, and dried on the asphalt.” 
 But the bit about “drying on the asphalt” is unique to John. Perhaps John 
agrees that the puddle slides, but also thinks that sliding alone does not account for 
the water’s disappearance, i.e. the puddle must slide and dry. Or, he might see sliding 
and drying as part of a single process. He subsequently refers the puddles as drying 
during the rest of the experiment, and does not mention sliding again, suggesting that 
the term “sliding” did not hold much conceptual value for John. Rather, he may have 





what has come before in the conversation), and also possibly to acknowledge Ari’s 
contributions. Like John’s comment in [2.1], Ari’s explanation in [2.10] is relatively 
articulate:  
I think it also. (Molly: [joining group] that one's [6 oz puddle] a lot cooler 
than the ground) You know what I think it is. I think the water kind of acted 
like a cover for the asphalt for a few moments. So it, so that it, so this started 
to heat up, so it was like putting a cover over this so this doesn't heat up as fast 
as this. And then taking the cover off. 
 
While John’s statement in [2.1] helped define what counts as anomalous data, Ari’s 
comment in [2.10] is an attempt to account for anomalous data. Again, trying to break 
Ari’s idea into units of information: 
10a) The water kind of acted like a cover for the asphalt for a few moments.  
10b) The [covered asphalt] doesn't heat up as fast as the [uncovered asphalt].  
10c) [When the water leaves] it is like taking the cover off. 
Items 10a)-10c) represent explicit units of conceptual meaning in Ari’s statement. 
However, there are additional pieces of information contained in his utterance that are 
not represented in 10a)-10c). That is, there is additional meaning both explicitly in the 
Ari’s discourse, and also ideas that we can infer are in his mind. 
 First, conceptually, there seems to be more meaning in the word “cover” than 
what Ari explicitly states here. He talks about water acting like a cover, as though 
water can “block” sunlight, or whatever is heating up the asphalt. Maybe this is as far 
as Ari’s gone with the idea—he has drawn on some intuitive idea of blocking sunlight 
with objects, without necessarily elaborating for himself the mechanism by which that 
cover works. Or Ari could be imagining a specific kind of cover, like an umbrella or a 





seems to be a confounding factor that Ari needs to account for in his story; however, 
there is no evidence that transparency is a relevant part of the story for Ari.  
 There are a few linguistic and conversational markers that indicate Ari may be 
connecting more than just conceptual information in his statement. He uses a series of 
preliminaries to make space for the introduction of his idea: “I think it also”, “You 
know what I think it is”, “I think…” According to Schegloff (1980), preliminaries, or 
“self-referential feature[s] of the utterance” can serve many different purposes in 
speech, including to summon audience attention, to establish a point before moving 
forward, to mark something as a delicate topic, or to request permission to speak (p. 
104). Rather than requesting permission to speak, Ari appears to use a series of 
preliminaries to draw attention to or gain space for his idea. The timing of his 
preliminaries supports this observation. In line [2.9], Leah starts to share an idea, but 
trails off with the word “also.” Ari, perhaps mirroring her language, uses his first 
preliminary “I think it also.” The preliminary suggests that he not only recognizes that 
his idea is different than Leah’s, but also that he needs to use conversational norms to 
transition to his idea. He uses his second preliminary “You know what I think it is” 
just after Molly has joined the group and shared her observation about the 
temperature. Ari also faces the two girls directly, indicating that he wants to share his 
idea specifically with them. The preliminary serves to unite the two girls into a single 
audience for Ari’s idea. In terms of information that Ari is connecting, the 
preliminaries are evidence that he is attending to the flow of the conversation or some 
sort of conversational norms, Leah’s idea, Molly’s joining the group, and possibly 





him. In other words, Ari’s statement in 2.10 suggests that he is connecting not only 
conceptual information related to anomalous data, but also social and perceptual 
information as well. 
 It is easy to get lost in these nuanced considerations of what counts as 
“information” and lose sight of the purpose: to understand how John, Ari, and the 
others students are trying to make sense of a strange observation. But what can be 
gleaned from a careful exploration of lines 2.1 and 2.10 is that if we are really to 
interpret students’ search for coherence in terms of the information they are trying to 
connect, what counts as information must be flexible, so that it can represent the 
students’ perspective to the fullest extent possible given the available data. In 
addition, the analysis may need to attend to social, linguistic, cultural, affective, and 
epistemological information, as these may strongly interact with students connecting 
of information about the physical world.   
 In terms of the more specific issue in this analysis—students’ response to 
unexpected findings—all four students address the unexpected observation by 
confirming the data, accepting it, or developing new explanations for it. Once the 
students move inside to write down their reflections on the experiment, however, their 
noticing and treatment of the anomalous data diverge. 
5.3.3 Experiment 1b: Evaporating in Double Time  
 After completing the puddle experiment, the group goes back inside. In a 
moment of transition, John sets the stage for the next activity: 
4.1  John: Okay, everyone. Write down your theories. Okay so, here's  
what we were at. Three ounces, three ounces equals one and a half, 
one and a half inches. Six ounces equals three inches [referring to the 





both of them go where the wind goes. (Ari: wait d'ya wanna) About 
thirty-five degrees Celsius (***).   
 
Again, taking on the role of group leader, John instructs everyone to “write down 
[their] theories.” But, rather than write himself, John begins reading back the list of 
data they collected during the experiment. Ari interrupts once with a preliminary 
(“wait d’ya wanna”), and then again: 
4.2  Ari: But do you know what I thought was really interesting? Is that  
you would think that, let's say that three inches evaporated in five 
minutes. Then wouldn't you think that the six inches would evaporate 
in ten minutes? 
4.3  John: Yeah. (Molly: what, what was it-) 
4.4  Ari: But they really evaporated, is not double time in—I don't think. 
 
Ari interrupts John to point out what he believes is a surprising result: that twice the 
water does not take twice the time to evaporate. Not only does Ari find this result to 
be surprising, but he expects that everyone else will find it surprising too (“wouldn’t 
you think that…”) [4.2]. His use of the pronoun “you” and the phrase “wouldn’t you 
think that” may also indicate his taking a “reaching stance” and conveying to his 
partners that he is framing the activity as about making sense of the data, and inviting 
them to join (Lindfors, 1999, p. 106). The stance is not only towards the students, but 
also towards the topic. For example, lines [4.2] and [4.4] suggest that Ari is holding 
the experimental results accountable to common sense. He thinks it makes sense that 
twice the water should take twice as long to evaporate, but almost takes an accusatory 
tone towards the results that suggest otherwise (“not double time”). Leah briefly 
responds to Ari’s comment: 
4.5  Leah: Uh I think it's because it's ground. 
4.6  John: Depends on location, I think. 
4.7 Ari: I think how fast it's spread out and how fast it can (move?) out. 





and evaporated quickly.  
 
Leah and John do respond to Ari [4.5, 4.6] but is not clear how their answers explain 
the result Ari has pointed out. Leah and Ari may be providing short answers to 
mollify Ari and get back to “writing theories.” They might not find the result 
particularly surprising, and so they do not engage with it. Or maybe they do find it 
surprising, but they have reconciled the idea in their minds and do not feel compelled 
to discuss it further. For whatever reason, this result clearly fails to spark the 
relatively unified flutter of activity that surrounded the anomalous data while they 
were conducting the experiment outside.  
  In [4.7], Ari provides a slightly more detailed explanation, suggesting that 
maybe evaporation time is related to how quickly the puddles “spread out.” John 
elaborates, providing a sort of mechanistic description of how a big puddle quickly 
spreads out, gets thin, and so can evaporate relatively quickly [4.8]. John’s elaborated 
explanation is rather clear evidence that at least part of the information he is making 
sense of in that moment are the conceptual ideas Ari has put on the table. However, 
John quickly shifts back to reading data after elaborating on Ari’s explanation:  
4.9  John: Okay, so three minutes for the six ounce to get to steam.  
Three minutes. You can just look at this [the paper] later. 
4.10  Leah: Can I see? 
4.11 John: Just look at all the stuff on it, and I'm gonna write theories. 
4.12  Leah: So it's three minutes for um, the three 
 
John appears to give up on reading the paper, and decides to just “write theories”, 
though precisely what he means by this is not clear. He seems to distinguish between 
the “stuff” or data written on the paper, and the “theories” that should be written 





as indicated in [4.10] and [4.12]. Ari again interrupts, returning to the problem of 
evaporation times:  
4.13  Ari: I think they probably both evaporated in the same time. But the  
big one was more visible because it was um. 
4.14  Leah: I can't read anymore. 
4.15  John: Can you read this, Ari? 
4.16  Ari: Yeah I can read that. 
4.17  Molly: I wanna see. 
4.18 Ari: Um, uhhh, I'll read it out loud. Three ounces equals one and a  
half inches. Six inches. [writing and speaking to himself] Three O Z 
equals 
 
In comparing [4.2] to [4.23], Ari’s ideas about the experimental results seem to 
change. In [4.2], Ari suggests that the puddle with twice the water should have taken 
twice as long to evaporate. But in [4.23], he says that he thinks the puddles probably 
evaporated “in the same time.” However, these distinct ideas, and almost 
contradictory senses, might actually be part of the same line of reasoning for Ari. 
First, clearly Ari does not trust the experimental finding that the larger puddle took 
only one minute longer to evaporate, as indicated in both [4.2] and [4.23]. Secondly, 
Ari suggests a sort of causal explanation for why the relationship between amount of 
water and evaporation time is not linear—the larger puddles spread out more quickly, 
allowing them to evaporate faster. Then, in [4.23], Ari suggests that maybe the big 
puddle was “more visible”, i.e. when they were collecting data, it was easier to see 
the big puddle than the small puddle. Because Ari does not finish his thought, we 
cannot be sure what he was thinking here. However, the students used the water 
marks on the asphalt as an indicator of evaporation, and perhaps Ari thought the 
bigger puddle left more visible water marks leading to an overestimate of the time it 





 In fact, there are reasons to question the reliability of the data. The criteria the 
students use to determine when a puddle “evaporated” varies over the course of the 
experiment. Whereas the smaller puddle was considered “evaporated” when the water 
and most of the water marks on the asphalt were gone, the bigger puddle was deemed 
evaporated with water marks still evident on the asphalt. 
 However, why Ari specifically states that the puddles probably evaporated at 
the same time (as opposed to just any time other than what they recorded) is not clear. 
He might have been thinking that spreading cancels out the effect of volume so that 
both puddles evaporate in the same time. That interpretation is supported by a 
comment Ari wrote in his science journal that day: “Volume doesn’t matter but depth 
does.” Or, he might have been reflecting on the groups’ data collection methods when 
they were outside.  
 Regardless, throughout this episode, Ari appears to be trying to make sense of 
the experimental data that the group collected outside. All the while that he tries to 
make sense of this information, he also attends to the signals and comments from his 
group mates, most of whom are asking him to focus on writing down theories and 
copying the data. Leah, on the other hand, seems stably engaged in copying the data 
[4.10, 4.12, 4.14], and, in the conversation, there is less evidence of her trying to deal 
with the anomalous data Ari has pointed out. From Leah’s perspective, and looking at 
the information she is trying to connect, her response to Ari makes sense: task is to 
write down observations and theories, not discuss them. John switches back and forth 
between these two modes, while Molly is relatively silent and writing.  





 In the first experiment, the focus group encountered an unexpected result (that 
the spot where the puddle was is cooler than surrounding areas) and tried to confirm 
and explain it. While they were inside discussing the experiment, Ari pointed out 
another unexpected result (that twice as much water does not take twice as long to 
evaporate), but was only able to draw John in briefly to discuss it. However, in both 
of these cases, the students’ findings did not violate scientifically accepted 
understandings of evaporation. Cold water would cool the asphalt on contact and 
evaporating is a cooling process, so the formerly wet asphalt should be cooler than 
the surrounding area. And, though the students’ data collection process is 
questionable, as Ari describes, a non-linear relationship between amount of water and 
evaporation time is plausible, given variations in how much the puddles spread out.   
 But on Day 7 of the module, the focus group makes a jarring experimental 
observation—that cold water evaporates faster than warm water. If that observation 
were to be confirmed by scientists, then it would certainly require a change in our 
current understanding of evaporation and phase change which predicts that warmer 
substances contain particles with higher kinetic energy, resulting in faster 
evaporation. In addition, the finding that cold water evaporates faster than warm 
water would require new explanations for any observable phenomena that suggest 
warm water evaporates faster than cold.  
 According to Ari, the point of the experiments on Day 7 was to test if the 
temperature of the water affects evaporation. The students attempt to heat two 
beakers, each with “6 ounces” of water, to different temperatures using a microwave. 





measurement process for this experiment was not captured on video, so I am not sure 
what ounces means here.) The students use the time heated in a microwave as a proxy 
for temperature:  
 Puddle A: 15 seconds in the microwave 
 Puddle B: 0 seconds in the microwave, “room temperature” water 
 Puddle C: 20 seconds in the microwave   
They do not use a thermometer to confirm the different temperatures of the water, and 
there are numerous interruptions, technical difficulties with the microwave, re-
heatings, and arguments during the microwaving process. 
  Once outside, the students pour the beakers onto the asphalt outside, and time 
how long it takes them to evaporate (see Fig. 9).  
Figure 9: John Labels the Puddles 
 
 The students first claim that the hot water evaporates faster than the cold 
approximately three minutes into the experiment. At this point, Molly is sitting on the 





puddles and labeling them. Ari and Leah are walking back and forth between the 
puddles (see Table 6): 
5.1  Ari: Um..B has spread out the most.[Ari walks around the puddle and  
Leah.] 
[8 seconds of silence] 
5.2 Molly: Which one evaporated most? Probably B. B or A? 
5.3 Leah: What? I think B is. 
5.4  John: This one [C] is probably the thickest. It's still spreading out  
really over there. 
5.5  Leah: That's weird cuz that's the 20 second one. 
 [John draws a box around the puddle] 
5.6  Leah: Okay, it's been three minutes. 
 
Table 6: Puddle Information for Experiment 2a 
 Puddle A Puddle B Puddle C 
Temperature 
15 seconds in the 
microwave 
0 seconds in the 
microwave/room 
temperature 
20 seconds in the 
microwave 
Ari’s Opinion of 
Testing Surface 




Second First Third 
 
 
The students express different relationships between evaporation and “spreading out” 
in this exchange. Ari seems to think that how much the puddle spread out is important 
for the experiment. He comments that Puddle B spread out the most in [5.1]. And on 
previous days, including the volume experiment already discussed, Ari contemplated 
that thickness or how much a puddle spreads out might affect its evaporation time. 
For example, he wrote in his journal: “I think the more spread out/less depth the faster 
it evaporates…Volume doesn’t matter but depth does.” John does not specifically 
relate evaporation and thickness in this exchange, but in previous conversations he 





 Leah, on the other hand, seems to use thickness as an indicator of, or measure 
of, evaporation. When John points out that Puddle C is the thickest and still spreading 
out, Leah comments on the observation as “weird” [5.5]. What is weird about that, to 
her? As she makes the comment in [5.5], she looks down at one of the puddles in 
front of her (not visible to the camera), and then points and glances over to the 20 
second puddle. Perhaps, as indicating by her shifting gaze, she makes some sort of 
comparison between the puddles. If she sees thickness as a measure of evaporation, 
for example, then she might find it strange that the warmest puddle is also the 
thickest, i.e. least evaporated.  
 Molly, acting as record keeper, has made some judgment about which puddle 
has evaporated first (“Probably B. B or A?”). However, her judgment could be 
grounded in observations of the puddles’ shape or thickness, the water marks on the 
asphalt, or other students’ comments; there is no evidence that the relationship 
between evaporation and thickness is meaningful for her in this moment.  
  As the experiment continues, and John and Leah begin to settle on the idea 
that the hot water is evaporating the slowest, Ari raises concerns about the testing 
conditions:  
5.7 Ari: I think we found um a problem with the experiment. Is B and kind  
of it's a flat ground. C and A are both on a dent in the ground.  
 
According to Ari, the testing surface is not level. Rather than make a generalized 
appeal for fair experimental conditions, Ari focuses on a problem with the experiment 
that could specifically affect thickness of the puddle. If C and A lie in dents in the 
ground, then they cannot spread out as far, and presumably cannot evaporate as 





conditions. After a brief pause, Leah continues with her observations about the 
puddles:  
5.8  Leah: Oh, is there water vapor on all of them. Like I only see water  
vapor on that one.  
5.9  Molly: That one, B still has some water vapor at 5 minutes? 
5.10  Leah: Yeah. No, um, 6 minutes. 
5.11  John: No it has a little. 
5.12 Leah: C has a little. 
5.13  John: I don't see any on B.  
5.14  Leah: They all are drying up quickly. 
5.15  John: That one's [C] probably gonna go last.  
5.16  Leah: Six and a half minutes. 
 
By water vapor, the students seem to mean the water stain left on the asphalt after the 
water disappears from the puddle. Leah, Molly, and John check each other’s 
observations for consistency, to determine which puddles have “water vapor” left and 
at what time periods. John makes a prediction that Puddle C, the warmest one, will 
evaporate last.  
 As the experiment continues, Ari and his ideas become even more isolated 
from the sense-making of the rest of the group: 
5.17  John: Here, here's what I think. First-second-third. [B-A-C]. First- 
second-third. This one's [B] less thick. 
5.18  Ari: No that's the thickest [A].  
5.19 John: First-what do you think? Leah, what do you think? I think  
it's going first, second, third. 
 
John predicts that Puddle C will evaporate last. He also invokes a linguistic structure 
for making these predictions (first-second-third) that the group continues to 
throughout the rest of the experiment. Ari responds “no” to John, indicating 
disagreement, and claims that Puddle A is the thickest. Rather than elaborate on the 





Leah and John finally settle on an agreed order, B-A-C, while Ari continues to worry 
about the dent in Puddle A.  
5.20  Leah: I think first [A]-- 
5.21  Ari: I think first, second, third [C,B,A]. 
5.22  John: I think that's going first. 
5.23 Ari: It looks like there's a dent there [A]. 
5.24  John: (***) they all do. 
5.25  Ari: That one's [A] the deepest.  
5.26  Leah: Seven and a half minutes. Well, no I think that one's going  
first, so it's B, A, C. 
5.27  Ari: I don't-that one [A] definitely is deeper than all of the other ones 
 cuz it's in a dent. 
4.28  Molly: It's gonna go B, A, C. 
4.29  John: Yeah. 
 
The exchange in [5.20-5.29] demonstrates the continuing marginalization of Ari and 
his ideas. Leah begins by offering a prediction, again in the form first introduced by 
John in [5.17]. She also places emphasis on which puddle she “think[s]” will be 
“first.” Ari uses the same language structure in [5.21] (“I think first…”) to show his 
disagreement with Leah’s prediction. John then chimes in and confirms that he also 
thinks A will be the first to evaporate. Perhaps realizing that his group mates are 
moving towards consensus, and his opportunities for voicing his concern are growing 
more limited, Ari again refers to a dent under puddle A [5.23]. This time, John does 
respond to the dent comment [5.24]. He says that “they all” have dents, but he does 
not continue to make the case that the testing conditions are therefore fair. Rather, he 
seems to be trying to discount Ari’s concern about the dent. Again, Ari tries to point 
out that puddle A is the deepest, i.e. that it is in a dent. Thus, puddle A is thicker than 
the other puddles, extending its evaporation time.  
 Leah, playing time keeper as she usually does during these puddle 





thinks that puddle B is evaporating first. However, her change in ideas is not in 
response to Ari’s comment, but rather, her observations of the puddles. Molly and 
John agree, whereas Ari still tries to voice his dissent and draw attention to the 
depth/dent of puddle A. 
 Though Ari adapts the linguistic structures of the group in order to voice his 
ideas, he fails to get the group to take the dent/depth issue seriously. In other words, 
his linguistic and conversational coherence seeking does not lead to alignment among 
the conceptual information the group tries to connect. The dent remains an important 
bit of information for Ari, but John specifically sets the issue aside as irrelevant in 
[5.24]. Ari continues to worry about the testing conditions, perhaps sparked by his 
distrust of the experimental result that cold water would evaporate faster than hot 
water. Leah and John do not seem to worry about testing conditions at all; rather, 
their focus is on determining the order of the puddles’ evaporation, while apparently 
suspending their intuitive sense of what a reasonable order might be.  
 At the completion of the experiment, John reports to Ms. H that they found 
that cold water evaporates faster than warm water. After talking with Ms. H, the 
students choose to repeat the experiment to test different “cold” temperatures. 
Expanding the temperature range could serve as a confirmation of the results of the 
first experiment. Or, it might allow students to refine the apparent inverse relationship 
between temperature and evaporation rate. But part of the reason John suggests 
testing colder temperatures appears to be driven by his need to satisfy Ms. H’s 
requirements. 
 [Ms. H stands up on a ramp with the students below her.] 





6.2 Ms. H: Hottest water evaporated last... 
6.3 Molly: Yeah the room temperature one evaporated first.  
6.4 Ari: I think- - 
6.5  Ms. H: So what's going on with that?  
6.6  John: Uhh, the cooler it is the more heat it's exposed to [sotto  
voce].  
6.7  Ms. H: So you think it'll absorb more heat just because it's cold? 
6.8 John: Yeah. 
6.9  Ms. H: I don't know. I'm asking. 
6.10 Ari: But I also think- 
6.11 John: [smiling] Right now that's what I think. 
6.12 Ari: But I also think-- 
6.13 Ms. H: So how can you figure out if that's it? 
6.14   Ari: I also think it (***) because that one-- 
6.15 John: We could test colder temperatures instead of hotter ones.  
6.16  Ms. H: True, cuz now you're already saying it's not the hot one.  
[4 seconds of silence] 
6.17 John: [turning toward group] Okay, so now that we've figured out  
the hottest will evaporate last, the coldest will evaporate first we could 
try different temperatures that are colder than the three we did. 
 
When Ms. H asks John to explain why colder water evaporates faster, he suggests that 
cooler water is somehow exposed to more heat, as if it reacts more because it is cold. 
But when pressed, John expresses a lack of commitment to that idea [6.11]. 
 Again adopting the role of group leader, John suggests that the group test 
colder temperatures [6.17]. The students conduct a second experiment with one 
puddle consisting of six ounces of room temperature water and another puddle with 4 
ounces of room temperature water and two ounces of ice. But, the students allow the 
cup with ice to melt before conducting the experiment, perhaps explaining their 
finding that, again, the coldest water evaporates first: 
7.1  Molly: Coldest evaporates first. The warmer it is, the slower than  
the cold. 
7.2  Leah: That's weird. 
7.3 Molly: Yeah that is weird. 
7.4  Leah: Ooh! It's kinda like when you go in a pool and a jacuzzi.  
7.5  Leah: You go in the pool and then you go-you go in the pool then  





7.6  Leah: And it's even hotter than usual. So it's kinda like when-you  
know what I mean? 
7.7  Molly: [shakes her head no] 
7.8 Ari: Yeah 
 
This time, Leah does comment on the strange experimental finding intellectually, 
socially, and emotionally, as discussed in the Jacuzzi analogy episode from Chapter 
4.  
5.3.5 “Meaningful Relationships” in Students’ Search for Coherence 
 I suggest as a working definition for coherence, students’ trying to form 
meaningful, mutually consistent relationships between information. In the context of 
the first experiment, I explored in more detail some analytical approaches and 
challenges determining the information that students are connecting. And, parallel 
challenges exist for understanding the kinds of relationships students build between 
information. 
 In Chapter 4, I identified some of the relationships that have disciplinary 
meaning in science, including causal, analogical, and systemic. As a starting point, 
these kinds of relationships can guide our exploration of students’ coherence seeking. 
Sandoval’s (2003) work explored the causal connections that students build between 
information to explain the decline in population of particular Finch species in the 
Galapagos in 1977. Much of the work on explanatory coherence considers how 
students align theory and evidence, with sometimes elaborate diagrams to indicate the 
relationships between these bits of information (see for example Ranney & Thagard, 
1988).   
 However, that the pursuit of particular relationships between information is 





the same meaning) for students, and vice versa (Hutchison, 2008). Thus, considering 
the pursuit of meaningful relationships from the students’ perspective is not as 
straightforward as looking for the kinds of relationships we as educators would like 
them to make in that moment.   
 During Experiments 2a and 2b, for example, Leah and John continuously 
work to reach a consensus on the order in which the puddles evaporate, i.e. the 
meaningful relationship they seek is alignment between observations. There are many 
reasons why this relationship might be meaningful for them. The students might 
expect that an experiment should have a clear result. Or, Leah and John might have 
some social reason for trying to reach a consensus together, i.e. if they are developing 
a friendship. Through conversational techniques such as directing comments to each 
other, and talking past Ari, Leah and John succeed in completing the experiment and 
collecting data without too much interference from Ari. Thus they develop 
relationships not only between their observational data, but also among themselves to 
the exclusion of Ari. 
 But within science, consensus is not usually valued as an end in and of itself, 
especially when that consensus seems to contradict commonsense ideas without 
explanation. And existing coding schemes for coherence do not include consensus as 
a kind of relationship between information, perhaps because it is not considered an 
important kind of coherence to seek in science. (Though, it is important to note that 
sociocultural accounts of science recognize pursuing consensus in its own right as 
characteristic of the discipline). However, in conceptualizing coherence seeking as 





we cannot ignore that social consensus plays a prominent role in Leah’s and John’s 
work.    
 Reaching a consensus seems less important to Ari, in some ways making him 
seem more in line with objectivist or post-positivist accounts of science. He interrupts 
John and Leah’s attempts to reach consensus in order to introduce his own concerns 
about the testing condition and the reliability of their experimental results. Ari’s 
concern for the reliability of the observations may rest at least in part on the causal 
relationship he sees between thickness/spreading and evaporation over the course of 
the experiments. He does not pursue fair testing conditions as a goal in and of itself; 
rather, he sees a mechanism by which the unfair conditions could affect the 
experimental result. However, there may be other social and affective factors guiding 
his concern for the testing conditions. If he feels that Leah and John are ignoring him, 
he might continue to press on the point about the dent for social recognition. 
 My evidence that consensus and fair testing conditions are particularly 
meaningful for these students consists of both how often the students refer to these 
ideas, and the forcefulness by which they do so. In other words, they are somewhat 
persistent in seeking these particular coherences, as compared to others that they 
could possibly purse in the moment. Molly does not really provide clear evidence of 
if and how the consensus and fair testing relationships are meaningful to her; 
however, the lack of evidence does not imply a lack of meaning. One of the aspects of 
the framework that could be further developed in the future is articulating exactly 





meaning from the students’ perspective (especially in a dynamic way), and what 
counts as empirical evidence of meaning for students. 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Contextualizing Students’ Treatment of Anomalous Data Within Their 
Broader Coherence Seeking  
 Approaching students’ treatment of anomalous data with the assumption that 
the students are always seeking coherence with respect to something proves to be 
very useful in making sense of Leah, John, Molly, and Ari’s discourse in the puddle 
experiments. Consistent with Chinn and Brewer’s findings, the students respond to 
anomalous data in a variety of ways. In the first experiment, when the students find 
that the asphalt under the puddle is cool, they try to explain the result. Inside, when 
Ari notices that the relationship between volume of water and evaporation time is not 
linear, he again tries to explain it; Leah either does not recognize the finding as 
anomalous, or ignores it. In Experiment 2a, when the students find that cold water 
evaporates faster than hot water, Ari suggests that the testing conditions are 
problematic. John, Leah, and Molly accept the anomalous finding as truth, without 
explaining it. Following the second water temperature experiment 2b, Leah comments 
on the strange result and tries to explain it.   
 While some of these responses appear to be a failure to seek coherence, in my 
analysis I have also demonstrated that even when students seem to ignore anomalous 
data, they are doing so in service of other kinds of coherences. In other words, 
different ways of treating anomalous data are equivalent to seeking coherence 





 That finding raises important questions about how we characterize and 
evaluate students’ responses to anomalous data in science class. First, students’ 
attempts to reconcile dissonant information might lead them even farther from the 
canonically accepted answer, as was clearly the case in the hot/cold water 
experiments. I argue, drawing on similar findings from other studies, that this might 
be a feature, rather than a design flaw, of science curricula. Many studies have 
attempted to show that students’ development of non-canonical explanations for 
phenomena can be a valuable part of their learning to do science. Likewise, I have 
shown that, despite (or perhaps because of) issues in their experimental design, many 
aspects of the focus group’s attempt to explain the anomalous data in their 
experiments in fact aligns with characterizations of expert science.  
 Secondly, and not surprisingly, students respond to anomalous data in ways 
that are highly context-dependent; information about the task at hand, peer 
relationships, etc. intersect with students’ work to make sense of observational data. 
One of the ways Leah and John dealt with anomalous data, for example, was to defer 
to rules of school science. Ari often appeared to deviate from the rules of school 
science and his peers’ wishes in order to reconcile anomalous data with his intuitions 
about the physical world. Neither of these responses is inherently “good” or “bad”, 
but certainly they imply different criteria for coherence which we would ultimately 
like students to be able to evaluate and negotiate as they make sense of physical 
phenomena. 
5.4.2 Pinning Down “Information” and “Meaningful Relationships” in the 





 In trying to make information “hang together” in science class, students 
pursue consistency between information and meaningful relationships between 
information. Vosniadou and Brewer (1992), Driver, Guesne, and Tiberghien (1985), 
and others have demonstrated consistency depends on perspective, i.e. what students 
see as consistent may look inconsistent to educators, and vice versa. Likewise, I argue 
through analysis of data that the “information” and “meaningful relationship” aspects 
of coherence may also differ in the students’ and educators’ perspectives. A growing 
body of research has suggested that affect, identity, and social dynamics, for example, 
are inextricably intertwined with students’ conceptual sense-making (Engle & 
Conant, 2002; Girod & Wong, 2002). Though construction of a complete analytical 
framework for these entanglements is well beyond the scope of this work, these 
analyses warrant additional exploration of how students’ sense-making of the 
physical world intersects with their sense-making of the social word.    
5.4.3 Comments on Normative Claims about Students’ Coherence Seeking 
 Finally, analysis of the focus groups’ responses to anomalous data in the 
context of experiment suggest that, even when students are ignoring some 
information, they are doing so in service of seeking coherence with respect to other 
information. However, students’ coherence seeking differs in terms of the information 
they are trying to connect, how they are trying to connect it, and possibly, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, why they are trying to connect it.  
 The perspective on coherence I have described and illustrated thus far 
theoretically distinguishes between what counts as evidence of coherence seeking in 





“sophisticated” coherence seeking in science class. But it is tempting to make whole-
scale generalizations about certain kinds of responses to anomalous data being more 
sophisticated than others. Something about Ari’s work in the puddle experiments just 
seems more productive for coming to understand evaporation than what Leah and 
John do. We might base these judgments of sophistication by comparing the students’ 
work to that of practicing scientists; however, Chinn & Brewer (1993) make a 
compelling case that in their work to build accounts of natural phenomena, scientists 
respond to anomalous data in many ways, including reject or ignore it. And yet, while 
rejecting contradictory data might prove productive in particular contexts and grain 
sizes, certainly we do not want students to complete their education with 
“untrammeled authority to construct any response to a problem in a discipline and 
declare it resolved” (Engle & Conant, 2002, p. 409).  
 We might look at the effects of students’ coherence seeking within the bigger 
picture of trying to understand what happens to puddle water. However, even with 
that approach, complications arise because we must consider how social and other 
ways of seeking coherence might support or limit students’ connecting of conceptual 
ideas. For example, seeking consensus for social reasons might be detrimental to 
students’ physical sense-making in the short term, but once students develop strong 
social ties, they might be more willing to challenge each other’s ideas later.  
 I do not mean to hopelessly complicate matters by suggesting that assessing 
students’ coherence seeking involves a seemingly infinite number of entangled 
dimensions. Rather, I use the puddle experiment data to reinforce Engle and Conant’s 





better align with our conceptions of productive disciplinary engagement than the 
predominantly static, locally-based judgments of individual students’ work currently 







Chapter 6:  Intent and Coherence Seeking—Examples from a 4th 
Grade Class Arguing About the Contents of a Battery 
“…there is a secret tie or union among particular ideas, which causes the mind to 
conjoin them more frequently together, and makes the one, upon its appearance, 
introduce the other…”       -Hume 
6.1 Introduction 
 An account of students’ coherence seeking—their trying to build meaningful, 
mutually consistent relationships between information—must in some way address 
the issue of intent. That is, are students really “trying” to make connections, or are the 
connections the result of coincidence, chance, or unconscious cognitive processes?  
 There are pedagogically important reasons for drawing a distinction between 
purposefully seeking coherence and accidentally supporting or happening upon 
coherence. While accidental or coincidentally discovery has played an important role 
in the progress of science, as educators, we would like our students’ work to be more 
than just pure happenstance. Among the many goals of science education and 
education more broadly, we would like students to develop a meta-cognitive 
awareness about their thinking, wherein they intentionally checking for certain kinds 
of consistencies, or work to develop certain kinds of explanations. We would further 
like students to search for particular coherences because they see it as valuable and 
useful in their work to understand natural phenomena, and not just because the lesson 
sets them up to do so. In other words, not just for descriptive purposes, but also for 
evaluative ones, educators need to have a grasp on what information students are 





 A theme recurring throughout this dissertation is the importance of 
distinguishing what we value or would like to see, from what is, with respect to 
coherence seeking in science class. Students often rely on superficial aspects of a 
problem that educators find irrelevant, and they ignore information that educators find 
important, but in both cases students are still connecting some set of information 
together. Continuing along that line of thinking, in this chapter I explore if and how 
questions of intent are relevant for building an account of students’ coherence seeking 
in science class. Specifically, I consider:   
 Is evidence of intent required to claim that students are seeking 
coherence? 
 Do conceptions of “authentic scientific practice” require that students 
seek coherence for particular reasons? 
 Does my interpretation of students’ intent affect my understanding of 
what information students are trying to connect, and in what ways they 
try to connect it? 
Drawing on episodes of student thinking from elementary, post-secondary, and 
teacher professional development science classrooms, I argue that intent certainly 
matters for thinking about coherence seeking, but not for reasons often identified in 
the literature. To be internally consistent, the perspective on coherence seeking set 
forth in this dissertation seeking cannot require that students work to connect 
information on purpose, or even for particular reasons, in order for their work to 
count as evidence of coherence seeking. Furthermore, definitions of “sophisticated”, 





alone, for educators’ interpretations of why students are seeking coherence are 
intertwined with interpretations of what information they are trying to connect.   
 In the following sections, I explore each of these claims in more detail, 
beginning with an account of why the word “trying” appears in the definition of 
coherence seeking in the first place. Then, I present a series of examples to show 
how intent matters for thinking about what information students are trying to 
connect. Finally, I conclude with a theoretical case for re-framing the debate around 
“pseudo” and “authentic” disciplinary engagement away from intent and purpose, 
and towards more careful consideration of what information students are trying to 
connect.    
6.2 The Importance of “Trying” in the Working Definition of Coherence Seeking  
 Research on student thinking in science has expanded from merely 
categorizing students’ ideas along dimensions of correctness to considering more 
fully the substance of those ideas, as well as the dynamic processes by which students 
construct them (see for example Cavicchi, 1997; Engle & Conant, 2002; Hammer, 
1997; Smith, Maclin, Houghton & Hennessey, 2000; Varelas, Pappas, & Rife, 2006). 
However, work that focuses specifically on coherence continues to take a more static 
approach, using coherence as a way to characterize the state of students’ knowledge 
and explanations, rather than an aspect of their dynamic reasoning. 
 Hammer et al. (2008) characterize scientific inquiry as “the pursuit of 
coherent, mechanistic accounts of natural phenomena” (p. 150). In characterizing 
inquiry as a pursuit, Hammer et al. re-frame the work of the teacher from about 





everyday intuitions about natural phenomena—i.e. allowing students to do science. 
Likewise, attaching the word “seeking” to coherence, I hope to emphasize the 
moment-to-moment work that students do to try to connect ideas and information 
together, even if in the end those connections do not pan out, from the students or 
educators’ perspective.  
 Emphasizing coherence seeking as an activity complements current work 
aiming to characterize “the nature and quality of students’ participation in 
exploration, invention, and discourse” (Hammer, 1997, p. 488). Furthermore, “shifts 
in attention from finished products to discovery processes” within education mirror a 
similar shift within philosophy of science:    
Within traditional philosophy of science, the role of inconsistencies has 
largely been ignored. As best, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance for 
good scientific reasoning…Today, it is generally recognized that almost all 
scientific theories at some point in their developments were either internally 
inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings (empirical or 
theoretical)… Whereas finished theories usually seem to satisfy the 
consistency requirement, developing theories do not. (Meheus, 2002, vii) 
 
Though perhaps not an apt way to describe science in general, the process/product 
distinction suggests at least two goals for science education: i) that students’ develop 
coherent understandings or explanations, and ii) that students refine their abilities to 
attend to, seek, and value different kinds of coherence. While the first goal has been 
the focus of many studies, the second has received far less attention. Thus, initially, I 
chose to think in terms of coherence seeking, and not coherence, in order to capture 
the dynamic nature of students’ reasoning. What I did not anticipate was the linguistic 
and theoretical baggage that comes with the use of the word “trying” in my working 





of the important tasks was to clarify what exactly “trying” means, and how that 
relates to evidence of coherence seeking.  
6.3 Evidence of Coherence Seeking Does Not Necessitate Evidence of Intent 
 In an everyday sense, the word trying denotes a conscious or purposeful 
attempt to act. In other words, if someone “tries” to do something, they are thought to 
be intentional, conscious, or purposeful in that trying.22 Thus, coherence seeking, 
defined in Chapter 3 as trying to form meaningful, mutually consistent relationships 
between information, seems to necessitate intent. Certainly, there are moments when 
people are clearly intentionally working to fit ideas together, for example, when we 
make predictions about how a movie will end, when make guesses about the 
criminal’s identity while reading a mystery novel, or when we suggest a compromise 
for disagreeing peers.  
 However, in laying out evidence for coherence seeking in Chapter 4, I referred 
to theories of psychology and perceptual processing which suggest that individuals 
“try” to connect information together subconsciously, outside of their awareness. We 
see evidence of this subconscious processing for example in conversation, when 
people mirror each other’s tone, gesture, and body positioning without even 
recognizing that they are doing so. Subconscious coherence seeking can manifest in 
more insidious ways as well, for example, in the form of stereotype induction: 
In one study, Leichtman & Ceci (1995) provided animated descriptions of 
their “clumsy” friend Sam Stone to preschool children. On a number of 
occasions, these children were told of Sam’s exploits, which included 
accidently breaking Barbie dolls or ripping sweaters. Later, the children met 
Sam Stone, who came to their classroom for a short, accident-free visit. The 
                                                 
22 Notably, in everyday conversation, we also sometimes distinguish trying from intentionality. For 
example, in saying someone “intentionally tried” to hurt another, we imply that the intention and the 





next day, the teacher showed the children a torn book and a soiled teddy bear. 
Several weeks later, a number of three- and four-year-old children reported 
that Sam Stone had been responsible, with some even claiming that they had 
seen him do this. (Bruck & Ceci,1999, p. 428). 
 
One might argue that these “unconscious” processes while important more generally, 
are too generic or broad to be useful evidence of students’ reasoning in science. The 
criticism is warranted. Characterizing every gaze, change in body position, facial 
expression, or utterance of speech as an act of coherence seeking is unwieldy 
analytically, and even if feasible or interesting from a researcher’s standpoint, 
certainly will not be of much use to an educator trying to make decisions about where 
to go next with her students. Even in the analyses presented in this dissertation, I have 
chosen to highlight certain kinds of evidence of coherence seeking in each clip; rarely 
do I specifically point out that students’ object recognition can be conceptualized as a 
form of coherence-seeking. 
 However, in some episodes, unconscious attempts to connect information 
were clearly pivotal for students’ sense-making about natural phenomena. For 
example, in Chapter 5, John predicted that after a puddle evaporates from the asphalt, 
the asphalt will feel cool. That prediction was based on a variety of experiences: 
objects can “feel” hot or cold, evaporation involves heat, when something touches a 
hotter object the cooler object warms, etc. How exactly these different experiences 
are stored and called upon are not yet understood, but clearly John’s making of such a 
prediction indicates that he has coordinated these kinds of experiences, and much of 
that coordination likely occurred outside of his direct awareness in the past and in the 
moment. Likewise, when Leah and the other students touch the asphalt, they 





Leah did not need to try to feel if the asphalt was warm; she just sensed it. Thus, 
while not always salient, “unconscious” coherence seeking—moments without clear 
evidence of intent to connect information—can indeed play an important role in 
educators’ understanding of students’ sense-making.  
 Furthermore, attempts to restrict coherence seeking to intentional work would 
require an understanding of the human consciousness that as yet we do not possess:   
Although consciousness is the only way we know about the world within and 
around us—shades of the famous Cartesian deduction cogito, ergo sum—there 
is no agreement about what it is, how it relates to highly organized matter or 
what its role in life is. (Koch, 2009, n.p.) 
 
Requiring evidence of intent to call students’ work coherence seeking means 
developing analytical tools to distinguish what students do intentionally and with 
awareness from what they do accidentally, coincidentally, unknowingly, etc. But 
clinical studies suggest that the line between conscious and unconscious thought is 
blurred. Humans often do not even know why we do things; when asked, we post-
rationalize our decisions without actually understanding our intent at the time we 
made those decisions. In one hallmark study, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) asked 
consumers to select a pair of stockings from a row of four. While consumers 
generally picked the pair of stockings farthest to the right, when asked to explain their 
decision-making, consumers came up with a variety of reasons (softness, etc.), none 
of which included the location. Split-brain studies have also brought into question the 
degree to which humans understand the reasons for their behavior (Wolman, 2012). 
Michael Gazzaniga exposed a split-brain patient to two stimuli—the word ‘smile’ to 
the right hemisphere and the word ‘face’ to the left—and asked the patient to draw 





he had seen the word smile due to the separation of his right and left hemispheres. 
When asked why he drew a smiling face, the patient responded: “What do you want, 
a sad face? Who wants a sad face around?” According to Gazzaniga: 
The left hemisphere made up a post hoc answer that fit the situation…The 
left-brain interpreter…is what everyone uses to seek explanations for events, 
triage the barrage of incoming information and construct narratives that help 
to make sense of the world.  (Wolman, 2012, p. 262)   
 
 Given i) our limited understanding of human consciousness, and ii) evidence 
that humans often operate outside of, or despite their articulated intent, I think it 
premature, and possibly unnecessary from an analytical standpoint, to demarcate what 
counts as evidence of coherence seeking from what does not solely on the basis of 
conscious awareness or intent. Thus, while perhaps linguistically awkward, I maintain 
that individuals do seek coherence both consciously and unconsciously, and I 
maintain the use of the phrase “unconscious coherence seeking” throughout the 
dissertation. 
 So, why talk about intent at all? At the start of this chapter, I suggested that 
intent does matter for coherence seeking, just not in the ways that the field of science 
education has previously identified. But none of the work on coherence reviewed in 
Chapter 2 tries to make a strong case about students’ intent. Sandoval (2003) talks 
about students’ epistemic criteria for coherence, but does not state whether these 
epistemic criteria operate on the level of students’ awareness. Vosniadou and Brewer 
(1992) suggest that the consistency of students’ answers reflects the consistency of 
knowledge structures in their minds, in some sense taking intent out of the question 
altogether. And Thagard, Ranney, and Schank approach coherence as a criterion for 





theories because of their increased alignment with data. As far as Thagard and 
Nowak’s (1988) study is concerned, scientists might ‘prefer’ certain coherences in the 
same way that Nisbett and Wilson’s consumers ‘prefer’ the stocking to the right.23   
 While science educators have not appeared to have taken a strong position 
regarding whether evidence conscious intent is required for evidence of coherence 
seeking specifically, they have suggested that the units of information that students 
try to connect can be identified without any serious consideration of students’ intent 
or perceived purposes of the activity in which they are engaged.  
 However, in analyzing classroom data, I found it quite difficult to separate my 
answer to “what information are students trying to connect, and in what ways?” from 
the second half of my research question: “to what ends?”  In other words, my claims 
about what information students were trying to connect, and how, was intertwined 
with my perceptions of students’ intent.  
6.4 Intent As Intertwined With the “What” of Coherence Seeking 
 To illustrate how interpretations of students’ intent might influence claims 
about what information students try to connect and how, I draw on an example from 
an undergraduate University of Maryland introductory physics tutorial. Briefly, in 
these tutorials, students work together in small groups to complete a series of 
questions and laboratory activities. The tutorials encourage students to think of 
physics as a refinement of their everyday intuitions about the physical world. For 
                                                 
23 That is not to suggest that scientists never seek particular coherences purposefully; certainly they 
do. Rather, Thagard and Nowak (1988) showed only that that scientists’ eventual selection of the 
Theory of Plate Tectonics over Contraction Theory can be postdicted on the basis of increased 
alignment with evidence. The study does not conclusively suggest that the scientists intentionally or 





example, one part of a tutorial for Newton’s Third Law explicitly asks students to 
reconcile their understanding of Newton’s Third Law with their intuition that small 
objects react more: 
Suppose the truck’s mass is 2000 kg while the care’s mass is 1000 kg. And 
suppose the truck slows down by 5 m/s during the collision. Intuitively, how 
much speed does the car gain during the collision? (Conlin, Gupta, & 
Hammer, 2010, p. 279) 
 
As written, the tutorial encourages students to draw on particular pieces of 
information, including: i) the masses of the truck and the car, ii) the ratio of the mass 
difference between the vehicles, iii) the change in speed of the truck, and iv) their 
intuition that smaller objects react more (an intuition which the tutorial writers predict 
students will activate based on other findings from education research). But transcript 
from one group’s conversation about the tutorial question reveals they are bringing all 
kinds of information to the table, beyond what the tutorial specifies:   
1.1  Molly24: The car is half as heavy, so it’ll gain twice as much. 
1.2  Camille: Ah shoot [laughs] 
1.3 Dianna: Or something, I dunno 
1.4 Molly: That’s what they want us to think, but this is not the real  
answer. 
1.5 Bridget: This is not the right /one/. Apparently, I think that’s what they  
want us to say.  
[about ten seconds of silence] 
1.6 Dianna: This is going…five…five meters per second, that’s it’s what?  
Acceleration or velocity? 
1.7  Camille: Speed. ##Velocity## 
1.8  Molly: ##velocity## 
1.9  Bridget: Slows down by…?? 
1.10 Dianna: Velocity? 
1.11  Camille: Mm hmm. [pause] So the car gains ten meters per second?  
1.12  Bridget: I guess. 
1.13  Dianna: Didn’t he say something about how like somebody in class,  
like—if something’s touched a velocity, or something was 
changed…what was he talking about in class, something, the masses? 
                                                 





 (Conlin, Gupta, & Hammer, 2010, p. 279-280) 
 
 In [1.1], Molly seems to draw on her sort of common sense expectation that a 
lighter object will gain proportionally more, in line with the expectations of the 
tutorial designers. But then in [1.4], Molly shifts the focus of her inquiry from the 
car/truck question to the intentions of the tutorial writers. She suggests that the 
tutorial sets up students to say the wrong (“not real”) answer. Bridget confirms, 
“That’s what they want us to say” [1.5]. Both of the students appear to be drawing on 
an experience or idea that “teachers/science/tutorials try to trick us.” The source of 
that idea might be in the history of these students’ experiences in school or in tutorials 
more generally; or it might be triggered by the phrasing of the specific tutorial they 
are working on. In a published analysis of this clip, for example, Conlin, Gupta, & 
Hammer (2010) point out that immediately after the previous excerpt, Dianna hears 
another group use the word “intuitively” (a word also used in the tutorial question), 
and says to her group, “I hate that word, ‘intuitively.’” Dianna does not elaborate, but 
her comment suggests that the word “intuitively” is at least ambiguous to her, perhaps 
explaining her uncertainty about the answers the tutorial expects.    
 Following Bridget and Molly’s comment about the intentions of the tutorial 
writers, Dianna asks whether 5 meters per second denotes the truck’s acceleration or 
velocity [1.6]. Most simply, Dianna may be trying to coordinate the following pieces 
of information: i) the phrase “five meters per second”, ii) the terms “velocity” and 
“acceleration”, iii) some sort of expectation or idea that using the correct term 
matters. In other words, Dianna may be trying to complete the worksheet, and part of 





working with more information than she explicitly states in [1.6]. If I assume that 
Dianna is doing more than searching for correct terminology, I can start to see other 
information she might be trying to connect in the service of physical sense-making. 
As worded, the tutorial question is a bit ambiguous. Meters per second are units of 
speed or velocity (see Camille and Molly’s responses in [1.7] and [1.8]), but the 
tutorial asks about a change in speed (see Bridgette’s comment in [1.9]) which, as 
Dianna points out, is called acceleration. What the tutorial means to say is that the 
initial and final speeds of the truck differ by 5 meters per second. However, this point 
might be confusing for Dianna. Though she does not specifically refer to it in [1.6], 
Dianna may be also trying to fit together the previously identified information (i-iii) 
with iv) “the truck slows down by”, making her coherence seeking seem more about 
physical sense-making than just using correct terminology, i.e. what is this change the 
truck experiences (“that’s it’s what?). Identifying which information Dianna is trying 
to connect is intimately related to my interpretation of what she is trying to do in this 
moment.  
 In [1.11], Camille sort of resolves the problem of what quantity 5 meters per 
second represents by omitting a label for her answer entirely (“so the car gains ten 
meters per second?). Bridget still seems uncertain, either about the answer the 
worksheet wants, or the truck/car problem itself.  Finally, Dianna begins “shopping 
for ideas” from physics class lectures related to velocity, change, and mass (van Zee 
et al., 2005, p. 1019). 
 So, what information are Dianna and her classmates trying to connect in 





“trying” in the context of students’ sense-making. Dianna, for example, is trying to 
connect information about quantities and their units with the wording of the question; 
however, she may be trying to make these connections in the service of physical 
sense-making, to generate an answer for the worksheet, or both. Likewise, Camille is 
trying to unite Molly’s answer (the car gains twice as much) with the concerns Diana 
raised about units, and she does this by omitting quantity labels. In this case, she is 
not trying to ease Diana’s and Bridgette’s uncertainty so much as she is trying to get 
the group to agree on a sanctioned answer for the worksheet.  
 Attention to the nestedness or multiple levels of purpose to students’ activity 
(from their perspective) has become increasingly important in science education, 
especially in work aiming to reform science education toward more “authentic” 
scientific practice. In reaction to findings that students can appear to engage in 
disciplinary practices like argumentation and modeling, but without the genuine 
purposes of science, the community has undertaken defining authentic scientific 
practices in a way that necessitates evidence of intent. In other words, students must 
not only argue in the form that scientists argue, but also for the reasons that scientists 
argue.  
 Though coherence seeking cuts across scientific practices, and is not a 
practice unto itself, it serves as a useful construct for exploring the developing role of 
intent in scientific practices more generally. Specifically, analyses of students’ 
coherence seeking reveal that perhaps our concerns about the authenticity or 





intent (why they are doing what they are doing), but more fundamentally, from our 
perception of what it is that the students are doing.  
6.5 Re-considering “Pseudo-inquiries” in Terms of What Information Students 
are Trying to Connect  
 In the push to make school science more like scientific practice, standards 
documents, education research, and in some instances teaching practice have moved 
away from presenting science purely has a collection of facts, and towards science as 
a way of thinking and knowing as exemplified in scientific practices. According to 
the 2012 Frameworks: 
Science is not just a body of knowledge that reflects current understanding of 
the world; it is also a set of practices used to establish, extend, and refine that 
knowledge. (NRC, 2012, p. 27)  
 
But as the frameworks and a host of research studies point out, students are extremely 
adaptive; they can quickly master the game of a disciplinary practice and implement 
it as a rote procedure, rather than as a tool for making sense of the physical world. In 
their study of argumentation in a high school genetics class, for example, Jimenez-
Aleixandre, Rodriguez, and Duchl (2000) identify two different patterns of 
participation—‘doing science’ and ‘doing school.’ The students who are doing school 
focus on completing tasks for the sake of school, or to meet the teachers demands, 
whereas in moments of doing science, “students are evaluating knowledge clams, 
discussing with each other, offering justifications for the different hypotheses, and 
trying to support them with analogies and metaphors” (p. 771). Other researchers 
have referred to doing school as ‘procedural display’ (Bloome, Puro, & Theodorou, 





reciprocal teaching and other modes of instruction that emphasize students’ execution 
of procedures to the detriment of their genuine wondering about a topic. She recounts 
an anecdote from her experience visiting a third grade social studies class, when the 
teacher asked the class to come up with questions about Eskimos: 
Over time there came to be a sanctioned set, and the task was to think of a 
missing member and suggest it. I’d look up at the board and say to myself, 
“Let’s see now. Which ones aren’t up there yet? We still don’t have ‘What are 
their customs? Or ‘What’s their religion?’” We gave Mrs. McKenzie the 
“questions” she was after. There was purpose in our utterances, but it was not 
inquiry’s purpose. We were engaging in a teacher-pleasing exercise. 
(Lindfors, 1999, p. 52). 
 
In Lindfors’ view, authentic engagement in inquiry requires that the participants’ 
intent, purpose, or desire be to truly wonder and find something out about the world.  
6.5.1 What ‘Doing School’ Means in Terms of Seeking Coherence  
 In analyzing classroom data for evidence of coherence seeking, I shared 
Lindfors’ view. During the first summer of the Learning Progressions project, the 
participant teachers completed the battery and bulbs module under the teachers 
participated in a summer workshop, during which they completed the battery and 
bulbs module. Working in groups of four or five, the teachers found multiple ways to 
make the bulb light, and also ways that do not work. As a collective, the teachers 
recognized that all of the ways that work require “two points of connection,” i.e. that 
the wire touch two points on both the bulb and the battery. After the discovery, the 
facilitator, David, asked the teachers to come up with some sort of analogy to explain 
why there need to be two points of connection. The idea for the analogy as a next 
move stems in part from an historical precedent in professional science, namely, that 





phenomena (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). In addition, both directed and spontaneously 
analogies appear to play a pivotal role in students’ science learning (May, Hammer, 
& Roy, 2006). One group of teachers share with David their train analogy to explain 
the two points of connection, in which the power box represents the battery, the track 
represents the wire, and the train moving represents the bulb lighting. David probes 
the analogy: 
2.1 David: What in this story makes the train move? 
[2 second pause] 
2.2 Patty: The battery source connect to the...wire. 
2.3 David: how -- 
2.4 Wendy: Something moves from the battery when you turn it on and  
everything is connected, something is moving from this power source 
through the tracks to that connection between the wheel and the track. 
2.5 David: So that part of your story is still sort of intangible it sounds  
like. 
 
David points out the analogy does not account for what makes the train move, and 
suggests that the teachers think about flow as a way of refining their analogy: 
 2.6 David: …[lines omitted] And in fact, in fact // So I want to give you, I  
want to give you a little bit of a nudge of a place to go shopping..Look 
in your mind around things that you know about that flow. 
2.7 Wendy: [pointing to Patty] Water. 
2.8 David: Because you // electricity flows. People always talk about  
electricity flowing from the battery to the bulb. That kind of thing. 
Look for things you know about that flow. And think about things that 
flow that might be a basis for thinking more about what the electricity 
is like and what it's doing and and what it's doing in the bulb...[David 
leaves] 
2.9 Trish: So it goes back to the water wheel or canal or aqueduct. 
2.10 Wendy: The paddle wheel on a..boat. 
[4 second pause] 
2.11 Patty: What about a possible connection to what we were talking  
about yesterday with air flows, right, wind creating the high and the 
low across the areas. That's also // or the water cycle, the actual water 
cycle itself // that's still not tangible. That's not tangible. 
2.12 Trish: Is there a toy boat, is there a boat, I mean is there something  
with a boat that we can use, that they've seen. 





surface that you're putting it on. 
2.14 Wendy: ##It // flow. He wants something that flows.## 
2.15 Patty: But that water flows. [9 second pause] 
 
One of the prominent aspects of Patty, Wendy, and Trish‘s work in this moment is 
that they appear to be searching for ideas about flow primarily because David has 
asked them to do so, and not because they see it as essential in refining their account 
of how circuits work. For example, in [2.11] Patty starts to suggest a connection to air 
and the water cycle, but retracts it on the basis of it not being tangible. David had 
explicitly stated in the beginning of the activity that the analogies should be tangible, 
everyday, and familiar (i.e. not like teleportation). Thus, in [2.10] Patty struggles to 
coordinate two criteria for the analogy—flow and tangible—both of which originate 
from David. Trish, in [2.11] suggests a toy boat as an analogy. Toy boats are tangible, 
involves water (which flows), and have the added benefit of being something with 
which students are familiar. Patty points out that in order for the boat to move, it 
needs wind, and that water is just a surface for the boat. Wendy re-iterates the 
instructions: “he wants something that flows” [2.14].  
 An experienced science facilitator, David was quite aware of the possibility 
that the teachers would try to do what he asks, instead of focus on making sense of 
the circuits. Thus, he repeatedly reminded the teachers: 
The “what am I supposed to do” kind of thing is not thinking about the world. 
It’s thinking about the boss. So, I want to stay thinking about the 
world…Don’t think about what I want. Well what I want is you thinking 
about the world.  
 
But simply cataloging the teachers’ work in lines [2.1-2.10] as an instance of ‘doing 
school’ or “thinking about the boss” makes ambiguous precisely what about their 





really connecting. In outlining the task, David asked the teachers to make analogies 
that are “tangible” and later, to try to draw on examples of things that “flow.” These 
words hold particular meanings for David, both as physicists and an educator. The 
word tangible, as David describes it, means: 
…connected to what people know about the world and not other than. Not 
distant. Not something weird. I mean cognitively tangible. Not necessarily 
that you can actually touch it with your hands, but that it is // it's not 
something that you think // it's not like teleportation. It's like kicking. 
 
And the unit of information represented in the word flow, for David, includes the 
ways that people use the word flow, and flow as a way of thinking about movement 
[2.8], among other things. But the teachers take up ‘flow’ and ‘tangible,’ as units of 
information, in ways different than what David meant. First, tangible and flow are 
tied to “what David wants,” i.e. criteria for a correct answer. The teachers also 
associate flow with some of the water system analogies they generated earlier in the 
morning. And tangible, as Stacey uses it, is intimately tied to something that her 
students would have access to, like a toy. Thus, setting aside for a moment why the 
teachers take up flow the way they do in the episode, clearly, the term ‘flow’ denotes 
at least two different units of information, one for David and one for the teachers 
(though, there are likely differences between the teachers, as well). Certainly, as 
Lemke (1982) notes, these meanings are determined by David and the teachers 
dynamically in interaction with each other and the classroom space, but importantly, 
the meanings are not universal. Or, as Jimenez-Aleixandre, Rodgriguez, and Duschl 
(2000) put it: 
…students and teachers often do not share the same “purpose” for a lesson or 
activity. Sometimes teachers and students are assigning (constructing) 





what counts as evidence, what counts as data, or what counts as explanation. 
(p. 762) 
 
And sometimes, our failure to consider students’ intent can lead to possible 
misinterpretations of what information they are really trying to connect, particularly 
when we mistake adeptness at using classroom vocabulary or completing assignments 
for coherence seeking with respect to ideas about physical phenomena. 
6.5.2 What ‘Winning’ Means in Terms of Seeking Coherence 
 Sometimes, learners take up a disciplinary practice like generating analogies 
as a moment to display procedural knowledge or create a teacher-pleasing answer. 
Another “pseudo-inquiry” drawing the attention of education research involves 
students’ participation in disciplinary practices primarily for social or affective 
purposes, i.e. “to win.” The concern here is that disciplinary practices are primarily 
tools for knowledge construction in science, but in science class, these practices 
sometimes become sources of entertainment for students, or tools for negotiating their 
social status, etc. (Hutchison, 2008). Engle and Conant (2002) found that students 
may align themselves with a position in order to avoid confrontation, or employ 
discourse moves to shut down the opponent and “win” the argument. Berland and 
Hammer (2012) showed how students will marshal evidence in sophisticated ways 
that both allow students to “win” a debate, but at the same time lead to progress in the 
accounts of predator-prey models. Notably, these findings challenge the notion that 
“authentic inquiry is motivated in the sense that the process is driven by an explicit 
intention to find out” (Kuhn & Pease, 2008, p. 513). On the contrary, students’ desire 
to win a debate, to gain approval from others, or to get an ‘A’ on an exam might be 





 But my focus here is not to argue whether the desire to win, to hurt or support 
others, or to gain the teacher’s attention ought to be considered a valuable or 
productive aspect of school. Rather, I aim to show that these perceptions of students’ 
intent again may be tied into what I believe is a more fundamental disagreement in 
the community about the nature of students’ sense-making—that is, what information 
students are trying to connect and in what ways. To explore in more detail the social 
and affective dynamics of students’ sense-making, I turn to a clip from fourth grade 
class also working on the batteries and bulbs module—the same module that we saw 
teachers working on in the last clip.  
 Ms. F’s class, like the teachers, found different ways to make a bulb light, and 
also generated analogies to explain why certain arrangements work. Ms. F asked each 
group of students to share their analogies (called “models” in this class), and during 
the presentations students were encouraged to ask questions and challenge each other.  
During these presentations, the students begin to unite around the idea that the battery 
contains two ingredients—positive and negative energy—which interact in some way 
to make the light bulb light. At one point, a student named Baxter suggests that these 
two kinds of energy leave the battery and meet in the light bulb, where they “fight” 
and “kill” each other and make the bulb light. A student named Phoebe challenges 
Baxter: 
3.1 Phoebe: I don't believe that because ##(***)##-- 
3.2 Shaye: ##So so so but## where does -- 
3.3 Ms. F: Shaye, let Phoebe say something please. 
3.4 Phoebe: Yes, Shaye. Well, I don't think that that's possible because the  
negative side still has to have energy in it -- 
3.5 Baxter: ##Yeah## it has a little energy, like ##the negative's## 
3.6 Phoebe: ##cuz they## ##but## they have to be different kinds of 





3.7 Baxter: Yeah, like the negative side has different liquid that like, kills  
the positive and the positive kills the negative. ##That's why their 
separated.## 
 
 In what still resembles Lindfors’ (1999) description of collaborative inquiry, 
Phoebe and Baxter debate the plausibility of negative and positive energy killing each 
other to make the bulb light. Phoebe begins with an appeal to ideas the class has 
already established—that both kinds of energy are needed for a “reaction.” She does 
not elaborate on this argument, but she might be thinking that if one kind of energy 
kills the other, then only one energy remains and that is not sufficient for a reaction. 
But her approach in [3.8] changes, and she stops referring to other ideas that the class 
has already established: 
3.8 Phoebe: [facing Baxter] ##Energy trying## to kill each other? 
3.9 Baxter: Yeah. [Phoebe scrunches her eyebrows together] 
[Many students speaking at once] 
3.10 Delia: Wait but -- (***)  
3.11 Student: I think (***) 
3.12 Brad: Then why would they have a negative if the positive kills  
[moves right hand into his left hand] the negative? == 
3.13 Baxter: ##They have a## 
3.14 Brad: ##And lights it?## 
3.15 Baxter: They, because they would have to separate them or when you  
get a battery it wouldn't like // You know how there's juice in a battery. 
Well, um, they kill each other [moves hands together and apart 
rapidly] -- 
3.16 Brad: ##Electric-electricity can go through metal.## 
3.17 Baxter: ##Well, when##  
3.18 Brad: ##Electricity can go through metal.## 
3.19 Phoebe: ##You're talking about energy and electricity trying to kill 
 each other! <Where is that from?!>## 
3.20 Baxter: ##Yeah## Yeah, when you try to light something up, the  
positive [drops right hand] and the negative [drops left hand] are 
killing each other [shakes both hands] and then light something up 
[moves hands apart] and that's how it loses juice [drops hands] 
because uh == 
3.21 Phoebe: Are you trying to (*** ***)25 [slightly smiling and raising  
                                                 





and then raising her eyebrows] 
3.22 Baxter: ##No## [giggles] 
3.22  Student: ##Either, I think the negative wins## or something like that. 
 
Phoebe’s three comments in this exchange are a bit more confrontational, and less 
like the kinds of exchanges Lindfors (1999) describes in collaborative inquiry. In 
terms of coherence seeking, Phoebe no longer tries to fit Baxter’s idea into the class’s 
agreed upon knowledge. In fact, in asking “where is that from?!” Phoebe indicates 
Baxter’s “killing” idea does not fit with any of her ideas about energy and electricity.  
 Of course, the aforementioned interpretation represents Phoebe’s treatment of 
Baxter’s idea as grounded in highly logical, rational, and conscious processes. It 
might be that Phoebe does not like the idea of energy killing each other, and so she 
becomes increasingly unwilling to entertain this idea. And further, Phoebe’s response 
might not even be completely grounded in conceptual the ideas. The exchanges above 
suggest a volatile relationship between Phoebe and Baxter. For example, Phoebe 
turns around and makes faces at Baxter when she speaks, and she changes her 
intonation with each utterance. In interviewing Ms. F about this clip, I asked her to 
discuss in more detail the relationship between the students in her class (see 
Appendix F). She commented that Phoebe is a “lawyer in training” and “can hold her 
own” in a conversation, and that Baxter’s ideas are often a target. She also suspected 
that the relationship between Baxter and Phoebe is contentious. Thus, Phoebe’s 
resistance to Baxter’s ideas, and Baxter’s persistence in defending them, are likely 
part of a complex social dynamic. While these two students may in part be trying to 
make sense of electricity, they are also (perhaps primarily) trying to engage in social 





 Ife Phoebe is taking on the role of a lawyer, trying to win a case, what is 
Baxter doing? Initially, Baxter’s reason for bringing up the idea that positive and 
energy kill each other might be grounded in his work to understand why wires 
sometimes get hot, and why the batteries do not blow up. Earlier in the conversation, 
Baxter suggested positive energy is dangerous, and left unchecked, can heat up the 
wire or explode the battery. Just like subtraction reduces a positive number (which the 
students learned that morning in math class), he reasoned, the negative energy 
“minuses” the positive energy, making it less dangerous. The introduction of killing, 
an embellishment but also an anthromorphism, seems to be a refinement of this 
“negative reduces positive” idea. From the perspective of coherence seeing, Baxter’s 
idea contains many conceptual elements (positives, negatives, energy, 
killing/cancelling) that he has combined into an analogy for understanding how 
circuits work.  In other words, part of the answer to “what information Baxter is 
trying to connect” seems to be resources related to his experience with opposites and 
cancelling. But as the students, notably Phoebe, strongly disagree with him, Baxter’s 
facial expressions and tone start to indicate a shift in the information he is trying to 
connect. The “killing” idea morphs from an explanation for how the bulb lights into 
an idea that must be defended against Phoebe, and also becomes tied into his reading 
of the social and emotional tone of the class. Erin, who at the time was standing at the 
front of the class trying to share her group’s idea, fights for space to respond to 
Baxter’s killing idea. However, unlike Phoebe, she responds to Baxter in a calm and 






[37 lines omitted] 
3.59 Baxter: Well, my strategy is sort of confusing but if I could draw it 
 [looking towards Ms. F] that'd be easier.  
3.60  Erin: I know what you're saying. You're saying like, um, when cuz  
you're saying that it's too dangerous if there's // if all if the positive 
goes wherever and then this [the bump] lowers it down because it's a 
minus and plus. I don't think that's true. 
3.61  Larry: I kind of disagree with that because, again, if you put the po // if  
you connect the wires to the positive side and you put it to // if you put 
it to the same spot on the light bulb, nothing's gonna happen.  
3.62  Baxter: Yeah, because like um == 
3.63  Erin: You have to connect both sides to it um if you want it to light  
cuz it has [moves hands in a ‘U’ shape upward] == 
3.64  Shaye: [facing Erin] ##Well that's why you need both types of energy  
for it to light## 
  
But when Baxter again tries to interject his idea that energies kill each other, the class 
immediately and loudly tries to shut him down: 
3.65 Baxter: ##Well since, like, Larry## [Larry looks towards  
Baxter] I'm answering your question. Well, you know how they kill 
each other?  
[Many students speaking at once, and loudly]  
[Alyssa and Phoebe turn around to face Baxter] 
3.66 Phoebe: They don't -- 
3.67 Student: They do not kill each other! 
3.68  Ms. F: Stop! Stop! Stop!  
3.69 Brad: Shhhhh. 
3.70 Erin: You need the negative side -- 
3.71 Ms. F: ##Guys, stop yelling. Remember, we're all just expressing## -- 
3.72 Tony: ##Baxter, how does energy kill each other?## 
3.73 Baxter: ##I dunno [giggles] I just said it##. 
3.74  Ms. F: Anthony and Ari. Stop for a moment. Remember, we're all just  
expressing some ideas, k? -- 
3.75 Baxter: Well, maybe == 
3.76  Ms. F: We're gonna try to get out our ideas. Other people can hear our  
ideas. They can add to it. They can offer some counter examples. But 
we need to stop drowning out each other. And we're not arguing, we're 
trying to make some understanding from this. Baxter. 
 
As Ms. F states in [3.76], the students talk over each other loudly in a way that might 
inhibit careful consideration of ideas. The students appear to be trying to shut Baxter 





Intent becomes relevant in these exchanges because students’ may not be trying to 
connect the substance of Baxter’s idea to the conversation. Instead, they begin to 
associate the killing idea with something silly or wrong that needs to be squashed. In 
terms of Baxter’s coherence seeking, he might be “just saying” [3.73] the killing 
analogy to attract attention; for example, he often smiles or giggles when Phoebe 
yells at him. But Baxter successively modifies his killing analogy in substantive ways 
throughout the class, suggesting that at least part of his coherence seeking indeed 
involves substantive ideas about the ingredients in a battery.  
6.6 Discussion 
6.6.1 The Importance of Students’ Trying to Make Connections 
 There are many ways of making sense of the world, and science has arguably 
come to represent an amazingly influential, but also narrowly defined set of tools, 
practices, and knowledge for sense-making about natural phenomena. By recognizing 
the myriad ways that students try to make sense of their experiences in science class, 
we are better prepared as researchers and educators to support their ongoing 
refinement of their ideas about natural phenomena, even if those sense-making 
practices appear to deviate drastically from accepted scientific practice. The idea that 
the battery contains two ingredients indeed proved to be a useful idea for students in 
Ms. F’s class. They not only refined the model over successive days in the module, 
but also used that model to explain other observations, for example the differing 
brightness of bulbs in a series and parallel circuit. And Baxter’s use of 
anthropomorphism raised questions about whether energy in a battery has “agency” 





reiterate a point already made, but unfortunately under acknowledged, in the science 
education literature: that a primary goal of educators and researchers ought to be to 
consider sincerely the sense that students are trying to make (see for example 
Duckworth, 1996; Hammer, Goldberg, & Fargason, in press; Lindfors, 1999).  
6.6.2 How Intent Matters for Coherence Seeking 
 Philosophical and cognitive accounts of humans’ work to connect perceptual, 
epistemological, conceptual, social, linguistic, cultural and other information together 
distinguish between those connections which are achieved on purpose, consciously, 
and those which occur without any apparent conscious intent. 
 I have argued in this chapter i) that students seek coherence both consciously 
and unconsciously, and ii) that our perceptions of students’ intent affects our 
interpretations of what information students are trying to connect. However, I have 
remained relatively agnostic concerning normative judgments about students’ 
coherence seeking, especially in regard to intent. In their review of conceptualizations 
of argumentation in studies of science and science education research, Bricker and 
Bell (2008) advocate for a broader perspective on what constitutes authentic 
engagement in that practice: 
We have used the scientific practice of argumentation as a model for our 
argument that the field of science education’s attempts to integrate 
conceptualizations of scientific practice deeply into the work of science 
education have been hampered by arguably narrow theoretical considerations 
of the forms and purposes of those practices—and that many of the specific 
theoretical conceptualizations like the kinds presented in the previous sections 
can be used to further inform important aspects of the endeavor. (Bricker & 
Bell, 2008, p.495, emphasis added) 
  
Likewise, I suspect that a priori limiting “authentic” coherence seeking to those 





conceptual ideas will not serve the interests of researchers or educators. Whether 
students are trying to win, trying to do well in school, or are just curious, our focus as 
educators really centers on what those purposes tell us about the substance of 







Chapter 7: Reflections on Defining and Seeing Evidence of 
Coherence Seeking 
“Yet even if too broad and vague, this classification of life at least points us in the 
right direction...”   -James Lovelock, on the Gaia Hypothesis 
7.1 Introduction 
 In constructing and refining a perspective on coherence seeking, I studied 
classroom videos and transcripts from the Learning Progressions project carefully and 
considered, “How are the students’ utterances, movements, expressions, gazes, etc. 
evidence of coherence seeking in this moment?” In other words, rather than ask if or 
when students seek coherence, I asked, “What information are they trying to 
connect?”   
 In purposefully stretching the construct of coherence to its limit, I illustrated 
how students’ attention to classroom norms, peers’ and teachers’ expressions, 
instructions, their sense of what a task is about, their acts of language, etc. can be 
construed as kinds of coherence seeking, along with the more often recognized forms 
of coherence seeking related to connecting conceptual information. It is only partly 
facetious to say that according to the perspective laid out in this dissertation, 
everything is coherence seeking. Some might argue that a construct which can be 
construed so as to include every aspect of the classroom ecosystem is meaningless, 
and also useless. The usefulness of any construct in education research, they might 
add, stems from the ability to reliably distinguish what does and does not fall into the 





 In response to such concerns, I first point out that the emphasis of this work is 
not so much to create a valid and reliable definition of a construct, but to create a 
perspective, or way of looking at, students’ reasoning in the classroom. Certainly, 
perspectives can hold important cultural, emotional, and spiritual consequences for 
individuals and their communities. The mantra that “music is everywhere” for 
example, plays an important role in Tanzanian communities (Paladino, 2008), as does 
the principle of interdependence in some Native American cultures (Cajete, 1999).   
 Without minimizing these sorts of meaning stemming from expansive 
worldviews or perspectives, I appeal to evidence that the development of these 
ambiguous perspectives can be important tools for discovery and may significantly 
impact practice. Working under the assumption that any sound (or lack thereof) can 
be called music, post-modernists have explored music as a social construct, leading to 
recognition of forms of musicality previously unknown to Western culture (Kramer, 
1999). Within the field of education, educators’ shift from a deficit model to the view 
that students enter the classroom with myriad resources for reasoning about the world 
has a profound impact on their assessment practices and instructional decision-
making, and may also impact many aspects of students’ performance in school, 
including retention and self-efficacy. Though the mechanisms by which educators’ 
perspectives on learning impact the classroom are not completely understood, 
evidence for the impact is well-documented (see for example Ball, 1993; Hammer, 
1997). 
 Beyond the demonstrated practical implications, an expansive view of 





(1973) work on prototype theory suggests that for many natural categories, humans 
view category membership as a matter of degree, rather than a matter of fitting (or not 
fitting) a definition. In other words, when asked to identify members of a particular 
set (“birds”, “furniture”, “colors”) participants demonstrate a gradation—i.e. a robin 
is more like a bird than a penguin. In terms of coherence seeking, existing work 
appears to identify prototypical examples (causal relations, explanatory coherence, 
non-contradiction from the expert’s perspective), without acknowledging the 
possibility of gradation in membership (i.e. to some degree, everything is coherence 
seeking). The perspective outlined in this dissertation treats coherence seeking as a 
sort of natural category of which all classroom activity is a part; however, in doing so, 
I have possibly understated the importance of centrality—i.e. is “finding 
inconsistencies among ideas” more like coherence seeking (or more valuable) in 
science than “aligning one’s behavior with social norms” or “recognizing an object as 
a chair”? Since issues of centrality become salient in conceptualizing students’ 
progress in science, I discuss that issue in more detail in Chapter 8.  
 While there are reasons to value a perspective that essentially tags everything 
in the classroom as evidence of coherence seeking, certainly, in stretching the 
construct of coherence seeking to its limits, aspects of that perspective have become 
ambiguous or ill-defined. Components of the perspective that require further 
refinement include the definition of coherence seeking, the fluid boundary between 
research and student coherence seeking, and the emphasis on verbal over non-verbal 
evidence. I discuss each of these in turn in the following sections. 





 Three aspects of the working definition and research questions (see Fig. 10) 
proved inextricably intertwined, and problematic: ‘trying’, ‘meaningful’, and ‘to what 
end.’  While not initially conceptualized that way, all three of these terms ended up 
intersecting at the idea of purpose of students’ coherence seeking, from their 
perspective, i.e. what are students trying to do in science class, and why are they 
trying to do that? 
Figure 10: Ambiguous Terms in the Definition and Research Questions 
Aspects of the framework that need to be elaborated,  
specifically along the dimension of purpose, intent, or  
meaning of coherence seeking are highlighted in red.  
Seeking Coherence:
Trying to form meaningful, mutually 
consistent relationships between 
information
Research Question:
In what ways do students seek coherence, 
with respect to what information, and to 
what end(s)? 
 
 The word ‘trying’ proved potentially problematic in analyzing student work 
that lacked clear evidence of intent. For example, students in Ms. F’s and Ms. H’s 
class often shared grammatical structures in a sort of coherence seeking that operated 
beyond their awareness. In making sense of phenomena, students’ appealed to 
intuitive ideas that likewise are the result of coherence seeking operating outside of 
their awareness. For example, John expected that the asphalt where the water 





types of intuitive knowledge are built from experience in the world, and yet, students 
do not seem to “try” to put those experiences together, it just happens. The concept of 
trying also needed to be bifurcated in data analyses to distinguish between local goals 
of connecting information, and broader goals related to the framing of the task at 
large; though, clearly, these two goals might reflexively inform each other. For 
example, Dianna in Chapter 6 tried to connect a vocabulary word to the quantity five 
meters per second, but she did that perhaps in service of the broader goal of 
completing a tutorial worksheet. (And her recognition that the tutorial worksheet 
should be completed is likewise the result of even more coherence seeking on her 
part, with respect to her experiences in school.) The initial reason for using the word 
trying into the working definition was the same reason for using “coherence seeking” 
instead of coherence—to mark coherence seeking as something that students’ do, 
rather than as just a static characteristic of the products of their reasoning. To that 
end, the language of trying and seeking has been useful. However, future refinement 
of the definition might include alternative ways of expressing that dynamism without 
the added baggage of intent. 
 Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1992) work provided some guidelines for thinking 
about ‘consistency’ from the students’ perspective; thus, that aspect of the definition 
was relatively unproblematic in analysis. However, the term ‘meaningful’ was both 
theoretically and analytically challenging. First, I quickly realized that while I could 
relatively easily distinguish consistency from my own and the student’s perspective, it 
was far more difficult to step outside my own views on what relationships are 





how fog forms. There is some evidence that Raphael found the story meaningful. He 
was excited to share it with Ms. M, and he exclaimed “Oh I know!” when he thought 
of it. At least one reason why he found it meaningful, from his words, is that the story 
connec[ed] clouds, evaporation, and the sun together. But when watched Raphael 
share his story, I saw meaning in its cyclical-ness and causality. In other words, the 
relationships in that story that are meaningful to me may not be the same relationships 
that are meaningful to Raphael, or at least not meaningful for the same reasons.   
 I originally opted to include the word ‘meaningful’ in the working definition 
in order to distinguish coherence seeking from a random listing of information. 
However, in analyzing data, I never found it necessary to invoke that boundary; 
students are rarely if ever truly random in their behavior or speech in science class. 
Rather, the word meaningful became a sort of stumbling block for analysis because it 
suggests that not all relationships are meaningful, and thus not all connecting of 
information is coherence seeking. (Theoretically, it must be the case that all 
relationships are meaningful for the students, otherwise the assumption that students 
are always seeking coherence does not hold.) I found in trying to address meaning, I 
really was addressing the “to what end” research question defined at the outset of my 
study. In other words, in analyzing data, the use of meaning, trying, and to what end 
became redundant; all three of these words are different ways of articulating the 
reasons that students do what they do.  






 Ironically, seeing evidence of coherence seeking in students’ thinking requires 
the researcher to seek coherence on multiple levels. And often, I found it difficult to 
distinguish between my attempts to connect information, and the students attempt to 
do so. In analyzing a transcript, I had the benefit of being able to trace students’ ideas 
over many minutes, hours, or even days to construct claims about the information 
they were trying to connect. However, in constructing these claims, I may have seen 
connections that the students were not actually making. In making sense of this 
methodological challenge, I used the analogy of the word association game. In the 
game, players alternate saying the first word that comes to mind. For example: 
Player 1: apple 
Player 2: orange 
Player 1: Florida 
Player 2: sunburn 
Player 1: red 
Player 2: apple 
In looking at these turns, I might make guesses about how the players came up with 
their words, i.e. an orange is a kind of fruit, like an apple. Florida exports oranges. 
Sunburns happen in Florida. Red is the color of burned skin. Apples are red. But, I 
might also assume that Player 2 has sought some sort of coherence over the entire 
exchange, trying to bring the conversation back to apples. In other words, I, like the 
players constantly seek coherence; and one of the coherences I see is this cyclical 
pattern in the data, starting and coming back to apples. But when Player 2 said ‘apple’  





or was the reappearance of the word apple the result of coherence seeking with 
respect to the word ‘red’ or some other unarticulated information?  
  The word association game is a simplified version of the methodological 
challenge I faced in analyzing classroom data. For example, in discussing how a bulb 
lights in Ms. F’s 4th grade class, Baxter puts forth a series of ideas involving a 
reaction between “positive” and “negative” energies. Baxter’s ideas appear to evolve 
throughout the conversation, and I struggled to make sense of whether successive 
versions of Baxter’s ideas were connected, for him, or whether I was imposing these 
connections as an outside observer. I have arranged a small portion of these 
utterances chronologically (noted by timestamp), and extracted from the surrounding 
conversation: 
[8:16] Baxter: ##I'm starting to think## now that --Well, they're, they're 
probably can't be a chemical reaction because, like if there's a chemical 
reaction, in chemical reactions, doesn't like something explode inside or – 
 
[8:31] Baxter: You gotta get a sign of the chemical reaction // Well, um now 
I'm starting to think Ari's way because when you were holding the wires, if 
you were holding the metal, then it would get really hot, and then it would 
burn your fingers for a second. Well I think that would be the positive and 
negative energy mixing. -- 
 
[9:57] Baxter: Wait. Wait, now I sorta think they go together because I'm sorta 
thinking about math now, and how // let's just say you add 20 plus 20. Well a 
way to um check that is uh // you could get your answers by 20 minus twe-uh 
40 and what would that ##equal##? It'd be // yeah. 
 
[10:19] Baxter: Yeah, it'd be 20. So you'd have two 20's and one 40. ##They 
go together as a fraction.## 
 
[10:42] Baxter: Or, or maybe ##the positive side## // Maybe the positive side 
has more like um, more like power and the negative side takes away power. 
So like, ##Like adding builds## it up and minusing takes it down. So maybe 
uh the plus // well the positive side um has a lot more energy, like a lot of 






[11.19] Baxter: Yeah, but like maybe one liquid is a negative liquid and like it 
takes away power. And the positive uh adds power so when they combined it's 
just neutral. And it stays the same so it, it doesn't become dangerous and it 
won't, and it // like it will make it so it won't light up. So it's right in the 
middle. Like if you use one battery and two lights, the lights will only light up 
a little bit. Maybe the minus, well the negative takes away a lot of the power 
because if you took all the positive it would like make, make it really uh light 
up. And like, it would be like, dangerous like, it could burn your hands if you 
touched it or something. (See Appendix G for omitted portions of the 
transcript.) 
 
The challenge, analytically, was to determine whether Baxter was trying to connect 
all of these ideas over the course of the conversation together, or whether he shared 
each of his within a local moment of conversation, i.e. if we were to diagram the 
coherence seeking, would it look more like Figure 11A or 11B?   
Figure 11: Two Possible Diagrams for Baxter's Utterances 
A B
 
The circles represent the conceptual ideas Baxter shared in class. (A) Baxter tries to 
connect the circles together over the scale of the whole conversation, i.e. a sort of 
global coherence seeking. (B) Baxter tries to connect his ideas together to other 
information, locally, but not necessarily globally.  
 
 Importantly, I did not pick these quotes in such a way as to suggest a pattern; 





the speakers besides Baxter. In reading the transcript, I cannot help but see patterns 
and connections in Baxter’s utterances. In [8:16] he posits that a chemical reaction 
cannot occur between the positive and negative energies because that would lead to 
an explosion inside the battery. In his next utterance, Baxter changes his mind based 
on his observation that the wire sometimes heats up.  Here, he uses a linguistic 
marker to specifically highlight his changing view (“Well, um now I’m starting to 
think”). In [9:57], Baxter again uses a linguistic marker (“Wait, now I sorta think”) to 
indicate shifts in his idea. He brings an idea he just heard in the math lesson prior to 
science class—that a way to check the result of an addition problem (20 +20 = 40) is 
to turn it into a subtraction problem (40-20 = 20). Baxter does not fully articulate the 
connection he is trying to make here between math and science, but he does say (“I’m 
sorta thinking about math now”) indicating that he is seeking some sort of connection 
here. The next time Baxter speaks, he elaborates that the positive side might have 
“more power” which is reduced by the “negative side.”  Further, that without the 
negative “minusing down” the positive, it would be dangerous. He seems to be 
referring to two ideas that he has already introduced previously: i) that a chemical 
reaction in the battery would be dangerous, ii) that addition and subtraction might be 
useful for thinking about how negative and positive energy interact. Finally, in his 
last utterance of the three minute episode [11:19], Baxter suggests that when the 
negative and positive combine, they are “neutral” and not dangerous. Again, he labels 
the positive energy as the stronger or more powerful ingredient, and the negative 





 Over the course of the utterances, Baxter appears to construct and refine a 
model of the circuit based on an idea from math class—that the positive adds power 
to the bulb, and the negative takes it away. The opposing relationship between these 
two kinds of energies accounts for why the wire sometimes gets hot [11.19], why two 
bulbs are dimmer than one in a certain circuit [11.19], why both positive and negative 
energy are needed for the bulb to light, and why the reaction between the negative 
and the positive energies does not result in a dangerous explosion [8.16, 11.19] 
Baxter seems to attribute certain properties, like strength and effect, to the negative 
and positive energy relatively consistently (to me) throughout the three minute 
episode. He also continuously refers back to a concern he stated in [8:16]—that the 
battery might explode if the positive and negative energies undergo a chemical 
reaction. Finally, he sometimes verbalizes the connections he is trying to form 
between his ideas (“Wait, now I sorta think..”, “I’m sorta thinking about math now”). 
These aspects of his utterances seem to indicate that Baxter’s work in the presented 
sections looks more like Figure 11B than Figure 11A.   
 One of the dangers of such an analysis arises from the assumption that 
consistency from the researcher’s perspective equates to the consistency (or the same 
consistency) to the student. Part of the reason that Baxter’s ideas seem to “hang 
together” is that he uses the same terminology throughout the three minute episode, 
even if the ideas behind these words change. Each moment of speech is a 
reconstruction of an idea; and yet, as researchers, we can scan over an entire set of 
utterances as though they existed simultaneously in time, making the mistake of 





weighting particular elements of information more strongly than they would be 
weighted for the student. For example, in my analysis, I have highlighted how 
Baxter’s utterances seem to describe the successive refinement of an idea; there is 
little evidence that Baxter himself sees his work in this way. Rather, there is ample 
evidence that the issue of dangerous explosions is of central importance to him, and 
so perhaps a better way to depict his coherence seeking might be something like 
Figure C: 
Figure 12: A Third Diagram for Baxter's Utterances 
C
 
 The details of the diagram itself are not so important, and I argued in Chapter 
2 that in fact they may serve to de-contextualize students’ reasoning in problematic 
ways. But in attempting to construct these diagrams, researchers might become more 
aware of the fluid boundary between their own coherence seeking and the students.  
 The challenges discussed here relate strictly to if and how Baxter seeks 
coherence between the conceptual information he himself shared in class. The 
challenge of distinguishing researcher coherence seeking from Baxter’s becomes 
seemingly insurmountable considering all of the different information that Baxter 






 In the analyses presented in this dissertation, I have tried to denote clearly 
how my own coherence seeking intersects with my analyses of students’ coherence 
seeking. However, future work must continue to articulate this distinction, and I 
suspect one aspect of that work will be considering not only individual’s coherence 
seeking, but also the group or class as the unit that seeks coherence.  
7.4 Unpacking Linguistic and Non-Verbal Evidence of Coherence Seeking. 
 Linguistic and conversational coherence remains one of the understudied 
aspects of coherence in science education. Many of the existing coding schemes for 
coherence, including Davis (2003), Sandoval (2003), and Ranney and Thagard (1988) 
implicitly rely on linguistic structures and explicit articulation of relationships. 
However, little work has been done within education research to consider how 
students’ work to articulate their ideas is an act of coherence seeking in and of itself. I 
have drawn on aspects of conversational analysis, linguistics, reading comprehension, 
as well as Judith Wells Lindfors’ language-act-framework to begin to outline 
evidence of coherence seeking located specifically in students’ language. However, 
future work might unpack that evidence further and more systematically, especially in 
conceptualizing the relationship between conceptual and linguistic coherence seeking. 
For example, while teaching a unit on weather to high school freshman, I asked 
students to read an excerpt from James and the Giant Peach (Dahl, 1961) that 
describes how hail forms. According to the story, Cloud Men in the sky mold clouds 
into hail, and then once they have a big pile of hail stones, they use a shovel to spread 
the hail onto the earth below. I asked students if they believe the story about how hail 





like it’s written for little kids.” In that moment, I realized that her sense-making 
around the explanation for how hail forms was intimately tied to her sense-making 
around language of the story. And that coherence seeking was based not necessarily 
on the denotation of words, but rather her experiences with the language of children’s 
books and the language of science class. In Lemke’s (1982) terms, the student 
recognized the language in James and the Giant Peach as a thematic structure from 
children’s books, and not science class. (I cannot help but wonder, had I re-written 
the story using more technical vocabulary, might she have believed it?) Work on 
science and literacy connections abound; and yet, even recent work focuses on 
literacy as a way to convey science content, rather than literacy as another aspect of 
students’ coherence seeking within sense-making about natural phenomena (see for 
example Barber, 2009). Future work might unpack more specifically the linguistic, 
conceptual, and epistemic aspects of students’ coherence seeking in service of 
refining the framework and in extending current work on the science/literacy 
connection.    
 Finally, one notable shortcoming of this work is the lack of focused attention 
on non-verbal evidence of coherence seeking. While I did incorporate non-verbal 
evidence such as gaze, length of gaze, body position and movement into my analysis 
of highly verbal interactions like those in Ms. F’s class, I chose not to focus in this 
study on episodes that were totally quiet. However, in the batteries and bulbs unit, 
students spent a significant amount of time quietly constructing circuits. In watching 
these students, I could see evidence of violation of expectations, drawing on intuitive 





more extensive study of moments of quiet sense-making, perhaps in engineering, 
experimentation, or among listeners in science discussions, and drawing on for 
example studies of infant cognition, would extend the perspective presented here in 
important ways.  
Figure 13: An Example of Non-Verbal Evidence of Coherence Seeking 
 
Anne tries to make a bulb light. (A) She straightens the wire. (B) She checks the bulb, 
which does not light. (C) She turns bulb over to check connection at the bottom. (D) 
She looks back to battery, adjusts connection between battery and wire.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 In suggesting ways to refine the perspective on coherence seeking described 
in this dissertation, I have focused primarily on the needs and interests of the 
education research community. Indeed, when I first decided to create an alternative 
framework for coherence seeking, I did so specifically in response to coding schemes 
and ideas circulating among researchers. But, I am a teacher at heart, so in the next 
and final chapter, I discuss implications of the perspective lying at the intersection of 






Chapter 8: Discussion and Implications for Pedagogy 
“A proper account of coherence must not start from some partial intuitions, but 
should pay attention to the role that this notion is supposed to play within a 
particular context.”     -Bovens and Hartmann (2003) 
8.1 Introduction 
 The focus of this dissertation was to create and refine a perspective on 
coherence seeking, with a focus on the following research question: What information 
do students try to connect, in what ways, and to what end?  
 Starting with the assumption that students are always seeking coherence with 
respect to something turned out to be a useful way to notice previously hidden aspects 
of coherence seeking science class. In particular, the approach revealed that even in 
moments of reasoning in which students ignore discrepant evidence, create non-
normative accounts, or make seemingly off-task comments, we can still conceptualize 
their work meaningfully in terms of trying to form meaningful, mutually consistent 
relationships between information.   
 But claiming that students are trying to make ideas fit together says nothing of 
whether educators see those connections as valuable or desirable. Rather, I have 
painstakingly distinguished evidence of coherence seeking from evidence of 
coherence seeking that we usually value in science class. But in the practice of 
teaching, we must make decisions about what reasoning and ideas to support in 
working towards our educational goals.  
  Thus, finally, in this chapter, I outline what a dynamic, broadly construed, 





science pedagogy: student progress and curriculum design.  I argue first that 
coherence seeking may serve as a useful construct for characterizing students’ 
progress in science in that it cuts across disciplinary practices and lends itself to a 
context-sensitive notion of sophistication. Secondly, I argue that the perspective on 
coherence seeking presented in this dissertation is fundamentally at odds with efforts 
to build coherence into the science curriculum.       
8.2 Rethinking Learners’ Progress in Science in Terms of Coherence Seeking 
 As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation painstakingly distinguishes 
evidence of coherence seeking from the evidence of things educators would like to 
see in the science classroom. In my analyses, I have remained relatively agnostic 
about whether or not the work that students do is “scientific” or “sophisticated” or 
“desirable” from the educators’ point of view, not because all coherence seeking is 
the same or equally valuable, but because the rulers by which we measure “goodness” 
of students’ reasoning depending on one’s educational philosophy, goals, and 
decision-making in the moment, and an elaboration of all of these contextual factors 
is beyond the scope of this work.   
 However, I do suspect that coherence seeking might serve as a productive way 
for educators to think about students’ progress in science. First, coherence seeking 
cuts across and is embedded in all disciplinary practices, and as such, has the 
potential to reunite the strands of scientific proficiency that have become increasingly 
disparate in research and curriculum as of late. Secondly, coherence seeking is 
something that both students and scientists do, though perhaps in different ways, with 





allows educators to imagine bridges between novice and expert practice, in ways that 
value each in their own right (rather than cast one as deficient, and the other as 
“sophisticated” or desirable).  
8.2.1 Bridging Disciplinary Practices 
 Much of the data presented in this dissertation (see Appendix C) comes from a 
larger project to develop learning progressions for scientific inquiry. As defined by 
the National Research Council, learning progressions are the “successively more 
sophisticated ways of thinking about a topic that can follow one another over broad 
spans of time” (NRC, 2007, p. 214).  
 After developing a litany of learning progressions for various content areas 
and disciplinary practices, researchers began to recognize the growing and 
problematic separation of practices from content, and practices from each other. 
Some learning progressions focus on the development of concepts of force, without 
any discussion of the role disciplinary practices play in students’ building accounts of 
motion. Other progressions focus on the development of students’ evidence-based 
explanations, without any meaningful connection to the role those explanations play 
in students’ coming to understand natural phenomena. Thus, learning progressions 
research has resulted in curriculum materials and assessments that separate practices 
from content, and practices from each other, which we know does not characterize 
expert scientific practice, nor does it foster students’ meaning making and sense-
making in class (Lehrer & Schauble, 2009).  
 Part of the reason that disciplinary practices resist unification, I believe, is that 





function. An attempt to unify the disciplines need not start with specific practices, but 
rather, with the general orientation toward making sense of natural phenomena that 
underlies them. Coherence seeking is well-suited for that work.    
 Thinking in terms of what information students are trying to connect and why 
gets at the heart of any educative aim, whether that be in science, poetry, 
performance, or any other mode of sense-making. With coherence seeking as the 
starting point for a conceptualization of progress in science, disciplinary practices are 
re-cast as tools for making particular kinds of connections, for particular reasons, in 
particular moments. Mechanistic reasoning entails forming relationships between 
“entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes 
from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” (Russ & Hutchison, 2006, p. 
642). Models are “a representation that abstracts and simplifies a system by focusing 
on key features to explain and predict scientific phenomena” (Schwarz et al., 2009, p. 
633). And scientific argumentation is the process of connecting data and claims via 
warrants and backing. But all three of these disciplinary practices are more generally 
an attempt to connect information together in meaningful, mutually consistent ways. 
In other words, coherence seeking highlights what all of the disciplinary practices 
have in common, while at the same time recognizing the context-specificity of the 
connections that each practice values.   
  Another challenge to learning progressions research has been to bridge 
disciplinary practices and students’ learning of scientifically accepted explanations 
for phenomena. Certainly, one of the concerns teachers expressed in the LP project 





explanations that are, to put it bluntly, wrong. In Ms. H’s class, for example, the focus 
group wanted to find out if temperature affects evaporation time for water. They 
tested three different water temperatures and found that the coldest water evaporated 
the fastest. Then, to confirm or extend the findings, they repeated the experiment with 
room temperature and ice water. Again, they found that ice water evaporates faster. 
To explain the unexpected results, Leah and John suggest that ambient temperature 
somehow matters. The students design an experiment to test that idea: 
John: So we wanted to do the hot vs. cold thing. And see like if on a hot day 
cold water will evaporate faster // well we know that. Or if on a cold day 
warm water will evaporate faster [comment from Ms. H omitted]. And we're 
going to test four temperatures and one will have colder water and one will 
have hotter water to see what'll evaporate faster. 
 
The module (and school year) ends before the students are able to conduct the 
experiment, meaning that they leave 5th grade thinking that cold water evaporates 
faster than warm water.  
 Likewise, in Ms. F’s class, the students generate an idea that positive and 
negative energy somehow interact to make a bulb light. The students clarified various 
components of this idea, including the nature of the interaction between the positive 
and negative energy, the interior of the battery, and what sorts of materials allow the 
two energies to travel. Later, Ms. F said in an interview (see Appendix G) that after 
the LP electricity module, she exposed the students to the correct answer in the 
textbook and many students refused to accept it. They continued to argue for the idea 
that current flows in two directions and from both ends of the battery.   
 Students’ apparent failure to reach the canonically accepted explanations in 





contrary, the students were connecting a variety of information in class, and often in 
ways that epistemologically-speaking, resembled portrayals of expert science. The 
two ingredient model proved quite versatile in Ms. F’s class; they were able to 
explain many observations using that model, including why some arrangements light 
the bulb and others do not. In Ms. H’s class, the students did not just accept the 
strange finding that cold water evaporates faster than hot water; rather, they tried to 
confirm that relationship for a range of temperatures, and identify other factors (i.e. 
testing conditions, ambient temperature) that could explain the finding. Thus, though 
the students did not reach the canonically accepted answers, they certainly ‘got 
somewhere’ in their work much in the same way that scientists make progress in 
refining their own theories and models (Engle & Conant, 2002).  
8.2.2 Bridging Novice and Expert Practice via the Notion of Context-Sensitive 
Sophistication  
 Progress, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, is “forward or onward 
movement towards a destination.” In conceptualizing students’ progress in science, 
then, we must necessarily answer the question, progress toward what? Because 
children’s education lies at the intersection of political, social, and historical tensions, 
clearly no simple answer exists. Some argue that education ought to empower 
students to work toward a more just and democratic society; others argue that 
education ought to prepare students to compete in a capitalist economy. These goals 
may have very different implications for science education, as Calabrese-Barton, 
Ermer, Burkett, and Osborne (2003), Labaree (1997) and others have discussed. 





worldviews around controversial topics such as climate change and evolution, for 
which entrenched and competing worldviews exist. Thus, progress in science is 
associated with the learning of particular knowledge and skills, as well as the 
adoption of particular worldviews. For the purposes of argument, I will focus in this 
section on the commonly accepted goal of science education as expressed in the 
frameworks for science education (NRC, 2012) and other standards documents: 
students’ coming to engage in the work that scientists do.26 I argue that if we take 
seriously students’ developing expertise in the doing of science, our 
conceptualizations of their progress must necessarily involve a context-sensitive 
notion of sophistication. Finally, I present coherence seeking as a construct that lends 
itself to such notions.  
 8.2.2.1 What does a static notion of sophistication look like? 
 A static notion of sophistication labels some forms of thinking, or some ideas, 
as absolutely better than others, regardless of circumstance or context. Often, learning 
progressions focus on conceptual knowledge, and so the idea labeled as “most 
sophisticated” is the one that aligns with current accepted scientific understandings, 
regardless of how well-developed students’ alternative explanations are. There are 
also learning progressions and classroom rubrics that label particular ways of 
connecting evidence as absolutely more “scientific” than others, for example Gotwals 
and Songer’s (2008) progression for generating scientific explanations (see Fig. 14).  
                                                 
26 I intentionally phrase this goal as students’ engagement in “work that scientists do” rather than 
“thinking like scientists” or “acting like scientists.” In doing so, I hope to emphasize that it is the 
practice of science itself, and not just the students, that might change as a result of science education. 
Also, for students to engage in the work that scientists do they need not literally work alongside 
scientists; rather, I use the phrase figuratively to mean that students are engaged in making sense of 





Figure 14: A Static Notion of Sophistication as Represented in a Learning 
Progression for Scientific Explanation 
 
Image courtesy Songer, Kelcey, and Gotwals (2009, p. 49). 
Similarly, for coherence seeking, potential candidates for the slot of “most 
sophisticated” (and their least sophisticated counterparts) include: 
 Intentionally searching for inconsistencies or counterevidence for an 
explanation vs. actively avoiding or ignoring counterevidence 
 Seeking reconciliation between competing explanations vs. accepting 
disagreement as merely a matter of opinion 






 Evaluating ideas based on their alignment with observational data vs. 
evaluating ideas based on personal preferences, principles of fairness, or their 
spiritual, aesthetic or entertainment value  
 Bounding a data set on physical grounds  vs. bounding a data set so as only 
to include confirming (or disconfirming) evidence  
 8.2.2.2 Why the construct of coherence seeking suggests a context-
sensitive notion of sophistication. 
 The perspective on coherence seeking outlined in this work demands a 
context-sensitive notion of sophistication. Coherence, as Buchmann and Floden 
(1992) state, carries “positive implications of value” (p. 4). So, in frameworks that 
treat coherence as a dichotomous characteristic of students’ work or reasoning, 
calling a students’ work “coherent” is in and of itself a normative claim. And further, 
when narrowly defined, these frameworks specify which kinds of coherence are 
sophisticated and which are not.  
 I have argued for approaching classroom data with the assumption that 
students are always seeking coherence. In doing so, I have essentially applied the 
positive connotation of coherence to all classroom activity, meaning that construct of 
coherence seeking alone no longer distinguishes productive classroom work from 
everything else. Instead, judgments about the productiveness of students’ sense-
making must be determined by what that sense-making allows to happen in the 
moment, and what opportunities it opens up for future knowledge construction. Such 





 Beyond the direct implications of the construct as presented in this 
dissertation, studies of expertise also suggest a context-sensitive notion of 
sophistication. Though some experts certainly possess exceptional skill in executing 
specific procedures, more generally a hallmark indicator of expertise in and out of 
science is cognitive flexibility, or adaptive expertise (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986). That 
is, experts are able to resolve novel problems through coordination of various 
material, social, and reasoning tools, and their use of those tools depends sensitively 
on context; no tools are universally better than others.  
 Disciplinary practices unfortunately do not easily lend themselves to that 
context-sensitive view of sophistication because they are rather narrowly focused on 
particular kinds of connections and defined in isolation from one another. When 
broadly defined as suggested in this work, coherence seeking allows, and in fact 
demands, malleability in terms of what information and what connections we view as 
potentially most productive in students’ sense-making of physical phenomena. 
 8.2.2.3 An example of evaluating the sophistication of coherence seeking 
within context  
 To illustrate what that context-sensitive view of sophistication might look like 
in practice, I present a clip from a professional development meeting, during which 
the learning progressions participants and staff worked on the question, “Why doesn’t 
it rain more often in San Diego?” The group included 3 university professors, 2 
graduate students (including the author), and 7 elementary teachers. I participated in 
the workshop as a learner, a researcher, and occasionally a co-facilitator, allowing me 





 San Diego, where the workshop takes place, is a large, urban, ocean front city. 
San Diego’s low rainfall amounts, given its proximity to the ocean, troubled staff 
members and teachers alike. Over the first two days of the workshop, we brainstorm 
possible factors that could explain the lack of rainfall, including topography, latitude, 
ocean currents, and average temperature. We also began to consider mechanisms for 
what makes rain, but by the third day we had multiple threads of conversation going 
and no consensus. To reignite our inquiry intellectually and emotionally, the 
facilitator of the discussion, S4, suggested that we make a list of upon which we all 
agree. S1, another staff member and a biologist by training, offered two possible 
items of consensus, namely i) that heat rises, and ii) that it is colder at the top of the 
atmosphere. As one of the San Diego teachers eventually points out, these two ideas 
seem to contradict, i.e. how can heat rise and it also be colder at the top of the 
atmosphere? But in the moment, neither S1 nor any of the other participants 
(including myself) appear to notice the contradiction, or if they do, they do not 
mention it:  
 [T = San Diego Teacher; S = Learning Progressions staff member] 
1.1  S1: I have a contribution. I think..we all agree..that heat from the  
ground or the water is rising up to [gestures upward] // toward the 
atmosphere. Like, heat's going in an upward direction [repeats 
gesture]. Can we agree with that? 
1.2 T8: Heat rises? 
1.3  S1: No, not just that heat rises. But we either have land or water, and  
so we have heat going up in our atmosphere. 
1.4 S2: So what do you mean by heat? 
1.5 S1: I dunno. Warm? Temperature? Warmth? 
1.6 S2: Warm? 
1.7 T3: Oh, hot air goes // hot air rises. 
1.8 S1: Warmth. Hot air rises. Not like a physics27 thing of heat, but like 
 [gesture] 
                                                 





1.9 T1: Warm air rises. 
1.10  S1: Yeah, warm, warm goes up. [laughter] 
1.11  T3: Well warm goes this way or that way too [gestures left and right]. 
1.12 S1: Would a second thing we agree on is that it's colder up there  
[pointing up], whatever up there is, than it is down here? [pointing 
toward the floor] 
1.13  S3: Gotta be careful with that one because of a // mar // uh inversion  
layer thing.  
1.14  S1: How bout way up there? 
1.15 S3: K, super high up there, okay, that's cold. 
1.16 S1: ##Top of the atmosphere?## 
1.17 S2: ##Outter space## 
1.18 T5: ##Where clouds form?## 
1.19 T3: How about just higher-- 
1.20 S1: Top of the atmosphere 
1.21 T1: What about top of the atmosphere? What? 
1.22 S1: It's colder at the top of the atmosphere than it is down there. 
1.23 T1: Oh yes, yes, yes it is. 
1.24 S1: Can we agree with that?  
1.25 T3: Top of the mountain is colder than the bottom, right. 
1.26 S1: So we got two things. We got two things. That's two things. I got  
no more. 
 
Working to reach consensus represents a particular kind of coherence seeking, where 
the objective is to find alignment between differing viewpoints. In lines [1.1-1.26], S1 
suggests two items for consensus. First, she says that heat goes in an upward 
direction. T8 generalizes the idea to “heat rises”, but S1 clarifies that she is referring 
specifically to the case of heat rising in the atmosphere. S2 asks for a clarification of 
the term heat, and T1 responds as though she is using the term “heat” in the everyday 
(and not physics) sense of the term. And T3 says that “warm” can also move left and 
right, or sideways. In other words, perhaps heat/warmth does not always rise. S1 
looks directly at T3 during [1.11], but then looks away as if to intentionally ignore the 
contribution. Possibly, S1 wanted to avoid T3’s confounding evidence in order to 





 S1’s second item of consensus is that “it’s colder up there…than down here.” 
S3 expresses concern over the second item because she had recently read about 
inversion layers, or areas in the atmosphere where the air is warmer than that below 
it. S3 modifies her statement to say that the air “super high up there” in the 
atmosphere is colder than the ground, and S1 accepts that modification. Additional 
points of comparison suggested are outer space [1.17], where clouds form [1.18], and 
the top of the atmosphere [1.20]. With the suggestion of the top of the atmosphere, T1 
seems to suddenly “tune in” and subsequently agrees with S1. T3 also agrees, 
apparently in part because that idea aligns with her knowledge about temperature 
change on mountains. 
 As a collective then, we evaluate the evidence to support the claims (i) that 
hot air rises and (ii) that it is colder at the top of the atmosphere, but do so in a piece-
meal fashion. We connect (i) and (ii) together via consensus, but at least initially we 
do not apparently check that (i) and (ii) fit together in any other way. Agreeing on 
ideas without checking for internal consistency seems to be at odds with the scientific 
enterprise. In other words, according to static notions, perhaps our failure to address a 
logical inconsistency [1.1-1.26] was rather unsophisticated.  
 Remembering that coherence is always a matter of perspective, one could 
argue that perhaps most of us saw (i) and (ii) as consistent; or alternatively, we had 
already resolved any inconsistency ourselves or put it in abeyance. But a few lines 
later, T1 decides she does not support the idea that it is colder at the top of the 





T1: Yeah, I don't want to say that because then that doesn't // that doesn't 
match with warm air rises. You can't just say warm air rises, but it's colder at 
the top of the troposphere. That doesn't make any sense. [laughter] 
 
The group erupts in laughter following T1’s comment, indicating that suddenly we all 
became aware of the tension between (i) and (ii).  
 Even though we agreed on two contradictory ideas, a case can be made for the 
locally sophisticated nature our coherence seeking in [1.1-1.26]. To put the moment 
in context, we had been working for three days to understand why it rarely rains in 
San Diego. We tried coming up with mechanisms for what causes rain, as well as 
generating lists of relevant factors. We “went micro” to consider how rain drops form 
within a cloud. And we also looked macroscopically at global wind patterns and 
water transport. We were trying, but emotionally and intellectually struggling, to fit 
all of these different ideas together. Thus, the establishment of a few “foothold 
idea[s]” that we definitely agree on (even if they contradict), held promise for helping 
us move forward in our thinking at a time when we increasingly felt stuck (van Zee, 
Hammer, Bell, Roy, & Peter, 2005, p. 1015). 
 Indeed, part of our assessment of the quality of coherence seeking might 
reasonably rest in what follows students’ attempts to make particular connections. For 
example, following line [1.26], T1 does point out that ideas (i) and (ii) contradict. 
Immediately, members of the group articulate ways to fit these ideas together, 
speaking rapidly and often overlapping each other. One teacher suggests that as the 
warm air rises, it hits into the cooler air and cools down. Another teacher suggests 
that the air rises as it cools, without suggesting a particular mechanism for that 





understand precisely what happens to the temperature of air as it rises. (Perhaps 
conveniently, that rising and cooling process is absolutely central to the modern 
understanding of cloud formation, meaning that our agreement on two contradictory 
ideas actually opened a path toward the canonically accepted answer.)  
 8.2.2.4 Clouds weren’t made that way. 
A natural question to ask, following the last analysis, is: “Are there examples of 
reasoning that, regardless of the context, just do not belong in science?” Gieryn 
(1983) argues that “science is no single thing” and that attempts to absolutely 
demarcate science from other forms of knowledge construction are futile and 
misguided. And yet, there are certainly examples in the history of science where ideas 
are cast aside as non-Western-scientific. For example, phrenologists, who studied 
personality and character via the shape of one’s skull, were once viewed as legitimate 
scientists. But following a series of disputes in the mid-19th century, phrenology and 
anatomists diverged over issues of measurement methods and objectivity, their 
perceived connection to religion, and their standards for establishing truth. 
Anatomists maintained their status as scientists, and phrenologists lost theirs as a 
result of these highly politicized disputes.  
 What might non-Western-scientific thinking look like in science class? On the 
second day of the workshop about rain in San Diego, discussed in the previous 
section, we discussed why rain falls from clouds in droplets, as opposed to 
“dumping” all at once like water out of a bucket. One teacher, T2, suggests that 
perhaps the reason the water does not fall all at once is because clouds are not made 





1.1  T2: Can I throw something out I was thinking about last night? 
1.2 Unknown: Please do. 
1.3 T2: Cuz I know T4 was stuck with why doesn't it just dump, or  
I think we talked about that last time in our whatever discussion. Can't 
we just say that the cloud's not capable of dumping? That it, the way it 
rains, or the way it releases itself, it just comes down. That it's not..it's 
not capable of dumping. It's not made that way?  
1.4 T4: ##(*** ***)## 
1.5 T3: ##You mean like a bucket?## 
1.6 T2: Yeah. [slightly glancing back at T3, who sits behind her] 
1.7 S4: When you say // when you say "can't we just say" what is // 
 what are you asking? 
1.8 T2: ##Well--## 
1.9  T4: ##It's cooling at different rates.##  
1.10 Ms. F: ##It's not all gonna cool instantly.## 
1.11 T4: Yeah. It doesn't all cool at the same time.  
1.12 Ms. F: We were thinking as it's swirling around here [pointing to  
drawing] it's not all gonna cool instantly at the same time so as it's 
cooling that's the reason it doesn't ##all dump [gestures hand 
downward] immediately.##  
1.13 T2: ##Okay, so there is a (***) behind this.## 
1.14 T4: Well that makes sense with what you're saying [pointing to  
T2].  
1.15 T2: Yeah, because I just // it // it's not capable of just dumping. It's  
never just gonna // why doesn't it just dump like a bucket? // Well 
because it's not made. 
1.16 Ms. H: And get rid of all of it at once. 
1.17 T2: Yeah because it's // the cloud doesn't work that way type // type  
 thing.  
1.18 Ms. F: Think about too when you in a crowd, the people on the outside  
of the crowd are going to get colder first, so it's almost like in that 
swirling the stuff on the outside is gonna kinda cool down first and 
stuff.28   
 
Though brief, the excerpt contains an incredible amount of epistemological 
complexity, and speaks directly to the question of whether there are certain forms of 
coherence seeking that just do not belong in science class. In [1.2], T2 opens up a 
conversation around what constitutes a viable explanation:   
                                                 






Can't we just say that the cloud's not capable of dumping? That it, the way it 
rains, or the way it releases itself, it just comes down. That it's not..it's not 
capable of dumping. It's not made that way.  
 
T2 suggests that clouds rain, rather than dump water, because they were made that 
way. Though she phrases her statement as a question (“can’t we just say”), T2’s tone 
drops, not rises, when she says “not capable of dumping.” She seems to challenge to 
the group to develop a reason why her answer is not acceptable, in effect positioning 
her explanation as the dominant and satisfactory one.  
 Multiple people respond to T2’s comment, but no one directly challenges her 
comfort with the “clouds were made that way”-type explanation. Instead, T4 and Ms. 
F refer back to an idea they just shared about cloud formation to show that they have 
a possible mechanism for how droplets form [1.12]. They suggest that when air rises, 
it cools at different rates. Since the air rises and cools at different rates, then the liquid 
water in the cloud must also form at different rates, resulting in droplets rather than a 
massive dump of water. By constructing a mechanism on the spot for what might 
explain rain droplets, T4 and Ms. F offer a sort of epistemological response to T2, i.e. 
we can do better than the “clouds aren’t made that way” story. In [1.13], T2 
acknowledges their effort, but does not verbalize whether she has accepted their 
mechanistic story. 
 A few minutes later, T3 again brings up the question of why rain does not fall 
in buckets: 
2.1  T3: So going back to T2's question about why doesn't it just  
drop, do you think you could uh design an experiment to show a way 
that water doesn't just drop.  
2.2  S1: Good challenge. That's a good challenge. 





I've never thought that the cloud just dumped. Why? Cuz I've never 
seen the cloud just open up, pour a bucket on her head [gesturing to 
Sharon], and close up. So I'm saying, I've never seen any evidence of 
this // sorry S2 // [S2 and T2 laughing]. I've never seen that // I mean 
I've seen-- 
2.4  T3: Haven't you got rained on though by I mean huge amounts,  
like like like-- 
2.5 T2: Yeah, but not // but a bucket, I mean literally it's just gonna //  
its gonna to soak you like I jumped in the pool and it's, I've never seen 
it. And I'm from the east so I've been through my share of storms. I've 
never seen it. So I'm just saying, as a student, I would never ever ever 
go there that saying that it just dumps as a bucket. So I would 
automatically try to explain the phenomena of all of that stuff and like 
you said the colder water and separate all that stuff cuz I would have 
never // it would have never been an issue for me.  
2.6  S4: I do think it's // I do think it's something that we have to account  
for. I just // and you're question is [gaze in T2’s direction]..what would 
// how could we account for that?  
 
T2 disregards the droplet/dumping distinction because she has never seen any 
evidence to suggest that rain ever would dump all at once. In other words, in this 
moment T2 identifies the presence of, and not the lack of, an event as something to be 
explained. S4 pushes T2, saying that we do need to develop an satisfactory 
explanation for why rain does not dump, even though what that explanation might 
look like has yet to be agreed upon.   
 In terms of coherence seeking with respect to conceptual information, the 
distinction between T2, T3, and Ms. F and T4 lies both in what information they 
would like to connect and how. T3, T4, and Ms. F identify rain does not dump as a 
phenomenon to be explained; T2 does not. T4 and Ms. F seek an explanation that 
aligns with components of their model for cloud formation [1.12]; Donna seeks an 
explanation that includes experimental data [2.1]. Finally, and importantly, T3, T4, 
and Ms. F all express that the question of why rain does not dump is connected to 





question (a phenomenon which she has never observed) from other questions about 
downpours, etc., which she has observed. And, while scientists might employ 
teleological reasoning or place phenomena or data in abeyance at times, as a 
collective they are unlikely to settle on these kinds of explanations as satisfactory end 
goals of their inquiry, as S2 is apparently willing to do in [1.3, 1.15, 2.3, and 2.5].  
 Even so, as educators, there are reasons to value S2’s work. Among other 
things, S2’s comments indicate a healthy skepticism about the group’s inquiry, and 
her comments forced some of us to consider more carefully our own patterns of 
thinking. Is the fact that rain occurs in drops rather than all at once really a 
phenomenon that needs to be explained? If so, what might that explanation do for us, 
in terms of answering the question why it does not rain often in San Diego? And, 
finally, what are the criteria for a satisfactory explanation? In our specific discussion, 
the presence of a competing set of epistemological resources introduced by S2 had 
resulted in our coming to distinguish two different cloud models: one in which the 
cloud is a container that fills up with water, and the other in which the cloud is merely 
a collection of different sized water droplets.  
 More generally, Bang and Medin (2010) suggest that the presences of 
“conflicting and sometimes aligning epistemologies” may facilitate learners’ 
“distinguishing, and navigating epistemological resources and their applications” (p. 
15). In other words, even if we choose to demarcate some modes of coherence 
seeking as non-scientific, they might still prove to be fruitful in students’ coming to 
seek other kinds of coherence in science class and serve as a bridge to more 





8.2.3 Thoughts on What Kinds of Coherence Seeking to Foster (or Not) in 
Science Class  
 I have argued in the previous sections that a static assessment of coherence 
seeking will not satisfy educators’ needs for understanding and supporting students’ 
progress in science. To briefly recap, the arguments against a static assessment of 
coherence seeking emerge along three dimensions: i) the multiple and competing 
goals for science education, ii) our understanding of coherence seeking in expert 
science, and iii) our understanding of science learning as a complex phenomenon. 
Based on these arguments, I tentatively concluded that there are no forms of 
coherence seeking which are absolutely more sophisticated, or uniformly more 
productive for students’ science learning, than others. However, that does not mean 
that all forms of coherence seeking are equal, or that science teachers ought to allow 
students to pursue whatever connections they fancy in the moment. Some kinds of 
coherence seeking are, generally speaking, more likely to be useful for certain 
educational purposes.  
 8.2.3.1 Allowing learners to experience the kind of work that scientists do  
 Consider the opening question that S2 and the rest of the Learning 
Progressions teachers worked on during the summer workshop: Why doesn’t it rain 
very often in San Diego? In working on this question, one of our educational goals 
among the project staff was to allow teachers the opportunity to experience the kind 
of work that scientists do. In other words, we were not planning to write vivid fairy 
tales to explain how rain forms, nor use drought as a metaphor for difficult periods in 





our inquiry, nor did we express our ideas in the form of a song or interpretive dance. 
Rather, we hoped that our work on the rain question would ‘look like science’ in that 
it would involve the “use of evidence to construct testable explanations and 
predictions of natural phenomena” (National Academy of Sciences, 2008, p. 10).  
 So what kinds of coherence seeking must we encourage, if our goal is for 
students to generate testable, evidence-based explanations with predictive power? In 
previous chapters, I explained that we might not want to emphasize scientific 
vocabulary, task instructions, or authoritative sources of information because each of 
these can distract students from the sources of evidence upon which scientists 
generally rely (observational data and intuition) and obscure the nature of students’ 
reasoning.  
 But within the classroom where students are generating and refining 
explanations based on observational data and intuition, the educator must recognize 
which kinds of reasoning are likely to ultimately lead to evidence-based, testable, 
explanations with predictive power, and which are not. The key here is “ultimately 
lead to”—in other words, while science is ultimately concerned with evidence-based, 
testable explanations with predictive power—scientific practice need not adhere to all 
three of these criteria at all times.  
 For example, a list of factors or patterns, without an underlying understanding 
of their cause, will not usually have robust predictive power. But identifying patterns 
can nonetheless be a very productive part of scientific practice. Meteorologist Dean 
Blake’s (1933) early work to understand the origin of San Diego’s rainfall was almost 





three weather stations in San Diego County: one near the coast, one near the 
mountains, and one in a valley. By coordinating rainfall data from each of these 
weather stations, Blake attempted to track the path of storms across the county. He 
determined that the rain in San Diego generally originates in one of four locations: 
North Pacific, the South Pacific, the Interior/Great Basin, and western Mexico. Blake 
was further able to coordinate these empirical findings with Thomas Reed’s (1932) 
system for classifying Pacific Coast storms based on direction and flow of air masses. 
In other words, in leading the field of meteorology toward evidence-based, testable 
explanations with predictive power, Blake relied on two key forms of coherence 
seeking, 1) identifying patterns in rainfall amounts across various geographical 
locations, and 2) coordinating his empirical findings about rainfall with Thomas 
Reed’s empirical work on air masses. Blake’s work demonstrates that searching for 
patterns in empirical data can be a productive, or sophisticated, form of coherence 
seeking in science, even though on their own such patterns do not produce robust 
predictions.  
 Likewise, in science, we often think of quantitative relationships as more 
sophisticated or useful than qualitative relationships. It is not enough merely to know 
that a force applied to a stationary object will cause it to start moving; we would like 
to know how quickly the object will speed up, and what its final speed will be. So 
intuitively, it seems that a student who is trying to express quantitative relationships 
between variables must be engaged in a more sophisticated form of coherence 
seeking than a student trying to build qualitative relationships; however, that is not 





 First, qualitative reasoning can be very useful in developing explanations with 
predictive power. J.R. Humphrey’s work on the origins of San Diego’s rain relied 
heavily on qualitative reasoning. He describes how for example, how the Coriolis 
Effect determines the direction of prevailing winds, the location of high pressure 
zones at various latitudes, and the subsidence inversion in San Diego. And perhaps 
more importantly, his attempts to qualitatively relate temperature, humidity, and 
rainfall amounts foreshadowed future work on modeling weather as a chaotic system: 
In short, the entire circulation of the atmosphere and of the ocean and the 
distribution of temperature, humidity, and rainfall are so intimately woven 
together into one complex interdependent whole that no change could be 
made in any one without producing a reaction upon all the others.” (Carpenter, 
1913, p. 74, citing W.J. Humphreys of the United States Weather Bureau) 
 
Again, Humphrey’s work demonstrates that while we might ultimately prefer an 
account of weather that relates temperature, humidity and rainfall quantitatively, our 
work towards that end goal might necessarily involve qualitative reasoning.  
 If history of science alone fails to convince educators to evaluate the 
sophistication of students qualitative reasoning locally, Russ (2006) provides 
additional evidence. Russ studies a group of college students trying to predict the 
difference in pressure between the top and bottom of a room. Initially, the students 
articulate a sensible, qualitative prediction: the pressure at the bottom of the room will 
be higher than at the top. But as the students turn to equations to solve the problem, 
they apparently lose all sense of physical reality. They try using the Ideal Gas Law to 
calculate pressure, and in doing so, they get stuck trying to calculate the volume of 





against the explicit goal of the curriculum: to foster students’ sense-making about the 
physical world.  
 In meeting the goal of having students experience the work of science, 
educators will likely want to at some point support students’ causal reasoning, 
coordination of theory and evidence, quantitative reasoning, reconciliation of 
inconsistencies, etc. But, in addition, educators must be able to recognize moments 
when pattern matching, qualitative reasoning, process of elimination, and a host of 
other forms of reasoning might be evidence of students’ locally sophisticated 
engagement in science. (Or conversely, recognize when students’ quantitative 
reasoning, attention to inconsistencies, etc. is actually inhibiting progress, as in 
Russ’s work). Such dynamic assessments of students’ work require careful attention 
to students’ ideas and reasoning in the moment, as well as an eye for where these 
ideas might lead. The Learning Progressions project attempted to facilitate teachers’ 
growth along these two dimensions via professional development and an associated 
curriculum. The results of that work are described in Lineback (2012) and in 
Hammer, Goldberg, and Fargason (in press).  
 8.2.3.2 The complexities of school science.  
 Even a simplistic account of science suggests a context-sensitive notion of 
sophistication, as demonstrated in the previous sections. However, within a science 
classroom, issues of what constitutes productive or sophisticated coherence seeking 
become even more complex. 
 First, educators need to recognize that students’ seemingly “non-scientific” 





example, in Ms. F’s class, Baxton’s anthropomorphizing of energy (that energy kills 
each other) led to an argument about the nature of the interaction between positive 
and negative energy—a piece of their model which had not yet been fully fleshed out. 
Similarly, Warren et al. (2001) showed how a student improved the design of an 
experiment to determine whether ants prefer darkness by imagining himself as an ant. 
And in the rain workshop, S2’s claim that clouds do not dump water all at once 
because they “aren’t made that way” led to the articulation of two different cloud 
models, as previously discussed. Indeed, students bring a range of experiences and 
ways of thinking into the classroom, many of which have been shown to play a 
productive role in science class. And the fruitfulness of some resources, including 
fantasy, narration, and spirituality, have yet to be carefully explored in the context of 
science class.  
 A second reason to make space for a variety of forms of coherence seeking in 
science class is that students may come to better understand one way of thinking by 
seeing it in contrast to, or in harmony with, another. While working on the San Diego 
rain question, for example, we recognized that identifying lists of factors could only 
get us so far, and that at some point we needed to develop an account of what makes 
rain. Similarly, S2’s suggestion that clouds do not dump rain all at once because “they 
aren’t made that way” led to a discussion of what that explanation gets us in terms of 
understanding why it does not rain very often in San Diego. I do not mean to suggest 
here that all forms of thinking should be given equal time in science class, or that we 





footing. Rather, I suggest that educators and researchers reconsider for example the 
National Science Teachers Association’s (NSTA) position that:  
There is no comparing science and religion because they explain different 
realms. Students bring many and varied beliefs into the classroom that are 
neither theories nor testable, and science does not emphasize questions that 
cannot be tested. (NSTA, 2012, n.p.) 
 
On the contrary, future research might consider if and how students’ epistemological 
awareness of science is actually enhanced, rather than inhibited, by the presence of 
competing epistemologies in science class.   
 Finally, school science has many goals, some of which are in apparent tension 
with each other. In her seminal work on the dilemmas of mathematics teaching, for 
example, Ball (1993) explains how she navigated tensions between representing 
mathematics content, respecting children as thinkers, and developing a sense of 
community in the classroom. Similarly, Hammer (1997) describes how he negotiated 
the sometimes competing goals of fostering students’ inquiry and supporting their 
learning of traditional content knowledge in a high school physics course. And a clear 
breach of traditional school science boundaries, Calabrese-Barton et al. (2003) 
articulate how their instructional plans for an after-school science program had to be 
modified in order to allow students to construct a practice of science that is 
meaningful and transformative to them. For example, one student takes the supplies 
to build a bird house and makes a desk instead. Another group of students, upon 
being told they cannot build a clubhouse, decide to build clubhouse furniture. In each 
of these moments, Calabrese-Barton and her colleagues had to make difficult 
decisions about what ideas, reasoning, connections, and projects to foster, and which 





 So, returning to the opening question, what kinds of coherence seeking should 
educators foster (or not) in science class? Surely, if an all-encompassing list—
complete with every potentially productive form of coherence seeking in science 
class—could even be generated, it would certainly be too long to be useful. 
Furthermore, any such list would mischaracterize the “inherent uncertainty” of 
“intellectually honest” teaching (Hammer, 1997, p. 490; Ball, 1993, p. 394). Thus, I 
suggest rather simply that educators approach students’ coherence seeking as a rich 
terrain to explore, whereby their instructional decision-making includes a careful 
consideration of the kinds of information students connect, the ways that they connect 
it, and the possible places to which these connections might lead. Finally, if we want 
students’ inquiries ultimately to lead to the sorts of coherence seeking that seem to be 
productive in science, then we also need to reconceptualize what coherence means in 
science curricula.  
8.3 Re-thinking What Coherence Means in Science Curriculum 
 Curriculum lies at the core of educative tools to support student progress. 
Recently, educators have sought to incorporate the idea (or perhaps ideal) of 
coherence into science curricula. According to Beane (1995): 
 A ‘coherent’ curriculum is one that holds together, that makes sense as a 
whole; and its parts, whatever they are, are unified and connected by that 
sense of the whole. (p. 3)  
 
 The push for coherent curricula stems largely from the problem identified at 
the outset of this dissertation—that students seem to see science as a collection of 
disconnected facts. The NRC (2007) Report Taking Science to School blames poorly 





equations without any apparent connection between them for students’ perceptions of 
science. Thus, a variety of projects have worked to develop so-called “coherent 
curricula” which consist of carefully sequences activities and lessons designed to help 
students see relationships between ideas, and also see big ideas and underlying 
principles that cut across different disciplines of science. According to the recent 
Science Frameworks (2012): 
An important aspect of coherence is continuity across different subjects within 
a grade or grade band. By this we mean “sensible connections and 
coordination [among] the topics that students study in each subject within a 
grade and as they advance through the grades” [3, p. 298]. The underlying 
argument is that coherence across subject areas contributes to increased 
student learning because it provides opportunities for reinforcement and 
additional uses of practices in each area. (p. 306) 
 
However, the perspective on coherence seeking that I have outlined in this work is 
fundamentally at odds with coherence as conceptualized in current science curriculum 
and the frameworks, for three key reasons: 
1. A universally coherent curriculum cannot exist because coherence is 
perspective-dependent. 
2. Coherent curricula are built on the assumption that scaffolding is required 
for students to seek coherence, rather than on the assumption that students are 
always seeking coherence with respect to something.  
3. In asking students to build particular connections, often toward canonically 
correct understandings, curriculum designers fail to attend to the epistemic 
purposes of students’ coherence seeking. 





 Researchers spend years, and significant financial resources, painstakingly 
constructing new, sensible sequences of instruction for students. Each curriculum 
includes its own organizing structure: benchmarks and curriculum blocks (Ahlgren & 
Kesidou, 1995), key/big ideas (Shwartz et al., 2008), projects (Nordine, Krajcik, & 
Fortus, 2010), etc. From the designers’ perspectives, these sequences hang together, 
illuminate underlying connections between phenomena, and are thus coherent. 
However, we have good reason to question whether these connections, even when 
made explicit, are actually coherent to students.  
 In their work on evaluating the coherence of students’ mental models, 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) note that “what may appear as contradictory and 
inconsistent from the adult or expert point of view may not be contradictory from the 
point of view of the child” (p. 580). That is, assessments of coherence depend on the 
knowledge and experiences we bring to bear in that moment, as well as the “frame of 
reference against which we judge whether an appropriate range and selection of 
phenomena are covered” (Sherin, Krakowski, & Lee, 2012, p. 27). 
 When educators construct curricula, they draw on their vast experiences in 
science, their philosophies of science and learning, and importantly, their carefully 
reflection and search for underlying connections and themes within the content 
area(s) of interest. Indeed, "the connectedness of things is what the educator 
contemplates to the limit of his capacity” (Van Doren, 1959). Often, these 
connections were not even apparent to the educators while learning the subject, but 
were constructed as part of their teaching practice. Marion Brady (1995) describes her 





How do I begin to understand—make coherent—such varied experience? We 
make sense of experience by breaking it into intellectually manageable pieces, 
pieces we call occurrences, events, incidents, accidents, happenings, 
movements, situations, things, actions, eras, ages, this moment. When we 
want to be more specific, we give these parts of reality more precise 
conceptual labels—call them wars, volcanic activity, elections, chemical 
reactions, marriages, writing articles. When we want to be even more specific, 
we name the parts: The Battle of Bull Run, Mount Saint Helens’ eruption, 
Woodrow Wilson’s margin of victory, the World Trade Center bombing, “that 
Charles and Di thing,” a piece for the 1995 ASCD Yearbook called “A 
Supradisciplinary Curriculum” (p. 27) 
 
 In curricula with pre-determined sequences of topics, students are often asked 
to set their own questions and coherence seeking aside to preserve the “coherent” 
sequence learning goals. Even if students try to build connections between these 
activities, or teachers make some connections explicit, it is unlikely that the sequence 
holds together for students in the same way that it holds together for the designers of 
the curriculum.   
8.3.2 Coherent Curricula are Built on the Assumption that Scaffolding is 
Required for Students to Seek Coherence  
 Designers of coherent curricula speak as though students need support in 
order to start building connections between information, or even more 
problematically, that the curriculum itself must make these connections:  
To build integrated understandings, instruction must be built from coherent 
curriculum. To be coherent, curriculum must align with learning goals based 
on a set of core scientific ideas while avoiding nonessential information, 
making connections between new ideas and prior knowledge explicit, connect 
evidence to scientific ideas, and connect the ideas of science to the natural 
world. (Nordine, Krajcik, & Fortus, 2010, p. 675) 
 
According to Nordine et al., integrated understandings are only achieved through 
carefully constructed curriculum. The curriculum should lay out the pieces and 





disconnected facts. Their view characterizes many existing approaches to coherent 
curriculum.   
 In prior chapters, I argued using studies from perceptual processing, 
psychology, and studies of language and reading comprehension that people are 
always seeking coherence with respect to something, and so I will not recap all of 
those points here. But briefly, we know that students constantly build understandings 
that are integrated to them, even if not evident to the outside observer (Gomez, 
Benarroch, & Marin, 2006). Students coordinate many kinds of information in 
science class, and information about the physical world as conveyed by the teacher, 
the text, or the curriculum are but small pieces of that information set. Ironically, the 
fact that students see science as a set of disconnected facts is precisely evidence of 
this coherence seeking among their years of experience in the typical science 
classroom.   
8.3.3 Coherent Curricula May Reinforce the Message That Science is a 
Collection of Disconnected Facts  
 In asking students to build particular connections, often toward canonically 
correct understandings, curriculum designers fail to attend to the epistemic purposes 
of students’ coherence seeking. Standards documents and curriculum work cited in 
this chapter explicitly aim to help students build connections between information 
and experiences in their science classes. Importantly, many of these projects also 
hope that students will come to value and to actively seek coherence (including 
consistency, connections, and a sense of wholeness) in science class. But when 





kinds of coherence, these conceptual and epistemological goals are in tension, and 
this tension can manifest in a number of ways in the classroom.  
  Shwartz et al. (2008) explain that pre-determined sequences of activities 
generally favor particular connections chosen by curriculum designers over students’ 
own coherence seeking. For example, in one of their Investigating and Questioning 
our World through Science and Technology (IQWST) curriculum modules, Shwartz 
et al. ask students to generate and categorize questions about light. During the 
activity, we can imagine the class focusing in on one question, generating plausible 
answers to that question, and then finding ways to test and refine those answers. Or, 
the class might begin to sort and categorize their questions, and in the process 
consider which types of categories are meaningful and useful. Both of these possible 
next moves are characteristic of productive disciplinary engagement in science (Engle 
& Conant, 2002).  
 However, the IQWST curriculum requires that as a next activity, students sort 
their questions into pre-defined categories, which relate to important conceptual 
learning goals, for example: “How does light let me see? How does light interact with 
matter? (Shwartz et al, 2008, p. 16). While these questions might lead to particular 
concepts about light, as well as open up opportunities to engage in scientific 
practices, they also are also limiting in an epistemic sense. More specifically, in 
constraining how students work with their own questions about light, the IQWST 
curriculum limits students’ opportunities to negotiate what ideas and experiences 





 Constructivist accounts of learning hold that students build new knowledge 
from existing knowledge, but the question I have raised repeatedly throughout this 
dissertation is—what information are students trying to connect? Coherent curricula 
like IQWST focus on students’ attempt to connect conceptual information, with little 
attention to for example, the epistemological information that students try to process, 
or how the two might interact. And in the most extreme examples of curricula that 
carefully sequence or “fabricate” coherence, students may eventually come to see 
connections as facts to be memorized, thus ironically positioning “coherent curricula” 
as part of the problem they are meant to solve (Buchmann & Floden, 1992, p. 8).  
 Unlike existing approaches to coherence curriculum, a curriculum that aligns 
with the perspective on coherence seeking outlined in this work must:  i) recognize 
that students are always seeking coherence, ii) consider coherence from the students’ 
perspective, and thus iii) consider how students’ seeking of connections between 
conceptual information intertwines with their seeking connections between 
epistemological, social, material, affective, etc. information. The Learning 
Progression modules were an attempt to create such a curriculum.29  
8.4 Summary of Implications for Teaching and Research 
 The implications discussed here—characterizing progress in science and 
curriculum design—lie at the intersection of education research and practice. I have 
argued that coherence seeking might be a fruitful constructing for re-uniting 
disciplinary practices, an achievement which is both highly sought after and elusive. 
                                                 
29 I first presented these arguments in A case for reconceptualizing coherence in science curricula. 
Paper presented at the National Association for Research in Science Teaching Annual Conference, 





Further, coherence seeking may also be useful for developing a context-sensitive 
notion of sophistication, a notion which will affect not only how researchers code 
students’ reasoning, but perhaps more importantly how teachers evaluate and respond 
to it. Finally, the perspective on coherence seeking outlined in this work implies that 
attempts to develop so-called “coherent curricula” are misguided, and quite possibly 
counterproductive.  
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
 The goal of this study was to create, refine, and illustrate a perspective on 
coherence seeking in order to better understanding how students make sense of 
physical phenomenon. That perspective consists of i) assuming students are always 
seeking coherence, and ii) recognizing coherence seeking as a dynamic activity. As a 
result of applying and refining that perspective in response to classroom data, I found: 
 Much of the coherence seeking we proclaim to care about in science 
education (such as distinguishing between competing ideas) are not 
captured by existing frameworks, but are captured by the perspective 
offered in this dissertation. 
 Some of the coherence seeking we generally ignore or discourage in 
science education (such as reaching consensus for social reasons, or 
building non-canonical ideas) may actually play important roles in 
students’ coming to engage in the work of science. 
 The sophistication of students’ coherence seeking cannot be meaningfully 
determined without taking into account the context in which that 





 Our perceptions of students’ intent likely influence our interpretations of 
what information they are trying to connect; more generally, additional 
work to understand what meaning and purpose students attribute to the 
relationships they try to build is warranted.   
And finally, the recognition that students are always seeking coherence may serve as 
some relief to educators concerned that students see science as a set of disconnected 
facts. Indeed, no longer needing to ‘fabricate’ coherence for students in the form of 
carefully constructed curricula, educators may instead focus on carefully 






Appendix A: Example Analysis Describing “Evidence of Coherence 
Seeking” As a Dichotomous Category 
The following analysis comes directly from a course paper I wrote during the 
Fall of 2009 (EDCI 771, Instructor David Hammer), titled Stance as an “Upper 
Anchor” for a Learning Progression in Scientific Inquiry. I have marked in bold the 
language indicative of a dichotomous view of evidence of coherence seeking, and 
underlined language indicative of a degree-of-membership view.  
Episode Title: Water vapor or steam? 
Data Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Year 1, Water Cycle Module 
 
During the puddle experiments, many students reported seeing some sort of 
“stuff” rising off of the puddles. On the third day of the module, Ms. H leads a 
discussion of what this “stuff” might be. Most of the students decide the stuff is “water 
vapor.” Ms. H asks the students to work in small groups to explain how they know it 
is water vapor: 
[1] Leah: (inaudible) in the puddle, and then there a vapor that comes out so 
it’s water vapor. 
[2] John: Well, how do you know it wasn’t like a breeze of sand or 
something? 
[3] Ari: Because um, it, it- have you ever seen a pan or water boil how coming 
off? It looked like that,  
[4] Leah: Mhm… 
[5] John: It looked very much like it was steam. 
 
Leah begins with a sort of tautological argument—the stuff is vapor that comes from 
water so it must be water vapor [1]. The contribution might be evidence of coherence 
seeking in a textual or linguistic sense, but provides no evidence of coherence between 
ideas (Trabasso, Secco, & Van Den Broek, 1982). Her comment might also indicate a 





challenges Leah to explain away the idea that the stuff is sand, and this is evidence of 
seeking coherence. The coherence seeking continues as Ari jumps in to point out 
that the stuff coming from the puddle looked like the stuff coming from boiling water. 
The group begins to dismantle the idea that the stuff is steam:  
[6] Ari: But, I knew that it wasn’t steam because um 
[7] John: Steam- it wasn’t boiling.  
[8] Leah: No. 
[9] Ari: Because I- if it was boiling we would be… 
[10] Leah: It would be bubbling. Bubbling. (Ari: We would be a little bit) 
[11] Ari: warmer.  
[12] John: It would be bubbling. 
[13] Ari: It’d be a tad warmer out there. 
[14] Leah: A tad. 
[15] Molly: And the water was colder than the actual ground. 
[16] Ari: Yea, and also, um, we didn’t see any bubbling  
[17] Molly: Yea. 
 
The pace of the exchange, though not captured here, is remarkable. The students build 
off of one another, and in rapid succession. In Ford’s (2005) terms, all four students 
seem to quickly recognize the “game” they are playing. The game is as follows: 
considering the evidence that might support the idea that the stuff is “steam”, and then 
show that the evidence is absent: the water is not bubbling, it was not hot enough 
outside, and the water was cool. This game—systematically showing how the evidence 
does not fit with the theory—is essentially a game of coherence seeking. And despite 
research suggesting that students are unable to distinguish theory and evidence (Kuhn, 
1989), in this instance, the focus group is clearly playing that game well. The group 
also takes on the idea that the stuff is sand:   
[18] Ari: so it- we didn’t think it was sand because it was coming actually like 
off of the puddle. 
[19] Molly: Yea up not like… 





[21] John: Well it came up for a little and then the wind pushed it in a certain 
direction. 
[22] Molly: Ya then it came up and out. 
[23] Ari: And we, and we definitely, um, and if it was sand, we didn’t see any 
sand zooming up off the soccer field. 
[24] Molly: Yea. 
 
The stuff cannot be sand, the students reason, because the stuff came from the puddle, 
and not from anywhere else. Even so, Leah suggests that they should have swept the 
ground before starting the experiment:  
[25] Leah: Maybe we should have swept it- the areas that we poured it in 
before.  
[26] Molly: Maybe. 
[27] Ari: But, um… 
[28] John: Well how would we do that without a broom? 
[29] Ari: But from previous experiments of when we would, when we uh, made 
the water evaporate in the Petri dishes with the salt and stuff, the salt did not, 
salt, and like, I don’t think salt or dirt would evaporate with the water. Just the 
water would. It even separates solutions. So… 
[30] Molly: Okay, who’s gonna say that? 
[31] John: Ari, because he came up with it. 
 
Leah’s suggestion to sweep the testing area is surprising. She previously argued that 
the stuff must be water vapor because it is vapor coming from the water. However, 
she seems unwilling to accept a natural extension of that argument—if the stuff came 
from the water, then it cannot be sand. Her reasoning might be that they should sweep 
the area “just in case.” But, John points out the pragmatic problem of not having a 
broom. Ari’s next statement discounts the need for a broom, and is very clear 
evidence of coherence seeking. He recalls that they previously conducted an 
evaporation experiment with salt water—the water evaporated and the salt did not. He 
expects this result to be consistent in similar situations, that is, even if the sand were 
in the testing area, it should not evaporate. The students seem impressed by Ari’s 





Appendix B: Annotated Transcript of a Focus Group Presentation 
 
 As described in Chapter 3, my attempts to distinguish between evidence of 
coherence seeking and evidence of sophisticated or productive coherence seeking 
were hindered by a sort of bias in my episode selection. I tended to overlook clips that 
did not contain what I intuitively felt were rich examples of coherence seeking.  
 For example, the following episode comes from Ms. H’s 5th grade class on the 
last day of her Year 1 implementation of the water cycle module. On that day, Ms. H 
asked students to look into their minds, books, on the computer, etc. for more 
information about weather and the water cycle. The students then presented the 
information they found to the rest of the class. I initially ignored the presentations 
because students just seemed to be reciting information that they copied out of the 
textbooks. Though I could articulate how what the students were doing was still a 
form of coherence seeking, it just did not seem that interesting in terms of their trying 
to build a coherent, mechanistic account of weather. Instead, it felt like the students 
were just “doing school.”  
The presentation format, with the focus group (Leah, John, Molly, and Ari) 
standing at the front of the class, also seemed to close off, rather than opening up, 
collaborative inquiry. In fact, that formal presentation mode rarely occurred during 
Ms. H’s implementation of the module; usually, the groups shared ideas from their 
seats. But during these more formal presentations, the audience was very (and 
unusually) quiet, and the focus group looked uncomfortable. Again, there were many 
episodes like this in the Learning Progressions data, which I generally overlooked. 





in continuing to refining the framework for coherence seeking, especially in terms of 
thinking about how I support normative claims about students’ work and reasoning.  
1  Leah: Okay, so uh we found some stuff in a book. 
2 John: It's called, "The Weather Engine." 
3 Leah: And it said that [reading from chart] "If the temperature of  
the air below a cloud is higher than the freezing point, the water 
droplets begin to fall as rain. If, if it is below the freezing point, ice 
crystals stay frozen and fall as snow or freezing rain. Hail only occurs 
in large clouds with powerful air currents. As the air currents swirl, 
layers of ice build up and hail stones grow."  
 
I wondered whether Leah and her group mates came up with this explanation 
themselves, or whether they copied it directly out of the book. To me, copying 
seemed like a less useful sort of coherence seeking than creating an explanation based 
on readings from different sources. The video from the group work before the 
presentations revealed that John was the only student in the group who read The 
Weather Engine (Morrison, 2003). While he was reading, he put sticky notes on the 
pages to indicate which ones Leah should copy onto the group’s chart paper. 
However, because the sticky notes did not indicate specifically which sections to 
copy, John later read the passages to her directly as she copied them onto the group’s 
chart paper.  
4  Ms. H: So how many of you understood what they just said? [one  
student shakes his hand as in "so-so"] 
5  Molly: And I created a picture. [pointing to parts of the picture as  
she speaks] This is a small cloud and it's below the freezing point and 
it creates the snow and this is the large cloud with the powerful air 
currents right here and it creates hail. 
 
Unlike the explanation, which was copied directly from the book, Molly created her 
picture on her own while Leah was writing the explanation. She would periodically 





drawing, etc.  In line 4, Ms. H asks if the class understands what was said. That move 
reinforces the presentation-mode of the class. Molly, perhaps sensing that the 
explanation has not been understood, refers to her picture possibly in the hopes of 
clarifying the group’s ideas and saving the presentation. The students’ attention to 
social dynamics seems to occlude their sense-making with respect to ideas about 
weather.  
6  Ms. H: So it's powerful air current withIN the cloud? 
7 Molly: Ummm 
8 Ari: Yeah. It the-- 
9 John: [opens book] 
10 Ms. H: You're having to go back and look. 
11  Ari: Um, it's inside the cloud. [John directs Ari to a paragraph in  
the book. Ari reads quietly.] 
 
The students apparently have not considered Ms. H’s question about the placement of 
the air currents. Interestingly, rather than try to generate an explanation from their 
drawing or together using their own senses, John immediately refers to the book as 
the authoritative source of knowledge. Ms. H appears to sanction his turning to the 
book for an answer. Again, in a moment where the students could draw on their own 
ideas to make sense of the air currents in the cloud, instead they turn to an 
authoritative source of knowledge. That alone does not make what they are doing 
unsophisticated, but it was the type of observation that initially led me to overlook 
this clip. 
12  Ms. H: So now do you think // Ari. Do you think ONE book's going to  
be enough or do you think you need to look on a lot of things to double 
check. 
13 Molly(?): A lot.  
14  Ari: Um, I looked al // I also was reading a book and I was reading, or  
seeing what hail is, hail and it said stuff along that lines but worded 
differently. [John holds up the book Ari was reading, and passes it to 





Ms. H suggests a particular kind of coherence seeking—to check for consistency 
between multiple sources. But Ari jumps in to clarify that he did read another book, 
and in fact, it said something similar to the Weather Engine. He seems to be trying to 
provide evidence that he did his due diligence as a student, rather than providing 
additional evidence about the dynamics of clouds.  
15  Ms. H: So did hail definitely need wind? 
In what becomes obvious later in the clip, Ms. H begins a leading line of questioning 
in 15. Earlier in the conversation, students claimed that the formation or presence of 
snow fall requires wind. Ms. H has recognized that the focus group’s explanation and 
drawing contradicts the idea that snow requires wind; she uses a line of questioning to 
draw students’ attention to that inconsistency.  
16  Ari: Yeah. 
17 Molly: Yes. 
18  Ms. H: Did snow need wind? 
19  Molly: No. [Leah shakes her head no] 
20  Ms. H: So maybe write "wind" on that big cloud and no wind on the  
small one. Would that clear it up a little bit? So did that fit with what 
people were thinking or not? [Molly adds "no wind" to the small cloud 
in the picture] Megan, what do you think? 
21 [Ari shows something in the book to Molly, then makes a gesture on  
the picture in a swirl pattern. Molly adds some sort of writing next to 
the big cloud.] 
22  Mia: Kind of, yeah. 
23  Ms. H: Kind of, but wasn't Colin over here // and Chuck was going,  
"Have you ever seen it snow and it only goes at a diagonal." What did 
the diagonal mean? 
 
In [23], Ms. H signals that Mia’s response is not sufficient, because in fact the idea 
that hail requires wind and snow does not contradicts Chuck’s observation that snow 
only goes at a diagonal.  
24  Alan?: The wind was pushing it.  





needed wind to have snow?  
26  Student B: No.  
 
Like Mia in [22], Student B in [26] provides short answers to Ms. H’s questions. The 
dynamic seems to follow the initiate-respond-evaluate style of questioning.  
27  Colin: Also there needs to be that freezing point. I went on the  
internet and looked at freezing point. It was [ruffling through papers] 
uh 32 degrees for hail and 30 degrees for snow.  
 
Colin breaks the IRE pattern established in previous lines. He points out that like the 
wind/no wind requirement, there is also a freezing point requirement for hail and 
snow to form.  
28  Ms. H: 32 for sno // hai // okay so Molly, in that cloud, hail, write //  
hail was what? 32?  
 
The focus group’s chart paper has become established as a tool for keeping track of 
ideas, as Molly continues to modify it in response to Ms. H’s suggestions, but it also 
shapes the class’s thinking, as most of the utterances relate directly to some aspect of 
the artifact. In other words, the artifact bounds what information students draw on in 
the moment.  
29 Colin: Hail was 32. 
30 Ms. H: Hail was 32 and snow he said was  
31 Colin: 30. 
32 Ms. H: 30. 
33  John: And we also found some stuff about temperature. And it  
says, "Sinking air prevents clouds formation, but rising air increases it. 
So high pressure therefore means clear sunny weather and low 
pressure usually means cloudier weather." 
 
John demonstrates a coordination of both conversational and social norms in 
utterance 33. First, he introduces his statement with a preliminary “and we found out 
some stuff about temperature.” However, in the information that follows, he does not 





Colin’s point about freezing point not in substance, but to adhere to the 
conversational norm that what comes next ought to follow what was said before. 
Possibly, John sees a substantive link as well—that sunny and cloudy weather 
correspond to different temperatures. John’s utterance in [33] also marks the 
completion of a presentation norm—to share all information that is recorded on the 
chart paper.   
34  Ms. H: So, then what kind of air pressure do you think we have this  
morning? 
 
Again, Ms. H opens an initiate-respond-evaluate (IRE) line of questioning. Her 
questions may serve the dual purpose of 1) asking students to connect the information 
they have read to their everyday lives, and 2) check that students were actually paying 
attention to John’s utterance in [33].  
35 John: Probably... 
36 Ari: Um, high pressure.  
37  Ms. H: Was it really cloudy this morning? 
38  Molly: Yeah.  
39  Ms. H: So what kind of air pressure? 
40 John and others: Low pressure. 
41 Ms. H: Low. What do you think we have now? 
42 Students: High. 
43 Ms. H: Or at least  
44 John: High-er.  
45 Ms. H: In the middle, maybe higher. K. Alan? 
 
This little segment [lines 34-45] seems separate from the rest of the conversation in 
terms of conceptual substance. The high/low pressure questions are self-contained, 
and do not connect back to the larger picture that students are building about weather. 
However, in terms of social norms, the questions reinforce the presentation mode and 
also the IRE discourse pattern.  





thing, oh hail. Well, it can't be 32 degrees in um San Diego. 
 
Again, like Colin, Alan jumps in with a point that seems important to him. 
Previously, Colin said that hail comes from somewhere else and lands in San Diego. 
Alan apparently has taken Colin’s data as evidence for his idea, because if hail 
requires a temperature of 32 degrees, and San Diego is not 32 degrees this time of 
year (hail had occurred the week before in San Diego), then the hail must come from 
somewhere else. His sense-making seems to center around the phenomena of hail and 
its source, rather than around the information in the focus group’s presentation.  
47 Ms. H: So both of em can't be 
48 Alan: so it must have been some from somewhere else (*** ***) 
49 Ms. H: So where would it have had to have been 32 degrees? 
 
Again, Ms. H asks a closed question, and as indicated in [51], she has a pre-
determined answer in mind.  
50 Student: Cold places! 
The students point out that the hail must have come from a cold place. The comment 
is important because students might have posited that the hail blows in from a cold 
place like Alaska. Instead, Ms. H directs them to the idea that the air is colder higher 
up in the atmosphere, and idea that appears in the state science standards.  
51  Ms. H: But the cloud's above me...Okay, wake up it's Friday afternoon,  
we're almost done. Where must it be 32 degrees? The cloud's above 
me and I'm getting hailed on. 
52 Student: In the cloud. 
53 Ms. H: Dunn. 
54  Dunn: Well, I was just wondering cuz of do you know what the  
temperature it was when it was hailing on the freeway? Cuz I-- 
55  Ms. H: The other day, it was 50s/60s at ground. 





Dunn has stumbled upon the same inconsistency that Alan and Ms. H are talking 
about, but apparently without recognizing that to be the case. Perhaps he is adding to 
the conversation a specific case of when hail occurs on a warm day.  
57  Chuck: It could be up in the air like by // like how it said the pressure 
in  
 the clouds. The wind could be up in the air.  
 
Chuck’s idea seems to fit Ms. H’s appeal for students to notice that the cold air could 
be up higher in the sky. However, the details of Chuck’s idea are unclear. He 
mentions pressure, but does not elaborate on that term. He also comments that wind 
could be up in the air, which happens to align with the picture Molly drew on the 
chart paper.  
58 Ms. H: So, ok so Chuck, do you guys want to use that? Go.  
59  Chuck: Well, cuz it said the um  
60 Ms. H: Chuck. You guys can move up and explain it then, to feed in.  
[Chuck's group comes up. The focus group sits down.] 
 
 Clearly, even a preliminary analysis reveals some interesting aspects of the 
students’ coherence seeking in the episode. In particular, the episode brings to light 
considerations about how students bound what information is in play in the moment. 
The focus group’s written work dominates the earlier part of the conversation, but 
Colin and Alan both bring in information from earlier in the conversation. There are 
local moments of coherence seeking around conceptual information (for example 
pressure) that seem disconnected from the larger conversation. And, the focus group 
does a lot of work to coordinate social and affective and material information, 
possibly at the expense of their coordinating conceptual information.  
 My initial failure to even notice or transcribe this episode even late into my 





intersects with my perceptions of evidence of coherence seeking. Because I saw the 
clip as an example of completing school-ish tasks like presenting and copying 
information out of a textbook, I failed to recognize it as a possibly useful source of 
data for evidence of coherence seeking more generally. As a result, I nearly missed 
the opportunity to carefully consider why copying information out of a textbook 
seems unproductive, and if and when that normative judgment is actually justified. 
What is it about copying that seems limiting in terms of students’ sense-making? 
Could copying information prove to be a useful aspect of students’ sense-making? Or 
scientists’ work? Future work might explore these kinds of clips in more detail, to 
consider not only what they can say about evidence of coherence seeking, but also to 
inform the conversation around how we judge the sophistication of students’ 





Appendix C: Summary of Episodes Presented in the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 
Title: Raphael’s Cloud Story 
Description: Raphael spontaneously connects together conceptual ideas about 
the water cycle into a cyclical narrative 
Source: Ms. M’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project  
 
Title: Darcy’s Ideas about the Shape of the Earth 
Description: During a clinical interview, Darcy modifies her answer in 
response to interviewer’s demands.  
Source: Vosniadou and Brewer (1992, p. 570) 
 
Chapter 3 
Title: Raphael’s Cloud Story (see previous) 
 
Title: Jason and the Magnets 
Description: Jason identifies an inconsistency in and requests reconciliation of 
a classmate’s idea that magnets contain electricity. 
Source: Ms. B’s 4th grade class, Batteries and Bulbs Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project 
 
Chapter 4:  
Title: Evaporation in Winter 
Description: Nate constructs a question about how evaporation can happen in 
winter as he speaks.   
Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project 
 
 Title: Jacuzzi Analogy 
Description: Leah spontaneously constructs an analogy to explain the strange 
experimental finding that cold water evaporates faster than hot water.  
 Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Year 1, Learning  
Progressions project 
 
Title: “You skipped a line!” 
Description: An example of seeking linguistic coherence while reading an 
explanation for how a bulb lights.  




Description: A student recognizes he has misspoken while presenting his 





Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project 
 
Title: Clouds cold 
Description: Raphael uses a preliminary to introduce his question about how 
clouds can be cold when they are close to the sun.  




Description: Leah tries to get her group to come up with questions about 
evaporation.  
Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project 
 
Title: “Dear World Science News” 
Description: Student work coded as “incoherent” in the Davis (2003) coding 
scheme.  




Title: Which evaporates faster—a “3 ounce” puddle or a “6 ounce” puddle? 
Description: Episode from an experiment during which students predict that 
the asphalt from which water evaporates will be warmer than the surrounding 
asphalt; their results suggest the opposite.  
Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project 
 
Title: Daylight Savings Time 
Description: A student explains the cause of the seasons during a clinical 
interview. 
Source: Sherin et al. (2012)  
 
Title: Write down your theories 
Description: A student tries to explain a strange experimental result while his 
peers mates focus on “writing theories.” 
Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project 
 
Title: Which evaporates faster, hot or cold water? 
Description: Students disagree over the validity of the experimental finding 
that cold water evaporates faster than hot water.  







Title: Jacuzzi Analogy (see episodes for Chapter 4) 
 
Chapter 6 
Title: Newton’s Third Law Tutorial 
Description: Students try to make sense of curriculum designers’ intentions 
while completing an introductory physics laboratory tutorial. 
Source: Conlin, Gupta, & Hammer (2010) 
 
Title: Train Analogy 
Description: A group of teachers tries to incorporate instructor’s directions 
into their analogy for how a simple circuit works.  
Source: Professional Development Summer Workshop, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project 
 
Title: Killing Analogy 
Description: A complex interaction between two students over whether 
“positive and negative energy” can “kill each other” to make a bulb light. 
Source: Ms. F’s 4th grade class, Batteries and Bulbs Module, Year 2, Learning 
Progressions project  
 
Chapter 7 
Title: Chemical Reactions 
Description: A string of Baxter’s utterances about how a bulb lights. 
Source: Ms. F’s 4th grade class, Batteries and Bulbs Module, Year 2, Learning 
Progressions project  
 
Title: Anne tries to light a bulb. 
Description: A series of screen shots demonstrating non-verbal evidence of 
coherence seeking. 
Source: Ms. C’s 4th grade class, Batteries and Bulbs Module, Year 1, Learning 
Progressions project  
 
Chapter 8 
Title: What we agree on 
Description: The group of teachers and staff tries to establish a set of ideas we 
all agree on related to the question of why it rarely rains in San Diego. 
Source: Teacher Professional Development Summer Workshop, Year 3, 
Learning Progressions project 
 
Title: Clouds weren’t made that way 
Description: A teacher suggests that clouds do not dump water all at once 
because ‘they weren’t made that way.’ 
Source: Teacher Professional Development Summer Workshop, Year 3, 







 Title: Water vapor or steam? 
 Description: The focus group discusses possibilities for the identity of the  
“stuff” they observed rising up off a puddle on a hot day. 




 Title: Focus group shares ideas about weather 
Description: On the last day of the water cycle module, the focus group 
presents information they have read about weather to the rest of the class. 
Source: Ms. H’s 5th grade class, Water Cycle Module, Learning Progressions 





Appendix D: Table of Evidence of Coherence Seeking 
 
Operational Definition Relevance Example from Classroom Data 
Notice an (in)consistency 
between  
 two or more 
pieces of 
information 
 a claim, 
prediction, or 
explanation and 
one or more 
pieces of 
information 
Seeking coherence involves 
checking that ideas and information 
are mutually consistent. Noticing an 
inconsistency, whether intentionally 
or spontaneously, can be first step 
towards resolving the inconsistency. 
In addition, noticing the 
inconsistency is evidence that 
students are aware of something 
that just “doesn’t make sense." 
Often, this form of evidence is 
concurrent with “Draw attention to 
an inconsistency.”    
 
a. A student identifies an 
inconsistency between two pieces of 
information (electricity goes through 
metals, magnets are metal) and 
another student’s claim that magnets 
have electricity in them. He brings 
this inconsistency to the attention of 
the teacher and the class: 
 
“…how could a magnet have 
electricity in it because, isn't a 
magnet metal too? sort of?  If it had 
electricity in it, it would go out. 
Because once electricity hits metal it 
goes, it keeps going in the metal until 
it goes—until there's no other metal 
on to for it to travel through and then 
it goes out.” 
b. A group of students are copying 
experimental data from a “group 
paper” to their individual papers. A 
student interrupts this process to 
point out an inconsistency between 
Draw attention to an 
(in)consistency  
Bringing the (in)consistency to the 
attention of others indicates that an 
(in)consistency is a worthy object of 
discussion, and also allows for 
possible reconciliations; often, this 
form of evidence is concurrent with 





his expectation (a puddle with twice 
as much water takes twice as long to 
evaporate) and experimental results 
(the puddles evaporate in about the 
same time): 
“You know what's probably really 
interesting…you would think that, 
let's say that three inches evaporated 
in five minutes…then wouldn't you 
think that the six inches would 
evaporate in ten minutes?” 
Request reconciliation of 
an inconsistency  
This move explicitly indicates that 
the inconsistency is something that 
must be resolved, or reconciled. 
Requesting reconciliation can also 
take the form of a challenge to 
another person’s explanation or 
argument.  
“…since the the clouds are so high, 
high up and it's cold, and the sun, 
and they're closer to the sun than we 
are, why is it cold?” 
The student requests reconciliation 
for the inconsistency that clouds are 
cold even though they are “closer to 
the sun than we are.” 
Offer reconciliation of an 
inconsistency 
These are bids to increase the 
mutual consistency between ideas 
and information. These offers may 
be explicit or implicit, and can 
involve, among other things, 
identifying relationships between 
the potentially conflicting 
A student finds that, contrary to his 
prediction, the asphalt from which a 
puddle evaporated is cooler than the 
surrounding asphalt. He offers a 
reconciliation: 
“I think the water kind of acted like a 





information. This is one of the 
broadest categories of evidence—
attempts for reconciliation occur 
during the development of 
explanations, models, criteria for the 
evaluation of evidence, 
experimental designs, etc. 
moments. So it, so that it, so this 
[asphalt] started to heat up, so it was 
like putting a cover over this so this 
doesn't heat up as fast...” 
 
Indicate that a result or 
observation is unexpected 
Surprise may indicate a violation of 
expectations, or the lack of an 
anticipated outcome. The 
anticipated outcome may be 
grounded in expectations of 
consistency between ideas, 
experience, and information.   
A group of students are investigating 
whether temperature affects the 
evaporation time of water. They find 
that puddles of cold water evaporates 
faster than puddles of warm water, 
and are surprised by the result: 
“Student 1: Coldest evaporates first. 
The warmer it is, the slower than the 
cold. 
Student 2: That's weird. 
Student 1: Yeah that is weird.” 
Attend to the fairness of 
experimental condition 
Concern for fairness of 
experimental conditions may 
involve both attention to 
consistency and the formation of 
relations between information. 
Inconsistencies in results may be 
due to experimental inequalities. 
Information that is not acquired in a 
“fair” manner may not be subject to 
integration into explanations, 
a. Upon finding that a puddle of cold 
water evaporates faster than a puddle 
of warm water, a student expresses 
concern about the experimental 
conditions: 
“I don't like the test area. I thought 
the test area [for the two puddles] 





theories, models, etc. Likewise, 
information that is acquired “fairly” 
must be related to other information.  
The students repeat their experiment 
on a different test area and confirm 
the result that cold water evaporates 
first.   
Suggest or actually 




If students choose to repeat an 
observation or experiment, this 
could suggest that they are seeking 
consistency with respect to 
experimental results.  
A group of students conducts an 
experiment involving the evaporation 
of a puddle. They expect the asphalt 
under the puddle to be warm after the 
water evaporates. However, they find 
instead that the asphalt from which a 
puddle evaporated is cooler than the 
surrounding asphalt. To confirm this 
result, they check if this is true for 
another puddle: 
Student 1: …if you put one hand one 
here [evaporated spot on asphalt], 
one hand on here [regular asphalt], 
this part [the regular asphalt] is 
hotter. 
[00:02:01.06] Student 2: Just by a 
little. (…) Let's try that with the other 
one [puddle]. 
Devise a hypothetical 
situation involving a 
contradiction 
This is a way of drawing attention 
to and/or requesting reconciliation 
of an inconsistency.  
“…what happens if lightning struck 
the top of a tire with the rim in it? 
Like what would happen because that 





the top of it, would it reflect off 
because you have metal under the 
rubber so?” 
The student sets up a hypothetical 
situation with the implicit 
contradiction that electricity behaves 
differently in rubber and metal. 
Identify or construct a 
relationship (implicitly or 
explicitly) between ideas 
and/or information, for 
example: 
a. cause and effect 
b. part-to-whole 
c. category and 
example 
d. temporal/chain of 
events 
e. analogy, etc. 
 
Coherence seeking is not just 
collecting mutually consistent sets 
of information, but also linking that 
information. The meaningful 
relations that might be formed vary 
and depend in part on the discipline 
and phenomenon under 
investigation. Like “Offer 
reconciliation of an inconsistency” 
this is a very broad category of 
evidence for coherence seeking. It 
may include students’ explanations, 
models, predictions, etc.  
“...She said that it was heat coming 
up. Me and Robert were thinking 
maybe it’s like um cause and effect. 
Heat is the cause and the water vapor 
is the effect.” 
 
Students are debating what the 
“stuff” is that they see rising from an 
evaporating puddle—steam, water 
vapor, or heat. As part of her 
argument for why the “stuff” is not 
heat, the student explicitly identifies a 
cause and effect relationship between 
heat and water vapor. 
Notice (and/or draw 
attention to) a 
phenomenon or 
“Disconnected” bits of information 
may be troublesome to those who 
are trying to fit information and 
ideas together.  
“…if they [clouds] need to get rid of 
their energy and it turns into 
electricity, why does that only happen 
in certain areas?...Some areas they 





observation that is 
unaccounted for 
everyday. Um, why does that not 
happen here?” 
The student recognizes that another 
student’s idea that clouds have to get 
rid of energy does not explain why 
some places are stormier than others. 
Question the relevance of 
a claim, observation, or 
piece of evidence 
Questioning relevance can be a 
means of reconciling an 
inconsistency (i.e., that observation 
is not related to the phenomena we 
are studying). It might also take 
place during the process of trying to 
fit ideas together.  
While talking about how 
condensation forms in a bottle, a 
student brings up condensation in on 
a car window. Another student 
questions the relevance of mentioning 
condensation on the car window: 
I'm just wondering, I'm kind of 
getting confused now cause we kinda 
have gone off subject like we've gone 
from a glass or a bottle to a car 
and…It's-I started with the glass, not 
the car…I just want to know how it 






Request a relationship 
between ideas or pieces 
of information 
Falling directly from the definition 
of coherence seeking, this is an 
attempt to uncover connections 
between ideas/information. 
A class is discussing clouds and 
lightning. One student asks about the 
relationship between lightning, 
electricity, and clouds: 
“If, if lightning is, like, electricity, 
then does that mean there’s 
electricity in a cloud?” 
The student appears to use a chain of 
deductive reasoning to infer that 
clouds contain electricity.    
Comment on if/how one’s 
comments fit into the 
larger conversation 
From research on narrative 
coherence and also conversational 
topic analysis, this is an attempt to 
demark an idea as being part of, or 
distinct from, other ideas that have 
been discussed. Often, these take 
the form of preliminaries 
(Schlegoff, 1980).  
 
More generally, evidence of 
linguistic coherence seeking. 
a. During a discussion about 
lightning, a student brings up a 
question about temperature of the 
atmosphere: 
Raphael: And also, I know this is kind 
of off our main question but, I just 
thought like since the the clouds are 
so high, high up and it's cold, and the 
sun, and they're closer to the sun than 
we are, why is it cold? 
b. A teacher asks the class why a toy 
car apparently made of plastic moves 
with magnets. Rather than answer 





Rick: Well, I just wanted to say 'cause 
our group found out something else 
about the toy car.   
False starts, pauses, or re-
phrasing midway through 
speech 
These moments can an indicator of 
one’s knowledge construction in the 
moment, and they can reveal how 
participants are linking together 
ideas, in a conceptual sense.  
.  
More generally, evidence of 
linguistic coherence seeking. 
In a discussion about what causes the 
marine layer over ocean-front towns, 
one teacher re-structures her idea 
midway through: 
Maggie: So we were saying that we 
notice in our classrooms, about 1 or 
1:30 in the afternoon, all the sudden, 
this wind hits. We get a breeze. And, 
you know, generally, and especially 
when you see that marine layer. That 
marine layer is coming in because 
things are cooling down. It takes a 
while, but it comes in okay, and um // 
no that's when it goes out. Right, it's 






Appendix E: Transcript Conventions 
 
== 
“a speaker’s pause at the end of uncompleted utterance, 
seemingly to encourage another speaker to talk”  (Varelas et al., 
2007, p. 93) 
// 
“false starts or abandoned language replaced by new language 
structures” (Varelas et al., 2007, p. 93) 
… Short pause within an utterance 
… … Long pause within an utterance 
….. Pause (other) 
-- or — 
“breaking off of a speaker’s turn due to the next speaker’s turn” 
(Varelas et al., 2007, p. 93) 
(***) 
“One word that is inaudible or impossible to transcribe” (Varelas 
et al., 2007, p. 93) 
(*** 
***) 
“longer stretches of language that are inaudible and impossible 
to transcribe” (Varelas et al., 2007, p. 93) 
## ## Overlapping language 
Italics Emphasis/drawn out word 
< > “Uncertain words” (Varelas et al., 2007, p. 93) 
[ ] or () 
“identifies what is being referred to or gestured and other 
nonverbal contextual information” (Varelas et al., 2007, p. 93) 





Appendix F: Fieldnotes from an Interview with Ms. F 
The impromptu interview took place on August 11, 2010. I did not videotape the 
interview, however, I wrote up field notes after the interview, and Ms. F read over 
them as a member check. I include those notes, verbatim, below: 
 Watched the Anthony solids don’t flow clip, and bits of a different day where 
Baxter and Anthony are talking about whether a light bulb saves energy. I couldn’t 
find my killing clip!!! GRRR. 
 Ms. F mentioned that these students all have “strong personalities” and know 
each other very well, grew up together, and many have kind of a brother/sister 
relationship. 
 Larry and Ari are self-perceived experts, and so students will attack their ideas 
just because of who they are, rather than because of their ideas. (Especially Ari.) 
 Ari is a student who will stick to what he thinks regardless of contradictory 
evidence, whereas Shaye will modify his ideas in response to other ideas that he 
hears. 
 There are a handful of talkative boys. Phoebe is a “lawyer in training” and 
will hold her own. Alia started out very involved and talkative but became quieter 
over the course of the module, perhaps because she felt she had already said 
everything she needed to say. Erin has a tendency to be worried about being wrong. 
She will share ideas but also becomes annoyed or frustrated or cry in class, and puts 
pressure on herself to be correct.   





 Ms. F says that at the beginning of the year, she did regular FOSS, and the 
students went along with it. But then when the cameras came she said all the rules 
that students had before about school went out the window (this is how they felt). 
They started arguing with each other and coming up with ideas, but then when the 
module was over, she said the students didn’t go back to before. They were still 
arguing about things. There was in particular a lot of continued debate about the 
direction of current in a circuit, and students continued to support their two ingredient 
model despite what the book said. Erin would often refer to what was in the book as 
the correct answer, and try to convince students to attend to the book. 
 Ms. F worried that one issue was that she couldn’t get the students to agree 
upon anything. She compared her students to her own experience in the water cycle 
workshop science time…how we run off in many different directions with many 
different ideas, and when Sharon tried to ask us what we agree on, we didn’t agree on 
anything! But next year, she would like to try to get that agreement. I asked if she 
maybe saw clusters of students agreeing about things, and she said that often when 
she would try to get students to pick a camp, they would avoid it.  
 She thinks that there is both a strong component of arguing about ideas, and a 
strong component that is about whose idea it is. Baxter’s ideas are often a target. The 
relationship between Baxter and Phoebe might be contentious.  
 However, all students were friends with each other at some point in the year; 






Appendix G: Transcript for Baxter’s Reaction Ideas 
[00:08:16.14] Baxter: ##I'm starting to think## now that -- 
 
Student: ##I think## 
 
Ms. F: Let's hear Baxter. 
 
[00:08:19.09] Baxter: Well, they're, they're probably can't be a chemical 
reaction because, like if there's a chemical reaction, in chemical reactions, 




[00:08:31.17] Baxter: You gotta get a sign of the chemical reaction // Well, um 
now I'm starting to think Ari's way because when you were holding the wires, if 
you were holding the metal, then it would get really hot, and then it would burn 
your fingers for a second. Well I think that would be the positive and negative 
energy mixing. -- 
 
[00:08:48.17] Phoebe: That could kind of be the reaction (***). 
 




[00:08:54.04] Ms. F: [points to Tony] 
 
[00:08:55.01] Tony: Now I...I agree with both of them.  
 
[00:08:59.14] Ari: ##He's just adding on to what I said.##  
 
Erin: ## I think that## um // I think that is a good idea...because // but um, I think it's 
// I think like they're both good ideas so um... // K, and // but I dunno which one is 
right and // I think the chemical is, it sounds right but I just think that um it um that it 
would get hot um with a chemical reaction but if there was a chemical reaction then 
you wouldn't have to have a positive side [touches the + on the chart] and a negative 
side [touches the - on the chart]. 
 
[00:09:44.24] Shaye: Well, well I think it's just they, they like // negative and positive 
are just naturally opposites and so like, they like spread to one side, each == 
 
[00:09:57.12] Baxter: Wait. Wait, now I sorta think they go together because I'm 
sorta thinking about math now, and how // let's just say you add 20 plus 20. Well 
a way to um check that is uh // you could get your answers by 20 minus twe-uh 






Shaye: ##No, 40 minus 20.##  
 
[00:10:19.12] Baxter: Yeah, it'd be 20. So you'd have two 20's and one 40. 
##They go together as a fraction.## 
 
Shaye: ##Well, I'm just gonna## I'm gonna draw it. [draws a battery next to the chart] 
See. See this is the battery. It's like // I think maybe the negative side and the positive 
side but they could change if like they moved [gesture] and but even if the negative 
went on this side [the side labelled +], the positive would still have to go on that side 
[the side labelled -] because their opposite. But -- 
 
[00:10:42.28] Baxter: Or, or maybe ##the positive side## // Maybe the positive 
side has more like um, more like power and the negative side takes away power. 
So ##Like adding builds## it up and minusing takes it down. So maybe uh the 
plus // well the positive side um has a lot more energy, like a lot of energy so the 
negative has to take some away or like it will be ##dangerous##. 
 
Shaye: ##But, two different energies always came out.## 
 
[00:10:55.06] Phoebe: So they (***) ##(*** ***)## 
 
Phoebe: [turning around to face Baxter] ##What do you say? One side's empty, 
empty?## 
 
[00:11:19.27] Shaye: Well, it'd still be in the battery, right? 
 
Baxter: Yeah, but like maybe one liquid is a negative liquid and like it takes 
away power. And the positive uh adds power so when they combined it's just 
neutral. And it stays the same so it, it doesn't become dangerous and it won't, 
and it // like it will make it so it won't light up. So it's right in the middle. Like if 
you use one battery and two lights, the lights will only light up a little bit. 
[Andrew looks at the chart] Maybe the minus, well the negative takes away a lot 
of the power because if you took all the positive it would like make, make it 
really uh light up. And like, it would be like, dangerous like, it could burn your 
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